NEW YORK TIMES

Kissinger's Kissinger

Alexander Meigs Haig Jr.

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 — The most interesting aspect of the White House advance party that is on its way to China to complete the preparations for President Nixon's journey may be the fact that the delegation is led by someone other than the President's assistant for national security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger. The man in charge is the next best thing—"Kissinger's Kissinger," as he was described here today. He is Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., a button-down, Ivy League-style career Army officer who is, above all, loyal to the next man up in the chain of command.

Man in the News

General Haig, at age 47, is the arch type of the military-political staff man who considers his ability to operate—and to advance his own career—to be inversely proportional to the amount of public notice he attracts. The general's success can be measured in two ways.

A colonel when he entered the White House, he made brigadier general within nine months. After barely two years he is on the selection list for promotion to major general.

Still Virtually Unknown

"Selection boards pay attention to commendation letters from the White House," a senior Pentagon official explained. Then too, the official added, senior military men eager to advance their views in policy circles "recognize who a guy works for, and Al Haig works for Henry Kissinger."

In the Defense Department there is already talk about the prospect that General Haig might one day become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Even more significant — Until Mr. Nixon thrust General Haig into public focus as head of the advance team —is that passion for anonymity. In three years General Haig has risen from being virtually unknown senior military adviser to the National Security Council to become a virtually unknown deputy assistant to the President for national security.

[illegible] emerged as the one member



Associated Press

His loyalty pays off

of Mr. Kissinger's staff of 120 with any clout of his own. At least twice the President has sent General Haig to Southeast Asia to gather military and political information, and it is believed that he made several other unannounced trips to South Vietnam and Cambodia, catching even the State Department unaware.

More often, however, General Haig, slouching slightly, sits for 14 hours or more seven days a week at his desk outside Mr. Kissinger's office. He was on duty on the Saturday in November when the Atomic Energy Commission detonated a nuclear warhead under Amchitka Island in Alaska. It was he who telephoned the President — in Florida with Mr. Kissinger — to assure him that the test had been successful.

Thrives Under Pressure

Mr. Kissinger's demands on his staff have been such as to drive a number of them, feeling tired and unappreciated, back into private research positions. None have been under more pressure than General Haig, who alone sees what Mr. Kissinger sees and who must take drafts of option papers and security memoranda, with Mr. Kissinger's criticism scrawled on the margins, back to the authors for improvement.

The sheer volume of effort involved is reflected by the [illegible] Kissinger of roughly [illegible] classified national security study memorandums, and the sweeping scope is attested by titles such as "Laos Peace Initiatives," "Uranium Enrichment Defense Needs" and "Vietnam Riot Control."

Some former Kissinger sides believe General Haig has thrived under pressure by "not disagreeing on issues." Joseph A. Califano, for whom he worked at the Defense Department under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and who urged Mr. Kissinger to hire him in 1969, recalls him as the "ultimate professional" dedicated solely to "doing the job and doing it right."

Even critics acknowledge General Haig's abilities as Mr. Kissinger's chief of staff. "Henry is just a dreadful administrator," one said. "He's preoccupied with policy. But Haig is enormously effective at keeping the machinery moving."

Whatever their reasons, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have developed sufficient respect for General Haig that, on occasion, he fills in for his boss in briefings of the President.

A West Pointer

Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was born in Philadelphia on Dec. 2, 1924 lost his father, a lawyer, before he was 10. He attended Notre Dame for a year before winning a wartime appointment to West Point, from which he graduated in 1947. As a junior aide to Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur in occupied Japan, he met and married Patricia Fox, daughter of a senior Army officer.

Their three children—Alexander, 19 and a sophomore at Georgetown University; Brian, 18 and a plebe at West Point, and Barbara, 15 and in high school here—do not see as much of the general as they used to. Nor does he get many opportunities, aside from an occasional tennis or handball match, to relax. Rarely can he count on being sure of using theater or concert tickets.

Nonetheless, his wife, preparing to spend New Year's Eve half a world away from her husband, had no doubt that he was fascinated with his grueling job.

"I don't think any man can [illegible] things," she said.

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
30 DEC 1971

The CIA's New Cover

The Rope Dancer
by Victor Marchetti.
Grosset & Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95

Richard J. Barnet

I

In late November the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its public image. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and published statistics, listening to the radio, thinking about the world, interpreting data of reconnaissance satellites, and occasionally publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over. The upper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and elsewhere—Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Richard Bissell, Tracy Barnes, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitzgerald—had died or departed.

In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to preparing intelligence "estimates" for the President and collecting information the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophisticated reconnaissance devices. Even Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, would now be as much a museum piece as Mata Hari. (There are about 18,000 employees in the CIA and 200,000 in the entire "intelligence community" itself. The cost of maintaining them is somewhere between $5 billion and $6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or mercenaries, such as the CIA's 100,000-man hired army in Laos.)

A week after my visit to the "senior seminar" *Newsweek* ran a long story on "the new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As *Newsweek* said, "The cavalier era of the adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray specialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that *Newsweek*'s article was a cover story in more than one sense.

It has always been difficult to analyze organizations that engage in false advertising about themselves. Part of the responsibility of the CIA is to spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard Helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. Intelligence organizations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call "frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influence without overtly involving the nation in another ground war.

But we cannot comprehend recent developments in the "intelligence community" without understanding what Mr. Helms and his employees actually do. In a speech before the National Press Club, the director discouraged journalists from making the attempt. "You've just got to trust us. We are honorable men." The same speech is made each year to the small but growing number of senators who want a closer check on the CIA. In asking, on November 10, for a "Select Committee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "the subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not met once this year."

Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J.

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
25 DEC 1971

STATINTL

[redacted]

Murrey Marder

A Double Setback at State

SECRETARY OF STATE William P. Rogers attempted at year's end to lift the crumpled morale of the Foreign Service out of a slough of gloom with a burst of holiday praise.

If effusive words alone could suffice, the Secretary, who is a professional optimist, would have accomplished a small miracle. But to diplomats to specialize in soft verbiage to cloak hard realities, the warm commendation of the Foreign Service for "outstanding work" carried about as much comfort as a diplomatic communique expressing "agreement in principle."

This has been "a good year in terms of foreign affairs" said Rogers on Thursday, brimming with enthusiasm over his listing of "very substantial accomplishments." But for members of the American Foreign Service, it has been indeed been a poor year.

The main body of professional American diplomats at State was frozen out of most high strategy-making in 1971, they ruefully concede.

Even Rogers himself received only the most fleeting mention in the White House citations of the year's foreign policy accomplishments, in comparison to the great pre-eminence accorded to presidential national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Rogers even ran a distant third in personal attention on the White House accounting to the space and prominence given to presidential counsellor Robert H. Finch's "mission to six nations in Latin America."

Is the conduct or state of American foreign policy really affected by who receives what attention in the White House pecking order, or by whether the Foreign Service happens to be happy or glum? The blunt answer is that in many respects it matters little or not at all in national dimensions. What does matter to the nation is whether its resources in diplomacy, as in other fields, are used fully and wisely.

FROM their own viewpoint, which is not wholly impartial, a very large number of the most experienced professionals in the American Foreign Service deplore what they regard as the wholly inadequate use being made of their talents.

This past year brought a double blow. The State Department long had been eclipsed in this administration by the Kissinger operation in the White House; suddenly State was preempted from another, unexpected direction—the Treasury Department, where freewheeling Secretary John B. Connally suddenly vaulted into a dominant position across the economic-foreign policy horizon.

State found itself not only operating on the fringes of high strategy, but performing what one chagrined diplomat called a "sweeper's role": sweeping up and trying to piece together the shards of allies' egos shattered by the shock of the administration's bold ventures in China and in international monetary and trade policy.

A minority inside the State Department responds, as one expressed it, "So what? What is so bad about being a 'service' organization? If the President wants to centralize all policy-making in the White House, and assign chores to the State Department, that's his prerogative. Every President has his own ideas about how he wants to operate; that's his choice."

What is lost in this process, others protest, is not only morale but the full range of expertise and balance that can be brought to bear on a given international problem, uncolored by the political-centered focus of the White House.

It is the prerogative of the White House to accept or reject this advice, it is argued; what is important is that the President have access to it. Dr. Kissinger maintains that this is precisely what is provided for in his elaborate National Security Council system. But the realty, insiders protest, is that the most important policy decisions never enter that elaborate mechanism.

With a critical election year ahead, the process of policy making is shrinking with increasing secretiveness into the confines of the White House. What is emerging is soaring optimism in place of realities about the outside world. This, too, is not without precedent in an election year. The risk comes, as the Johnson administration discovered, when the optimists let themselves be engulfed by their own product.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 1 DEC 1971

News Around the Dials

Two Specials on The White House

By GEORGE MAKSIAN

The White House will be the subject of two major television specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in the life of the President.

NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6, 1971: A Day in the Presidency," will be presented next Tuesday, from 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John Chancellor as host. It will cover President Nixon through an entire work day, focusing on every meeting on his schedule, including the first part of a top-level session of the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council.

This segment will show the President discussing the Indian-Pakistani war with Secretary of State William Rogers, presidential aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Gen. William Westmoreland and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

John Chancellor

Lucille Ball

Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, said this is the first time the White House has given permission to film a program of this type. "We have been asking to do a show on the Presidency since 1948," he said. "We got the go-ahead in mid-November after several meetings with John Scali, a special consultant to the President."

The President's work day on the day of filming (Dec. 6) began at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for congressional leaders, and ended shortly before 11 p.m., following a dinner for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Other events on Nixon's schedule that will be seen on the telecast included: a domestic council meeting chaired by Vice President Agnew; presentation of diplomatic credentials by ambassadors from Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal, and a meeting of the Quadriad, the President's four major economic advisers.

Chancellor said that for security reasons NBC cameras were excluded from a part of every meeting. "Among the unscheduled events that occured during the day," he said, "was a visit from Nixon's daughter, Julie Eisenhower.

CBS' special "Christmas at the White House," will be televised on Christmas Eve, from 10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow the First Family through its various activities preparing for the Yuletide season. Julie Eisenhower will join Charles Kuralt and Marya McLaughlin for the report.

Filming for the telecast began last weekend.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
14 DEC 1971

News Around the Dials

Two Specials on the White House

By GEORGE MAKSIAN

The White House will be the subject of two major television specials this month, one on CBS dealing with the Christmas season and the other on NBC covering a day in the life of the President.

NBC's special, titled "Dec. 6, 1971: A Day in the Presidency," will be presented next Tuesday, from 7:30 to 8:30 p.m., with John Chancellor as host. It will cover President Nixon through an entire work day, focusing on every meeting on his schedule, including the first part of a top-level session of the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council.

This segment will show the President discussing the Indian-Pakistani war with Secretary of State William Rogers, presidential aid Henry Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Gen. William Westmoreland and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.



John Chancellor

Lucille Ball

Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, said this is the first time the White House has given permission to film a program of this type. "We have been asking to do a show on the Presidency since 1948," he said. "We got the go-ahead in mid-November after several meetings with John Scali, a special consultant to the President."

The President's work day on the day of filming (Dec. 6) began at 7:45 a.m., with a breakfast for congressional leaders, and ended shortly before 11 p.m., following a dinner for Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

Other events on Nixon's schedule that will be seen on the telecast included: a domestic council meeting chaired by Vice President Agnew; presentation of diplomatic credentials by ambassadors from Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan and Portugal, and a meeting of the Quadriad, the President's four major economic advisers.

Chancellor said that for security reasons NBC cameras were excluded from a part of every meeting. "Among the unscheduled events that occured during the day," he said, "was a visit from Nixon's daughter, Julie Eisenhower.

CBS' special "Christmas at the White House," will be televised on Christmas Eve, from 10:30 to 11 p.m. It will follow the First Family through its various activities preparing for the Yuletide season. Julie Eisenhower will join Charles Kuralt and Marya McLaughlin for the report.

Filming for the telecast began last weekend.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
3 MAR 1971

Waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering:

Former CIA 'spy' comes in from the cold—into hot water

By Joanne Leedom
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

In the basement of his home in Oakton, Va., with dogs and children running havoc around him, Victor Marchetti wrote a spy novel last year. Today Mr. Marchetti and his new book "The Rope Dancer" are stirring up havoc of another kind just a few miles from his home, at Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters where Mr. Marchetti was an official just two years ago.

Today Mr. Marchetti is the spy "who came in from the cold—into hot water," to quote one of his friends. Now an outspoken critic of the agency, Mr. Marchetti has been traveling around the country promoting his exposé of the spy's world and crusading for reform in the CIA.

Mr. Marchetti left the CIA after a 14-year career in protest over what he asserts is its waste and duplicity in intelligence gathering, its increasing involvement with the military, its amorality, and what he says now is its subtle shifts to "domestic spying."

Reform, he says, in the entire intelligence network should be three-pronged: (1) reorganizing responsibilities, (2) reducing size dered by President Nixon. Placing CIA director Richard Helms as overall coordinator of national intelligence recently was in part aimed at eliminating the waste in the nation's $6 billion/200,000-man intelligence operation which spans a dozen governmen and funding, and (3) exposing the intelligence community to more public control and scrutiny.

Silence maintained

The CIA, in its turn, has remained customarily silent to the public attack. However, one former top CIA official, who asked to remain anonymous, agreed with some of Mr. Marchetti's points but disputed his main arguments.

Since Mr. Marchetti began speaking out several months ago, a major restructuring in the intelligence community has been ortal agencies. It was also aimed at tailoring intelligence output more closely to White House needs.

This reform and Mr. Marchetti's own criticism come at a time when Congress, too, is demanding more knowledge and control over the intelligence networks. For the first time Congress has ordered public hearings on the CIA next year, and Mr. Marchetti plans to testify.

Military influence

In Boston Mr. Marchetti explained his own "defection": "My discontent with the agency was hard for me to identify at first. I began first to criticize the waste. This is ridiculous, I thought. We could be doing the job for $2 billion less.

"The second thing that was most annoying to me was the military influence. This is very pervasive. When the Secretary of Defense controls 85 percent of the assets, he [the CIA director] doesn't have the muscle to make changes. The military influence in many ways is the greatest single factor of waste. They want to know more and more and are responsible for collection overkill."

To these two criticisms, the former CIA official who worked close to the director and who responded for The Christian Science Monitor, partly agreed. "There is unfortunately an awful lot of duplication," he said, but added, "What is needed is tighter control over the military [not the CIA]. It's not a question of the CIA duplicating the military, but of the military duplicating what the CIA does. The President's reorganization is a strong move in the right direction."

Another one of Mr. Marchetti's complaints is that the traditional intelligence work of gathering and assessing information has been "contaminated" with paramilitary activity.

A prime example is Laos where the CIA recruited and armed thousands of natives, says Mr. Marchetti, who worked in the CIA as an intelligence analyst, as special assistant to the chief of plans, programs, and budgets, to the executive director, and finally as executive assistant to the agency's deputy director.

"[At the time] perhaps a handful of key congressmen and senators might have known about this activity in Laos. The public knew nothing," he declared.

According to the former CIA administrator, however, paramilitary activity is shifting out of the CIA now and into the Army. "But in any case," he said, "the CIA doesn't decide on this activity; they are directed by the President and the National Security Council." If there is to be reform in the use of the CIA, he argues, it must come from the President's direction.

While Mr. Marchetti is highly critical of the CIA's paramilitary and clandestine interventions in other countries, he insists that the real threat of the CIA today is that it may "unleash" itself on this country.

Concern noticed

"In recent years as domestic unrest increased, I've noticed the CIA is concerned about the FBI's apparent inability to handle subversion in this country. I think there's an effort to convince the nation that the CIA should get into domestic intelligence."

"Ridiculous," snapped the former CIA administrator, and left this charge at that.

To reform the intelligence network, Mr. Marchetti says there should be a reorganization to limit the Defense Department to the routine intelligence needs of various departments — Army, Navy, etc.

"Then I'd put the National Security Agency under the control of the President *and* Congress," elaborated Mr. Marchetti "Congress has very little knowledge about what goes on. The Pentagon papers and the way the Supreme Court acted strips away the shield intelligence has always had. We need to let a little sunshine in; that's the best safeguard."

Laos example cited

The former administrator insists, however, that there are already adequate controls through special congressional committees which control appropriations and military affairs. "If you had the whole Congress and Senate debating these issues in executive session, you might as well do away with it [secret intelligence operations]. Inevitably there would be leaks."

"Of course there would be leaks," admitted Mr. Marchetti. "What I'm really saying is that in the final analysis if we made the President walk through it [his decision to use covert forces in foreign countries], the President would see it's all not worth it. Then if we deny ourselves these alternatives we'd have to act in a diplomatic fashion."

DAILY WORLD
2 DEC 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

THE YEAR OF THE BOOMERANG

By Gus Hall

General Secretary, Communist Party U.S.A.

At the last meeting of our National Committee, four months ago we said: "World capitalism has lost the source of its momentum. It cannot sustain periods of stability. Instability is now the more basic characteristic of world capitalism. It is a social system in a continuous crisis. Life is giving ever more dramatic evidence that this is indeed the last stage of capitalist development." About the present moment in history, we said:

"For U.S. imperialism this is a moment when the headwinds are threatening to take over. This is a period when the counter-forces have become an effective counterbalance to U.S. imperialist policies. Increasingly they are canceling out U.S. influences...

"Areas of past difficulties are turning into severe setbacks.

In world relations, U.S. imperialism is forced to seek new options, because the old options have put the U.S. on a precarious limbo.

"The options that are open are either detours or retreats and increasingly the detours are turning into fiascos...

"The new element that now more and more forces itself into all U.S. imperialist operations is the element of of a forced retreat."

What we have said is correct. It is a guide to understanding the nature of the present historic moment.

But the dramatic events of the past months, and even days, force us to probe further and to consider even more far-raching conclusions.

Needless to say, the contradictions, currents, relationship of forces giving rise to this moment are extremely complex. There are currents and countercurrents. The capitalist world is in an extremely unsettled state.

Events unfold with unusual impact and speed.

The moment is complex because the basic post-war point of reference for the capitalist world has crumbled. It is not only the capitalist currencies that are "floating." Political forces in the capitalist world are in a flux, each seeking for new relationships, for new points of reference.

What is the basic nature of this critical moment? What is it that has changed?

In a nutshell, the economic, political and military edifice of the post-war capitalist world is now crumbling. It can never be rebuilt on the old basis. The old relationships of forces cannot be reconstituted along past patterns.

The capitalist world is trying to find a new world structure. U.S. imperialism is trying to do this on its own terms. The task of our people, and the anti-imperialist forces of the world, is to prevent the regrouping, redestroy and prop [illegible]

We need to dismantle the institutions of aggression within the country—the military-industrial complex, the Pentagon-CIA, the invisible government, the National Security Council, and the rest. This is the moment to demand the dismantling of all U.S. military bases and alliances of aggression. The curbing of the post-war capitalist system is of great historic significance.

With this collapse of the post-war economic, political and military capitalist edifice, the general crisis of world capitalism is entering a new stage. The strategic U.S.-built imperialist cold war structure is in shambles. For U.S. imperialism this is the year of the boomerang. One cold war policy after another is boomeranging. The "roll back of Communism" policy is turning into a roll back for imperialism.

The isolator has become isolated. The initiative in world affairs is more and more in the hands of the socialist countries. The trade blockers are at work trying to break through the trade walls they themselves have built.

The U.S.-United Nations policy is boomeranging. Nixon is pleading, "Vote us down but please do not dance and sing in your victory." With the China vote, the 25 years of U.S. domination of the UN came to an end.

O

The post-war world, capitalist economic structure of satellites and appendages that are bound to, and dominated by, U.S. imperialism, is floundering in chaos and confusion. The centrifugal force generated by the inner contradictions of capitalism has brought to a breaking point the post-war ties fashioned under U.S. economic dominance.

The post-war capitalist political structure of political and military alliances under U.S. control are becoming skeletons of past relationships. This is reflected in the grab bag diplomacy of the Nixon Administration. The traditional post-war allies of U.S. imperialism are often left "holding the bag."

With this new stage in the general crisis of world capitalism has come a new shift in the balance of world forces. It is more than an ordinary shift. It is a new qualitative shift of great historic significance.

What is the basic cause for this shift on the world scene?

The processes leading to this shift have been present for a long time. The contradictions were born with the post-war setup. The prime source for capital that has sustained the reconstruction of post-war world capitalism has been the accumulated loot, the riches of U.S. monopoly capitalism. This has been the reservoir that has been the source of what stability there has been in the capitalist world. The U.S. has been the main source for the working capital for most of the capitalist countries. It has also been the instrument of U.S. imperialist domination.

U.S. domination of world capitalism gave rise to a world-wide [illegible]

continued

PENTAGON/SERVICES

Better Deal for Service Spooks?

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence reorganization announced last month by the President means a better deal, not less authority—as the country's press has been reporting—for members of the defense intelligence community.

Among the specifics cited:

- *More "supergrades"* (GS-16 to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intelligence Agency.
- *Assignment of top-caliber military personnel* to DIA (which in past years has had trouble getting the most qualified military personnel assigned to it and proper recognition for their work in intelligence fields);
- *Better promotion opportunities* for intelligence analysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top management levels without first breaking out into administrative posts that make little use of their analytical capabilities).

This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the emphasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysts, he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields.

The supergrade problem has been of special concern to the White House. A high Administration official, who asked not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not had any authorization for a GS-18, it took almost 10 months for the papers needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a "strong endorsement" from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission.

Ironically, just one day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had nevertheless *denied* the request. Instead, it offered DIA a choice of having an additional GS-17 slot or of having a Public Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an individual highly qualified enough to justify the appointment).

DIA's supergrade structure, nevertheless, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergrades, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House as well.

By going from 15 to a total of 39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel but to promote more of its own qualified analysts into these coveted, higher paying posts.

Press Misses the Point

Press reports on the intelligence reorganization convey a much different picture than the above highlights and White House sources suggest. In a 22 November feature, *U.S. News & World Report* noted in a lead paragraph that "The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpretations. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wide responsibilities with authority over all intelligence budgets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really support that view. . . . I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more . . . ."

The White House's determination to make the defense intelligence field more attractive for military (as well as civilian) personnel parallels steps taken earlier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's

Our Outgunned Spies

A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White House intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the *Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States*, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:

- DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades—roughly one for every 200 spooks.
- DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades—one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.
- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, has 36 supergrades—one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.
- The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people!

Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in supergrade count):

Defense Intelligence Agency	1-206
Office, Secretary of Defense	1- 95
Library of Congress	1- 51
Office of Management & Budget	1- 78
Office of Economic Opportunity	1- 54
General Accounting Office	1- 68
Smithsonian	1- 80
Civil Service Commission	1-103
Federal Maritime Commission	1- 14

DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD
DEC 1 1972
M - 111,867

Intelligence Priorities

...Congress must monitor CIA operations

President Nixon's irritation at the quality of information coming to him from the nation's fragmented intelligence apparatus is understandable. However, his efforts to streamline operations, while welcome, are not without hazard to the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.

The President has given to Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, coordinating responsibility and some budgeting authority over the diverse intelligence community. Coordination and economy both seem desirable. The various intelligence agencies employ about 200,000 persons and spend about $6 billion annually.

To the extent that the President has made the intelligence operation more effecient and responsive—as indeed it should be — he has increased the security of the United States. But he will also have further eroded Congress' role in formulating national policy if the legislative branch of government does not balance executive access to unlimited intelligence data with more intensive congressional scrutiny of and control over the nature and scope of intelligence activities.

A special congressional watchdog committee is supposed to review CIA operations and funding. Unfortunately, it seldom meets except to confer congressional blessings on CIA affairs. This congressional abdication of its responsibility for exercising a positive role in the formation of national policy reduces it to a rubber stamp for an omniscient executive. This has virtually been the case in foreign affairs since the National Security Act of 1947 unified the services and created the National Security Council and the CIA.

An efficient intelligence operation is vital to the interests of the American people. But the operation does not always serve the interests of the people when it strays into political and military activities such as the formation of coups d'etat, direction of clandestine wars and the practice of political assassination.

President Nixon's changes appear to offer increased efficiency, and in Helms the President seems to have a supervisor who is pre-eminently concerned with gathering and evaluating intelligence data. But only a vigilant and responsible Congress can serve to restrain the executive branch of government from abusing the vast power and influence available to it through these necessarily covert intelligence activities.

KISSINGER'S APPARAT

by John P. Leacacos

A top Washington's complex foreign affairs bureaucracy sits the National Security Council, a 24-year-old body given new status in 1969, when President Nixon moved to make it a kind of command and control center for his foreign policy. The new Nixon NSC system, run from the White House by Henry A. Kissinger, has now existed for nearly three years, producing 138 numbered study memoranda, reaching 127 formal decisions, and employing a permanent staff of about 120 personnel (more than double the pre-Nixon figure). Though the substance of its operations are necessarily secret, interviews with officials permit tentative evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the Kissinger NSC. There is broad agreement on the following seven points:

—The NSC has served President Nixon more or less as he desired, that is, in the ordered style of formal answers to detailed questionnaires. The volume of this paperwork has at times been staggering, but it has sharpened focus on the search for policy choices.

—The answers and alternatives for action "coming up through the NSC" have produced few panaceas, but have contributed greater coherence of outlook in foreign affairs management. NSC recommendations are more pragmatic than academic, reflecting Kissinger's view: "We don't make foreign policy by logical syllogism."

—Explicit insistence on the "limited" nature of U.S. power and the need for greater restraint and cautious deliberation about its exercise have been reinforced at the highest level by Nixon's habit of withdrawing to make final decisions in solitude and of frequently deciding on no-action rather than accepting advice to initiate new action.

—By being close to the President and keeping his fingers on all aspects of the NSC process personally, Kissinger without question is the prime mover in the NSC system. The question arises whether the NSC would function as effectively without Kissinger, and whether it can bequeath a heritage of accomplishment to be absorbed by the permanent machinery of government.

—Secretary of State William P. Rogers operates within the NSC system and also utilizes it as a forum to establish whatever policy position is preferred by his State Department; but he side-steps the NSC on occasion to carry his demurrer, dissent or alternate position to the President privately.

—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird is less personally involved in the NSC process, having apparent indifference to what he believes is unnecessary NSC paperwork, which he leaves to his deputy, David Packard. Laird's main day-to-day operational preoccupation is with the exit of U.S. forces from Vietnam. His International Security Affairs Bureau in the Pentagon performs poorly by Washington bureaucratic standards.

—The influence on foreign policy of the military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are usually represented in the NSC process, is at the lowest point in several years. This has been attributed to the anticlimactic winding-down atmosphere of the Vietnam war, and to the fact that the Chiefs' once die-hard views and abstract argumentation on strategic nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union have been successfully emulsified into the Nixon-Kissinger basic principles for SALT negotiations with Russia. Kissinger has commented: "In my experience with the military, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than any other group."

From time to time, gears have clashed within the system. The State Department has complained bitterly of the "Procrustean bed" fashioned by the Kissinger staff. Meeting excessive White House demands, bureaucrats allege, robs State and Defense of manpower hours needed for day-to-day operations. After his first year; Kissinger conceded: "Making foreign policy is easy; what is difficult is its coordination and implementation."

White House NSC staffers, on the other hand, exuberant at their top-dog status, express a degree of condescension for the work of the traditional departments. In 1969 Kissinger staffers rated State-chaired studies and recommendations only "50 to 70 percent acceptable" and based on mediocre reporting which failed to sift wheat from chaff in the political cables constantly arriving from 117 U.S. embassies overseas. The Kissinger staff say that they have to hammer out the real choices on the hard issues, since a cynical and sometimes bored bureaucracy offers up too many "straw options." State's planners, for their part, criticize the NSC staff for overdoing

Continued

FOREIGN POLICY
Winter 71

The Nixon NSC (2)

CAN ONE MAN DO?

by I. M. Destler

The clandestine journey of Henry Kissinger to Peking was a tactical coup such as no other high American foreign policy-maker has achieved for many years. It also offered a dramatic illustration of the Nixon-Kissinger style. The circle of men in on its preparation was very restricted. And it involved one of those large issues of strategic choice which both the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs consider to be suitable outlets for their talents.

Together with other summer 1971 developments—a Berlin agreement, apparent progress in the SALT talks—the new China policy has brought enhanced prestige to the Nixon Administration and its foreign policy-making institutions. Even Dean Acheson, in one of his last writings, was moved to temper his disapproval of the White House staff role in foreign affairs.[1] Yet despite frequent discussion of Kissinger as an individual, seldom do outside analysts take a serious look at the strengths and limitations of the Nixon foreign policy-making system more generally. It has given us an unusually effective Presidential Assistant. But is it enough for a President seeking to control the foreign affairs bureaucracy to have as his predominant instrument one talented White House adviser supported by a 50-man professional staff?

The Shape of the System

When Kissinger came to Washington he told a number of people of his determination to concentrate on matters of general strategy and leave "operations" to the departments. Some dismissed this as the typical disclaimer of a new White House staff man. Yet much in Kissinger's writings suggests that his intention to devote himself to broad "policy" was real. He had repeatedly criticized our government's tendency to treat problems as "isolated cases," and "to identify foreign policy with the solution of immediate issues" rather than developing an interconnected strategy for coping with the world over a period of years.[2] And his emphasis was primarily on problems of decision-*making*. He defined the problem basically in terms of how to get the government to settle on its major policy priorities and strategy, and had been slow to recognize the difficulty of getting the bureaucracy to implement such a strategy once set.

Kissinger found a kindred spirit in a President whose campaign had denounced the Kennedy-Johnson de-emphasis on formal national security planning in favor of "catch-as-catch-can talkfests." And the system he put together for Nixon is designed above all to facilitate and illuminate major Presidential foreign policy choices. Well over 100 "NSSM's" (National Security Study Memoranda) have been issued by the White House to the various foreign affairs government agencies, calling for analysis of major issues and development of realistic alternative policy "options" on them. These studies are cleared through a network of general interdepartmental committees responsible to Kissinger, and the most important issues they raise are argued out before the President in the National Security Council. Nixon then makes a decision from among the options, usually "after further private deliberation."[3]

No one pretends that matters end there, that implementation of the decision follows automatically. The Nixon system provides for coordination of actual agency operations in several ways—in the work of Kissinger's 23-man "Operations Staff"; in crisis coordination by the Kissinger-chaired Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG); in the Secretary of State's formal role of overseeing "the execution of foreign policy"; and in the operational coordination work of the interdepartmental Under Secretaries Committee headed by his deputy. Still, the system as designed and described clearly treats the carrying out of Presidential aims as a secondary problem. Whereas Kennedy, in McGeorge Bundy's oft-quoted words, "deliberately rubbed out the distinction between planning and operation,"[4] Nixon has sought to restore it. Rejecting the Kennedy-Johnson assumption that the problem of Presidential control over foreign policy is mainly one of intervening in operational issues to bring day-to-day bureaucratic actions into line with Presidential wishes, Nixon has emphasized the priority of "policy" over "operations." As he expressed it in his first general foreign policy message to Congress: "In central areas of policy, we have arranged our procedure of policy-making so as to address the broader questions of long-term objectives first; we define our purposes, and then address the specific operational issues."[5]

The Nixon system is well-designed for forcing consideration of such "broader questions" [illegible] partially emulates, the National Security

EDITORIALS

THE SUBVERSIVE C.F.R.

When President Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as his assistant for national security affairs we pointed out that he was hardly qualified for his job because he was a security risk himself. And we proved it.

Many people thought that we were crazy, or "extremists," to say such nasty things about a man appointed to such a high position by an allegedly "conservative" Republican.

HENRY KISSINGER

is the architect of President Nixon's pro-Red China policy, which has already caused our most massive foreign policy defeat since the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by Roosevelt. He was hand-picked for his job by the subversive Council on Foreign Relations.

The CFR is a private organization which controls our foreign policy. It is itself run for the benefit of the multi-billionaire internationalists who profit from our continuing sellout to communism. They picked Kissinger for Nixon and had Nixon put him in control of our foreign policy because they wanted to be certain that "American" policy continues to be made for their benefit, rather than the benefit of America.

Kissinger has been so successful in doing a job for his bosses in the CFR that on Nov. 6 Nixon signed an order putting him in charge of all intelligence operations—the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence, Departments of Treasury, Defense, and State, and Atomic Energy intelligence. Now, through Kissinger's National Security Council, the CFR can plug in to meetings of patriots who may be planning to overthrow at the polls the internationalist regime in Washington. Soon, it will be a "crime" to read an editorial like this unless the people wake up. But

THE PEOPLE ARE CATCHING ON

to the fact that the government is in the hands of ruthless pressure group bosses who wish to run our country for their exclusive benefit. They want to steal all your wealth "legally," through confiscatory taxes (the super-rich very seldom pay any taxes at all), inflation and interest on their Federal Reserve Notes, which they force us to use as "money."

A poll reports that in 1964, 62% of the people believed that the government was run for the benefit of all. After Johnson and Nixon that figure is now down to 37%. Which proves that you can't fool all of the people all of the time.

There is only one answer to this. It is to organize a political counter-force, and we don't mean the Republican or Democratic party. Both of these are part of the problem and any politician who calls himself either is in some degree controlled. If he's honest, he will admit it.

LIBERTY LOBBY

is the answer—a political force which is completely independent of all pressure groups and parties.

And when we say LIBERTY LOBBY, we don't mean an imitation, such as "Common Cause" or some other phoney organization which has been set up by the CFR to lead you down the road a little further. The CFR-Zionist cabal is expert at setting up this sort of thing to confuse its opposition.

There is plenty of evidence that Nixon's fiasco in the UN and forced busing of kids to integrated schools are waking up the voters as nothing else ever has. Public apathy is giving way to alarm. The people are looking up from their boob tubes and wondering what is going on.

Let's tell them—and let's tell them that there is only one way to fight effectively—LIBERTY LOBBY.

RAMPARTS
DEC 1971

The Rise of Henry Kissinger

"He was a Rococo figure, complex, finely carved, all surface, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ultimate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the Cabinet, he was the beau-ideal *of [an] aristocracy which justified itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if he never came to terms with the new age it was not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because he disdained it."*

WITH THESE WORDS, A HARVARD thesis-writer named Henry Kissinger introduced Clemens Metternich, Austria's greatest foreign minister and a man whose diplomatic life he has sought to relive. As Richard Nixon's most influential advisor on foreign policy, Kissinger has embodied the role of the 19th century balance-of-power diplomat. He is cunning, elusive, and all-powerful in the sprawling sector of government which seeks to advise the President on national security matters. As Nixon's personal emissary to foreign dignitaries, to academia, and—as "a high White House official"—to the press, he is vague and unpredictable—yet he is the single authoritative carrier of national policy, besides the President himself.

Like the Austrian minister who became his greatest political hero, Kissinger has used his position in government as a protective cloak to conceal his larger ambitions and purposes. Far from being the detached, objective arbiter of presidential decision-making, he has become a crucial molder and supporter of Nixon's foreign policy. Instead of merely holding the bureaucracy at comfortable arm's length, he has entangled it in a web of useless projects and studies, cleverly shifting an important locus of advisory power from the Cabinet departments to his own office. And as a confidential advisor to the President, he never speaks for the record, cannot be made to testify before Congress, and is identified with presidential policy only on a semi-public level. His activity is even less subject to domestic constraints than that of Nixon himself.

Not that any of this is very surprising, however, because Kissinger has emerged from that strain of policy thinking which is fiercely anti-popular and anti-bureaucratic in its origins. Like the ministers who ruled post-Napoleonic Europe from the conference table at Vienna—and the Eastern Establishment figures who preceded him as policy-makers of a later age—Kissinger believes that legislative bodies, bureaucracies, and run-of-the-mill citizenries all lack the training and temperament that are needed in the diplomatic field. He is only slightly less moved by the academics who parade down to Washington to be with the great man and peddle their ideas. And when one sets aside popular opinion, Congress, the bureaucracy, and the academic community, there remains the President alone. The inescapable conclusion is that Henry Kissinger's only meaningful constituency is a constituency of one.

At a superficial level, the comparison with Metternich breaks down. As opposed to a finely carved figure, Kissinger is only of average height, slightly overweight, excessively plain, and somewhat stooped. Far from *beau-ideal*, he is a Jewish refugee, and he speaks with a foreign accent. Despite the image of the gay divorcé, the ruminations about his social activity seem to be grounded more in journalism than in fact.

But without being a butterfly, Kissinger is a deeper individual than the man he wrote about, and he possesses qualities which have attracted him a great deal more popularity in inner circles than his methods or policies would seem to

continued

by David Landau

HUMAN EVENTS

27 NOV 1971

[redacted]

CIA Revamping

How the Administration Is Trying to Improve Intelligence

By HENRY J. TAYLOR

STATINTL

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephant is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

> Incredibly, we spend close to $6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money.

Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total of $135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least $1.5 billion a year.

Next to the Pentagon with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and—largely unknown—they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II, it is understandably jealous of its prerogatives, and traditionally it plays its findings very close to its vest.

Additional intelligence agencies—all growing, all sprawling, all costly—spread out into the world from the office of the secretary of defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches—most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

> The function of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus affect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least $1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

CIA Director Richard Helms heads up the 15,000-man intelligence operation that is now being streamlined.

THE ECONOMIST
20-26 Nov 1971

Spies get together

There is one secret that the intelligence fraternity in Washington has not been able to keep under cover : its own lines of communication have become badly scrambled. In an attempt to get rid of the worst discrepancies and overlaps President Nixon has announced a reorganisation of the multiple branches of the secret service under the direction of Mr Richard Helms, the present and very able head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr Helms will now head the new United States Intelligence Board and will co-ordinate the activities and the budgets of the various intelligence networks—the first time that anyone has had power to do this. The board will be directly responsible to the National Security Council. At the same time two new panels will be set up within the NSC. One, under the direction of Mr Henry Kissinger, the chief of the council, will analyse all the intelligence reports. (In the rush to collect raw facts their interpretation has often been neglected.) The other will compare the strength of the Soviet forces as a whole with those of the United States.

Richard Helms : master-spy

The tangles within the intelligence world go back beyond the crisis over missiles in Cuba. On numerous occasions the many military spies—the three services have their own intelligence networks and then the Department of Defence has still another—have come up with assessments that differ from those of the civilian agencies such as the CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department. Although the CIA has a hawkish image in foreign eyes, it is generally the military men who have over-estimated the resources available to the other side, partly in an effort to boost support in Congress for their own defence budget. Furthermore, relations have been strained recently between the CIA, which gathers information from abroad, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which manages surveillance at home.

This year the confusion has been more noticeable than most. The abortive commando raid a year ago to free prisoners of war from the deserted camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam caused acute embarrassment. Then the Pentagon papers revealed that there had earlier been some serious discrepancies between military and civilian information on the war in Vietnam. And now there is a struggle brewing over the extent of the reported build-up of missiles by the Soviet Union at a time when the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms are reaching a crucial stage.

Congress, which has always been suspicious of the secrecy surrounding the intelligence world, has also been prodding the President. The conservatives in the Senate, led, rather surprisingly, by Senator Ellender, who used to be the spies' best friend, want to cut the money that goes on military intelligence ; in the age of expensive satellite spies about $5 billion a year is spent on this out of an annual intelligence budget of around $6 billion. The liberals, on the other hand, claim that Congress has too little control over the intelligence networks ; in particular they feel that the CIA has too great an influence on foreign policy. What, they ask, is the CIA doing in Laos ? It will be no consolation to these critics that Mr Kissinger will now have greater authority over spying. As a presidential aide he is not responsible to Congress.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

2 6 NOV 1971

[redacted]

Senators Fear Helms Has Lost CIA Control

Reshuffling, With More Positions Going to Military Men, Worries Key Lawmakers

WASHINGTON (UPI)—Key senators are concerned that CIA Director Richard Helms might have been "kicked upstairs" in the reshuffle of America's intelligence community, with more influence in spy activities going to military men.

Helms has assured inquiring senators that he had no reason to believe he had been shuffled aside in the nation's intelligence hierarchy.

But there is concern on Capitol Hill that Helms has lost out in the shakeup of the intelligence network ordered by President Nixon last month.

Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) are concerned that the shakeup has increased Pentagon predominance in the intelligence field, and Sen. John Stennis (D-Miss.) is conducting an investigation to find out what happened.

What has disturbed Helms' friends in the Senate is that the day-to-day control of the CIA apparently has been relinquished to a military man, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., in order to free Helms for his new duties as overall director of the CIA and all other intelligence units. Cushman, a marine, is deputy director of the CIA.

Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the deputy secretary of defense have been given a new voice in the intelligence command through membership on a committee, which, under the direction of presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, will oversee intelligence.

Helms, in a closed-door meeting with the Senate Armed Services Committee this week, said he did not think he was being shoved out of the way.

Stennis, the committee chairman, said Helms "assured me that his dominance over it (the CIA), his effectiveness, his powers over it will not be diminished one bit."

But Stennis indicated he still was not satisfied and "we are going into it and we are going to analyze it and study it and have an investigation — if one wants to use that word—if necessary. We do not take these things lightly. The stakes are too high."

No one in the Senate really knows what has happened at the CIA. Not even senators like Stennis, who are let in on the nation's intelligence secrets, were told in advance.

NATIONAL REVIEW BULLETIN
26 NOV. 1971

[redacted]

Capital Bulletin

STATINTL

Dateline *Washington*

o "Was Richard Helms promoted or fired?" was the question most being asked around Washington last week. The CIA Director's new post as coordinator of all U.S. intelligence activities was interpreted by some observers as a kick upstairs and by others as a promotion of Helms to "intelligence czar." In fact, the change represents a move to bring U.S. intelligence activities more directly under White House control.

Helms will work under the close supervision of Henry Kissinger, who is now running the newly created National Security Council Intelligence Committee. Like the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, the new Intelligence Committee is designed to eliminate procedural difficulties and to consolidate information—thus avoiding interagency conflicts. Under Kissinger, Helms will work as a high-level administrator, not so much formulating policy as providing information upon which policy will be based. Implicitly, the new post will put Helms over FBI head J. Edgar Hoover, though relations with Hoover will continue to be handled through Hoover's titular superior Attorney General John Mitchell. Mitchell is a member of the Committee because Justice probably handles more interagency intelligence questions than any other department in the government, including Defense.

Besides consolidating intelligence activities under the White House, the President also is trying to avoid the horrendous duplication that has ensued from the proliferation of intelligence operations. Some of the overlap presumably will be trimmed away by Helms, though some observers believe this is, for the most part, wishful thinking on the President's part. They note that the individual service branches, the Treasury Department, the FBI, the Bureau of Narcotics, the CIA and even the White House police force are so jealous of their prerogatives that reform would take major surgery—more than either the President or Helms is willing to undertake at this time.

—WINSTON

MONROE, LA.
NEWS-STAR
NOV 24 1971
E - 15,121

Decision Memorandum

The White House is not pleased at all with the record posted by the American intelligence community. The displeasure doesn't apparently extend to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because its director, Richard Helms, has been placed in charge of all intelligence agencies. Further, the President added to Henry Kissinger's authority by giving him the power to evaluate intelligence reports.

The public is advised of this turn of events through the efforts of a government worker who leaked a secret "decision memorandum" to Newsweek magazine.

In the memorandum, Nixon singled out five instances in which American agents were not up to snuff. He complained not only of faulty intelligence, but also runaway budgets and a disparity between a glut of facts and a poverty of analysis.

Specifically, he found five areas of defective snooping, to-wit:

— Failure to predict the extent of North Vietnamese resistance in the Laotian campaign early this year.

— Misinformation leading to the Son Tay prisoner of war camp which turned out to be empty.

— Incorrect estimates of Viet Cong supplies flowing through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville.

— Lateness in detecting Russian built surface to air missiles in the Mideast cease-fire zone.

— An eighth month delay in the strategic arms limitation talks while the White House checked varying intelligence reports on how well the United States could detect possible Soviet violations of the arms control agreement.

The magazine article suggested that some of the gripes might conceal mistakes more properly laid at the Administration's door. However, it went on to credit Nixon with efforts to remove all possible bugs from the intelligence system as it faces what is likely its most critical test of recent years: solving the mystery of the apparent Soviet missile build-up.

The Pentagon Papers showed rather conclusively that U.S. military intelligence in Vietnam did not compare very well with its civilian counterpart. Time and time again the CIA and the State Department intelligence arm proved to be correct in their appraisals of the enemy situation and optimistic forecasts by military agents and their superiors wrong.

There's no telling how many tragedies or near-tragedies could have been avoided had those charged with keeping track of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had had more up-to-date information. My Lai was supposed to be a hotbed of Vietcong. It had been, of course, but when Charlie Company struck, there was no resistance. The VC had fled.

Within the last 24 hours, those in charge of Firebase Mary Ann where 33 GIs lost their lives in a VC sapper raid have been told they will be demoted or reprimanded for a lax defense perimeter and lack of troop preparedness. Those to be punished include a two-star general and four other high-ranking officers.

American intelligence cannot, of course, maintain an unblemished record. The Communist enemy, wherever he is, spends a great deal of time trying to outwit free world agents. He has notched some notable successes. Credit President Nixon with trying to streamline the U.S. intelligence system so that doomsday won't arrive due to secret agents asleep at the switch.

Newsweek
22 November 1971

November 22, 1971 / 50 cents

Newsw



STATINTL

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
29 NOV 1971

WHY THE SHAKE-UP IN INTELLIGENCE

An urgent need for faster and more accurate information underlies latest moves by the President. Upshot: more say for civilians, less for military.



Once again, the vast U. S. intelligence establishment is being reshaped by the White House. As a result:

- Presidential reins on the 5-billion-dollar-a-year "intelligence community" are to be tightened even more. Primary goal is to avoid repetition of recent disappointments in the quality of American intelligence.
- Fresh effort will be made to reduce costly duplication, overlapping and competition among the military intelligence agencies. The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle.
- The civilian head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, is being given broader authority over the entire U. S. intelligence network—civilian and military.

Key man in the reorganization is Mr. Helms, a veteran of nearly 30 years in his field, who took over in June, 1966, the dual job of heading the CIA plus his role as the President's principal adviser on all intelligence.

Now, under a presidential order of November 5, Mr. Helms has the biggest say on how to allocate men, money and machines in the gathering of foreign intelligence for the U. S.

At the same time, the President assigned Henry Kissinger, the top White House adviser and Director of the National Security Council staff, new powers which give Mr. Kissinger a larger voice in determining the direction U. S. intelligence will take and in assessing the final results.

Behind it all. According to Government insiders, a major reason for the President's action was growing "consumer" dissatisfaction with the intelligence product, particularly with interpretation of the secret data collected.

Too often, these sources say, the President has been inundated with information he does not need, or fails to receive in sufficient quality or quantity the data he considers vital for decisions.

The most recent example, one White House aide disclosed, was unhappiness over the length of time it took to get reliable intelligence on current developments in Red China. The Communist Government had been undergoing a leadership crisis just at the time of delicate Washington-Peking negotiations on the President's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, but weeks went by before the U. S. was able to sift through a welter of conflicting reports.

Officials say that another big reason behind revamping of the intelligence command was the daring—but unsuccessful—attempt by the Army and Air Force on Nov. 21, 1970, to rescue U. S. prisoners of war from the North Vietnamese prison camp at Sontay, 23 miles west of Hanoi. American commandos landed at the camp by helicopter in a well-planned and executed raid. But intelligence had lagged, and the camp was empty. The prisoners had been moved.

One official in a position to know explains that after the White House made the initial decision to rescue the POW's, the CIA supplied a model of the camp and details of Sontay's daily operations as they were known at that time. The actual rescue assignment was given to the Army and Air Force, which had to select, train and rehearse the commando team. By the time the operation was launched, intelligence was out of date.

According to this official: "If Helms had been responsible for the operation—as he would be now under the reorganization—he could have kept current, probably would have learned that the prisoners were moved, and probably would have scrubbed the operation."

Government sources say the President also was irritated by failure of his intelligence agencies to forecast accurately North Vietnamese reaction to the South Vietnamese invasion of Southern Laos last February and March.

Congress has had harsh words for the military. The House Appropriations Committee on November 11 declared that "the upward trend in total intelligence expenditures must be arrested" and recommended a 181-million-dollar cut in the Defense Department's military-intelligence appropriations.

The Committee took aim at duplication of effort. "The same information is sought and obtained by various means and by various organizations," it said.

The President hopes to overcome these shortcomings by giving Mr. Helms what Mr. Nixon termed "an enhanced leadership role" in planning, co-ordinating and evaluating all intelligence operations.

The Central Intelligence Director has had for years, on paper, the responsibility of co-ordinating military and civilian intelligence. But this has not always worked in practice. The reason, according to one U. S. official: bureaucratic rivalry among competing intelligence agencies.

Mr. Helms also becomes chairman of a newly formed committee which will advise on formulation of a consolidated foreign-intelligence budget for the entire Government. This committee will decide which intelligence service has the people and assets to do a particular job efficiently and cheaply.

Reshaping the network. The President took these actions to strengthen the American intelligence system:

- Reorganized the U. S. Intelligence Board, which sets intelligence requirements and priorities. The Board, headed by Mr. Helms, includes representatives of the CIA, FBI, Treasury, Atomic Energy Commission and Defense and State Department intelligence agencies.
- Established a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, with Mr. Kissinger as chairman. It will include, besides Mr. Helms, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of

continued

READING, PA.
EAGLE
NOV 12 1967
E - 48,419
S - 85,704

Gen. Eaker: Military Affairs

Dangers Seen in the U.S. Intelligence Reorganization

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER, USAF (Ret.)

A release from the White House Nov. 5 announced a drastic reorganization of the whole U.S. intelligence community.

Gen. Eaker

The reasons given for the big shake-up were "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence community."

The reorganization provides four new boards or committees including a director of central intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms, takes on this job in addition to his duties as CIA director.

There is a National Security Council intelligence committee with Henry Kissinger, the President's principal national security adviser, as chairman. There is a net assessment group within the National Security Council (Kissinger shop) and an intelligence resources advisory board which Helms also heads.

The U.S. intelligence board is "reconstituted," according to the White House release, and Helms' deputy at CIA is chairman.

It is generally believed that the White House was unhappy with the sometimes conflicting estimates of enemy military strength supplied by the U.S. intelligence community. There were also charges that the military deliberately overestimated enemy strength to get increased defense appropriations, and that intelligence was costing too much, about $5 to $6 billion annually. The intelligence apparatus needed therefore to be streamlined, reduced in size and cost and military influence curtailed, according to this view.

There is no doubt but that the reorganization does greatly reduce military influence in the intelligence apparatus. Of the 30-odd members of the four new layers, boards or committees at the highest levels on the intelligence totem pole, only three are military men.

The two men who now are clearly dominant in the intelligence community are Richard Helms and Henry Kissinger. The former wears three hats in the new setup and the latter two hats plus the all-important responsibility of personally determining what the President sees.

No defense leader, civilian or military, active or retired, so far as I know, questions the ability or loyalty of either Helms or Kissinger, but sound organization should not be based on personalities since they are always transient and sometimes fallible.

Strangely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who by law are designated as the principal military advisers to the President, are eliminated, for all practical purposes, from intelligence evaluation.

The whole purpose of foreign intelligence is to observe adequately and assess accurately the military strength of other nations and thus evaluate the hazards to our own security. The U.S. Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the intelligence agencies of the armed services are best qualified by education and experience for sound advice in these areas.

The intelligence apparatus has not been streamlined and reduced in size and cost. Instead, all the new layers, boards and committees now will have to be manned. A minimum of 500 top-level intelligence people eventually will be found in or serving these new echelons, considerably increasing the overall cost of intelligence. These new agencies, if used, also will create delays and make intelligence less responsive to the decision makers.

Rather than streamlining the apparatus, the new organization further fragments the intelligence community by adding the four additional advisory or administrative echelons.

The new system also increases the possibility that intelligence estimates and foreign assessments can be doctored to support decisions previously made rather than the other way around.

It would be safer and sounder for presidents to get, as they did in earlier times, the daily intelligence summaries from the defense department, the state department and the CIA uncensored by any intermediary. The President's principal national security adviser might well digest these estimates and assessments but he never should delay their presentation nor alter their meaning.

ALBANY, GA.
HERALD
E - 30,407
S - 31,092

NOV 20 1971

Reorganizing U.S. Intelligence

President Nixon has reorganized the Federal Government's intelligence operations which, in essence, gives Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms a broader mandate to coordinate all of the various activities in this field. In the meantime Mr. Nixon also created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee to be chaired by his national security affairs adviser, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

These steps have drawn immediate objections from Senators J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Stuart Symington on the grounds that Congress was not consulted in advance about them, and that what Mr. Nixon evidently is trying to accomplish is a removal of Congressional overseeing of any intellligence activities by vesting the area almost wholly with Executive immunity. But the fact of the matter is that the President has dealt solely with the Executive Branch in taking this action, as he is unquestionably authorized to do. What irks the Senators is that they cannot, under the new setup, bring Doctor Kissinger before their committee to be interrogated in this area of Government.

What may have prompted Mr. Nixon's action was recent history. That details how President Kennedy got some bad intelligence from the military on the Bay of Pigs, and Lyndon Johnson some even worse intelligence from his White House people and some of the military on Vietnam. The story is that the CIA was not responsible for these bum steers. Consequently, President Nixon now wants the bulk of his intelligence to come through the hands of a polished professional, CIA Director Helms — who was most impressive in an unprecedented appearance before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington last April when a trusted adviser, Doctor Kissinger. Certainly that is his privilege, however the Senators may fret.

As Director Helms told the editors: "We (the CIA) not only have no stake in policy debate, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts — the agreed facts — and the whole known range of facts — relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimative function — the projection of likely developments from the facts — but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.

"As the President's principal intelligence officer, I am an adviser to the National Security Council, not a member, and when there is debate over alternative policy options, I do not and must not line up with either side.

"If I should take sides and recommend one solution, the other side is going to suspect — if not believe — that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of the CIA goes out the window."

To the journalistic profession, whose watchword is objectivity, which equates with a presentation of balanced facts as free from personal emotionalism, bias or bent as it is humanly possible to record, these words of Richard Helms are heartening. He is, in a strong sense, one of us. Indeed, as he himself put it, "objectivity puts me on familiar ground as an old wire service hand, but it is even more important to an intelligence organization serving the policymaker."

It is reassuring to realize that a man of this singular dedication and rational approach has been empowered by the President to serve as the nation's foremost intelligence officer. He has our best wishes in an

THE NEW REPUBLIC
20 NOV. 1971

Spy Versus Spy

As recently as April 14 Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, assured the world that "the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before." That's all right, the administration has now said, but it costs too much and the overlapping and competition among agencies is wasteful and inefficient. The revelations of former CIA official Victor Marchetti (at one time an aide to the deputy director of CIA) that the combined intelligence budget is $6 billion puts it a billion or so higher than previous estimates. Over 200,000 employees are involved. Hence the President's new reorganization order. Mr. Helms is to have "enhanced leadership" to bring all the fiefdoms under control.

The White House announcement produced two principal reorganizational tools: (a) a new joint intelligence budget and (b) a new evaluation group, which theoretically will affect the missions in Defense, State, the National Security Agency, and the CIA, to name the most prominent. All intelligence agencies will submit their budgets to Helms instead of to the Bureau of the Budget, and he is to sort out the wheat from the chaff. This is not really a new grant of authority. The National Security Act of 1947 gave two jobs to the CIA director – command of the agency itself, and coordinating responsibility as director of Central Intelligence, chairing the United States Intelligence Board. He also sits on the National Security Council. The idea of central supervision has been there from the start. But the idea has foundered on the realities of power; that is to say, the Pentagon. That outfit is run by the Secretary of a department, while the CIA director is still just the head of an agency. For large overseas operations, as in Vietnam and Laos, CIA is completely beholden to the Pentagon.

Bureaucratically, Helms is also in an unfavorable position, although this may not have been the President's intention. Helms will make his combined budget recommendations not directly to the National Security Council, but to a new National Security Intelligence Committee, headed by Henry Kissinger. The reorganization scheme struck Senators Symington and Fulbright as an attempt to wrest from Congress its oversight responsibilities in intelligence matters. Kissinger is inaccessible in the White House, protected from congressional questioning by executive privilege.

Kissinger gains more power through the other presidential innovation, the Net Assessment Group headed by Anthony Marshall in Kissinger's office. This group's task is to define the situation for the United States vis-à-vis the great powers, or any other problem it wants to designate as a crisis. Vigorously pursued, this concept obviously will change the mission and emphasis of the various intelligence agencies. Some will wax, other wane. But they'll still compete. Rep. Nedzi, head of the subcommittee on intelligence oversight for the House Armed Services Committee, has been looking up and down the well-shaded streets of the Intelligence Community and finds that, "There is indeed real competition among the various agencies." He is not certain Helms' budget authority will do anything more than feed interagency suspicions. There will be the argument that intelligence requires compartmentalization at the cost of efficiency, that budget control will mean a monolithic intelligence voice instead of healthy if costly rivalry. Nedzi is concerned but philosophical, gearing up for his duties by going back to the basics set forth in Compton McKenzie's spoof on British intelligence, *Water on the Brain.* In that classic the fictitious Sir William Westmacott, head of the Security of the Realm, is addressing a new recruit. "After all, the whole point of the secret service is that it should be secret."

[redacted]

STATINTL

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
17 NOV 1971

STATINTL [redacted]

STATINTL [redacted]

HENRY J. TAYLOR

Our Spy Elephant Is Sick

Behind the scenes President Nixon's confidence in Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard M. Helms has taken a new leap forward. Mr. Nixon believes (correctly) that our nation's intelligence setup is a sick elephant. He has quietly assigned Mr. Helms to correct it.

A sick elephnat is a formidable danger. And secrecy keeps our public from knowing even the size of this elephant, to say nothing of how sick it is.

Incredibly, we spend close to $6 billion a year for intelligence. Just the CIA alone is larger in scope than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Legendary Gen. William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan's Office of Strategic Services conducted our entire World War II espionage throughout four years and throughout the world for a total $135 million. The budget of the CIA (secret) is at least $1.5 billion a year.

NEXT TO THE PENTAGON with its 25 miles of corridors, the world's largest office building, the CIA's headquarters in suburban Langley, Va., is the largest building in the Washington area. The CIA has jurisdiction only abroad, not in the United States. But the CIA maintains secret offices in most major U.S. cities, totally unknown to the public.

About 10,000 people work at Langley and another 5,000 are scattered across the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. These include many, many unsung heroes who secretly risk their lives for our country in the dark and unknown battles of espionage and treachery. I could name many. And as a part of its veil of secrecy the CIA has its own clandestine communications system with Washington and the world.

The Pentagon spends $3 billion a year on intelligence, twice as much as the CIA. Like the CIA, its Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence arms operate worldwide, of course, and — largely unknown — they also have an immense adjunct called the National Security Agency which rivals the CIA in size and cost.

Then there exists the important Intelligence Section of the State Department, likewise worldwide. Its chief reports directly to Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2nd, it is understandably very close to its vest.

ADDITIONAL intelligence agencies — all growing, all sprawling, all costly — spread out into the world from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA), and even the Department of Commerce.

In fact, there are so many additional hush-hush agencies that recently in West and East Berlin alone there were at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches — most of them competing with one another.

Mr. Helms himself defines intelligence as "all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action." The acquisition of intelligence is one thing; the interpretation of it is another; and the use of it is a third. The 1947 statute creating the CIA limits it to the first two. It also makes the CIA directly responsible to the President. But it is simply not true that the CIA is the over-all responsible agency, as is so widely believed.

Again and again, no one and everyone is responsible.

THE FUNCTION of intelligence is to protect us from surprises. It's not working that way. The sick elephant is threatening our national security by surprise, surprise, surprise.

Alarmed President Nixon has given Mr. Helms new and sweeping intelligence reorganization authority on an over-all basis. He has given him the first authority ever given anyone to review, and thus effect, all our foreign intelligence agencies' budgets. The President believes Mr. Helms, this undercover world's most experienced pro, can cut at least $1 billion out of the morass.

The President confided that he is totally fed up with the intelligence community's duplications, contradictions, self-protective vagueness and dangerous rivalries. He has made it clear that he wants its output brought closer to the needs of the President's so-called 40 Committee (actually six men), which serves the National Security Council and the President himself.

In amputating much of the sick elephant, Mr. Helms' directive is to cut down on the surprises. And the President could not have picked a more knowing, no-nonsense man to do it.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
17 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

PRESSURE-COOKER ATMOSPHERE

Security Council Staff Finds Kissinger a Hard-Driving Boss

BY ANN BLACKMAN
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON—Status on Henry A. Kissinger's staff isn't winging out to San Clemente on a military jet, or top-secret security clearance, or even access to the White House tennis court.

Status for the 48 members of the National Security Council staff is access to Kissinger. "The only thing that counts around here is your slot with Henry," said one of them.

Interviews with 18 Security Council aides offer a glimpse into the pressure-cooker atmosphere that surrounds those closest to Kissinger, who heads the council as President Nixon's special assistant for national security affairs.

Personal Abilities

"You do things for Henry you didn't think you were capable of," said Winston Lord, 34, of New York City. "He may know better than the persons themselves what they're capable of."

In organizing his staff, Kissinger dipped into the federal bureaucracy, recruiting members from the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency. But he also went outside the government and hired a half dozen bright young people, some of them under 30 and some of them Democrats, to get the benefit of their expertise in the specific areas.

Among them are 26-year-old Mary Brownell of Asheville, N.C., whose specialty is Latin America; 28-year-old Rosemary Neaher of Garden City, N.Y., an expert on the Middle East, and 28-year-old Robert D. Hormats of Baltimore, an economic adviser.

First Interviews

For most of those interviewed, the sessions were the first time they had authority to talk to a reporter since joining the National Security Council staff. All were instructed by Kissinger's deputy, Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, to keep the conversations "non-substantive," meaning policy and national security matters were not to be discussed.

They weren't. Nor were the staff members free with anecdotes about the boss, mindful perhaps of the time Kissinger reportedly opened a staff meeting by asking, "And who here is representing the New York Times?"

Under the ground rules, as laid down by Haig, the conversation tended to center on the demands Kissinger makes on his staff, and the satisfaction the staff gets from working for him.

"The motivation comes from working at the center of foreign policy," said Lord, who came to the National Security Council after service in both the Defense and State departments.

As a troubleshooter for special diplomatic missions, with emphasis on the Far East, Lord sees the boss more than most. He was one of two staffers to accompany Kissinger on the first mission to Communist China. "I think of Henry as a Vince Lombardi in the pursuit of excellence," Lord said.

Dennis H. Sachs, 28, of Portland, Ore., agreed with Lord that the job satisfaction stems from being at the center of power. "There's a psychic income of being associated at this high level with decision-[illegible]

Sachs, a Berkeley graduate with master's degrees in economics and urban regional planning from the University of Pennsylvania, is responsible for analyzing military and economic assistance programs. He joined the council staff from the Office of Management and the Budget.

Like most of his colleagues, Sachs works in the Executive Office Building next to the White House. With few exceptions, the council offices are small, utilitarian and furnished in "early bureaucrat" — plastic brown sofas, cheap impressionist prints and thin rugs the color of cement.

But if the staffers' offices are not impressive, their responsibilities are.

One of their duties is to write what they call "talking points" for presidential news conferences, questions they think reporters will ask, and prepare the answers.

"It's great to watch one of these things and hear your question come up," one staffer said. "You know exactly what the President is going to say because you wrote the answer yourself. And the impressive thing is that he expands on your answer with his own ideas and insights."

Also, the staff is expected to consult with various government departments before drawing up memos, reports, recommendations and options. These go to the President who can then make a decision with full awareness of agency positions and national security implications.

[illegible] said Gen. Haig. "These staffers have to be objective transmitters of any position on any issue. They sit at the apex of policy machinery in the government. The only problems they deal with are the most complex. The easier ones are solved down along the line."

A senior staff member explained the council's function this way:

"The objective is not to reach a consensus for its own sake or to develop a course of action in which the President has only to choose yes or no, approve or disapprove; but rather it is to give him a clear description of the options he really has so he can choose, knowing what the costs and consequences of each of these options will be."

Latin Affairs

Several younger aides came to the council staff straight from academia, with advanced degrees and prestigious fellowships fattening their resumes.

The youngest, Miss Brownell, is a University of North Carolina graduate with a master's degree in Latin American studies from the University of Texas. She joined Kissinger's team two years ago, and her work is primarily connected with Latin American affairs.

Her counterpart in the Mideastern-affairs section is Miss Neaher, a Smith College graduate who has studied Arabic and taught school in Kuwait. She was recruited two years ago from the Middle East Institute.

While younger staff members occasionally represent the Security Council at agency or depart-[illegible] meetings [illegible]

continued

THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER
16 Nov 197

STATINTL [redacted]

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

STATINTL [redacted]

STATINTL [redacted]

In the opinion of American observers, no othe aspect of U.S. foreign policy with the exception of the Vietnam war has voked such vigorous condemnation and protest as the subversive actions o the U.S. intelligence service, its covert and not infrequently overt intererence in the internal affairs of other states, its complicity in all kinds o reactionary conspiracies and putsches. The generally known failures and scandalous exposures of its intelligence service have certainly impaired the prestige of the United States.

A MONSTER TOWERING OVER CONGRESS

Immediately after the end of World War II, seeking a greater say in policy-making the most powerful spokesmen of monopoly capital secured reorganization of the entire government machinery of the United States. In July 1947 the National Security Act was promulgated, envisaging cardinal reconstruction of the military departments, the establishment of a single Department of Defence, a Joint Chiefs of Staff committee, and a Department of the Air Force. At the same time there was constituted the National Security Council, the highest, after the President, body called upon to play an important role in sharing U.S. foreign policy.

During the reorganization of the military and political leadership of the country the greatest attention was paid to intelligence. Drawing upon the experience of Hitler's Germany, the U.S. imperialists set about establishing their own system of total espionage — on a colossal scale as "befits" the United States of America. Q. Pettee, a U.S. intelligence theoretician, wrote that to exercise leadership of the world in all continents, of all types of states and social systems, of all races and religions in any social, economic and political conditions, the United States needed an exceptionally wide ranging intelligence service.

The Central Intelligence Agency, subordinated directly to the President, became the first postwar independent intelligence organization. It was charged with collecting intelligence data and at the same time engineering subversion in other states tasks:

(1) To obtain intelligence information in both secret and legal ways, (2) to generalize the information collected by other organizations and agencies, evaluate it and submit to politicians in a form suitable for utilization, (3) to prepare, in secret, interference in the affairs of other nations in case orders came regarding the need for such interference. Thus, the National Security Act enabled the CIA to exert its influence on matters of state importance, something on which the advocates of a "positions-of-strength policy" pressing for the militarization of the economy and social life of the United States insisted with particular vigour. According to Allen Dulles, this act gave American intelligence a more influential position in government than that held by intelligence in any other country of the world.

INCREASING POWER OF CIA

As American authors claim, the power of the CIA and of its chief has been growing in a geometrical progression. In 1948 the NSC issued a secret order authorizing the CIA to conduct secret political operations on foreign territories. Such operations, it was stressed, were to be carried out in such a way that the U.S. government could, if necessary, disassociate itself from them. Thus, in the first year of its existence, the CIA was assigned functions which no other intelligence service has ever had.

In 1949 Congress adopted, as an addition to the National Security Act, a special law on the Central Intelligence Agency. By this act the United States' government and parliament, for the first time in mankind's history, openly elevated espionage to the rank of state policy and thereby officially approved methods of action involving interference in the internal affairs of other countries and violation of their sovereignty.

The law of 1949 already openly placed intelligence above all American legislature: it deprived the congressional committees of the right to intervene in matters pertaining to the organization and activities of the CIA and gave its head unlimited freedom of action, vesting him with almost dictatorial powers. The CIA could ignore federal laws and ordinances whose observance could involve divulgence of information about its structure, functions, names, official designations, salaries, the size of the personnel (the Treasury was instructed not to report to Con-

with the CIA). In the matters of hire and dismissal the CIA director is not bound by any political or legal norms, procedures or recommendations obligatory for government institutions.

The Central Intelligence Agency was authorized to subsidize the programmes of colleges, to institute and keep up different foundations, cultural societies and publishing houses. Moreover, it could spend material means in disregard of the laws or rules established for government institutions and have its accounts certified only by its director. The latter was thus in a position to spend any sum from the vast allocations without any control or explanations. The CIA was allowed to earmark special sums to be spent by its personnel abroad. It could conclude contracts with non-government institutions on the conduct of research projects.

However, publicly promulgated laws do not give a full idea of the extent of the powers with which the CIA is vested. Along with them there exist top-secret directives of the National Security Council. To be sure, Allen Dulles wrote, there is the secret aspect of the matter, and the law authorizes the NSC (i.e., actually the President) to entrust the CIA with some powers in addition to those specified in the law. These powers are not given publicity. What is involved here is "special operations" and clandestine actions designed to install (often through military coups) reactionary pro-U.S. regimes enjoying the financial and political support of the American ruling circles and the biggest monopo- [illegible] these actions became as organic part of the CIA's practical activities.

DANVILLE, VA.
BEE
NOV 16 1971
E - 17,128

U.S. Spy Network

It is amazing that in all the years that the United States has been a super power, there was not a super intelligence agency to determine the relative strategic balance between major powers. This would have enabled our defense department to correct any faults that were found, and to meet all challenges to our security.

That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions, before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay. This development is believed to have brought about the reorganization of the American intelligence community into a network that perhaps should have been organized long ago.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given 30 days to reorganize his own office so that he can become the head of the new network, to coordinate civilian and military intelligence and bring the military role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating responsibilities for CIA.

Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies in the government are said to employ an army of 200,000 persons, at home and abroad, at a cost of some $5 billion a year. It is a huge and very important undertaking. Helms will supervise the consolidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of sources and methods used.

The results will be channeled to the National Security Council, which will make White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers and evaluate intelligence quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that can keep the nation at peace through strength, it will be worth the huge outlay of men and money collecting it.

STATINTL

[redacted]

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER
Nov 15 1971
M - 194,557

The President's Prerogative

President Nixon has realigned the top echelon of the vast military-civilian intelligence complex in a manner he has deemed best suited to his needs. Predictably, a couple of senatorial scolds have raised a fuss.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been freed from his day-to-day supervision of the CIA to coordinate that agency's work with the input of other intelligence-gathering departments, including the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Moreover, the President has created a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which will naturally include CIA director Helms but which will be chaired by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs and executive secretary of the National Security Council staff.

Senators J. William Fulbright and Stuart Symington object. They object, they say, because Congress was not consulted in advance and because Mr. Kissinger's executive immunity from congressional supervision "further erodes congressional control over the intelligence community."

The President, of course, does not have to consult with or obtain the permission of Congress to create or reshuffle intelligence (or other) committees within the Executive Branch. Furthermore, the complaint that congressional control over the intelligence community is being "eroded" would have some credibility if direct congressional control were actually exercised or if such agencies as the CIA were created to serve Congress instead of the President.

The real target of the complaints is Mr. Kissinger, whom Sen. Fulbright and others have tried (unsuccessfully) to hale before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for interrogation. But to complain about Mr. Kissinger's position as chairman of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee is to cavil about titles. The fact is the CIA (and thus Mr. Helms) serves directly under the National Security Council and the Council's staff (and functions) are already under Mr. Kissinger's direction.

NEWSWEEK
15 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

INTELLIGENCE:

Helms at the Helm

For months the talk in Washington was that the President was about to reorder the nation's vast, $6 billion military-civilian intelligence complex. Last week, in a two-page low-key announcement, the White House disclosed that Mr. Nixon had given Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms, 58, a broad mandate to unsnarl the U.S. intelligence-gathering agencies. Putting Helms at the helm, insiders predicted, might prove to be the most significant power realignment in U.S. intelligence since the CIA was founded in 1947.

Helms's new job falls well short of over-all intelligence "czar." Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger is still virtually the sole conduit of intelligence information to the President. And, significantly, Kissinger will chair the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Mr. Nixon also created, to evaluate White House-bound data. But the President's order frees Helms of many of his routine CIA duties (which will be taken over by his deputy, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.) so that he can devote his time to the task of coordinating and streamlining the nation's far-flung and disparate intelligence organizations, which include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

[redacted]

HOUSTON, TEXAS
POST
NOV 14 1971
M - 294,677
S - 329,710

An intelligent move

The Nixon administration's plan to consolidate the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies operating abroad is a step toward further efficiency and economy in this vital and expensive bulwark of our national security.

Under the administration plan, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms will supervise all U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations. The revamping holds the promise of reducing conflicting and overlapping efforts by a plethora of U.S. intelligence organizations.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield and Republican Sen. George D. Aiken, both members of a special Senate review panel for CIA activities, have endorsed the reorganization plan. Speaking of the need for centralized administration of our intelligence work, Sen. Aiken said:

"We've had too many intelligence agencies. Every agency of government seems to have one — the Defense Department, the Navy, the Army, and God knows how many others. If you have more than two agencies of government working on the same thing they always try to undercut each other."

The public gets only sketchy indications of the huge sums spent by government agencies on intelligence gathering precisely because most such activities are classified. One indication appeared a few months ago in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report that the CIA spent well over $100 million last year to halt North Vietnamese advances in Laos.

It remains to be seen what economics can be effected in intelligence agency budgets but it is reasonable to assume that some money can be saved through reduced duplication of effort and coordinated planning. The main goal, however, is improved efficiency. This country's economic troubles dictate that we get more mileage from our intelligence-gathering dollars as from other forms of government spending.

MANCHESTER, N.H.
UNION-LEADER
D - 58,903
N.H. NEWS
S - 49,019
NOV 14 1971

I Wonder Who's Kissinger Now

Walter Trohan (see column opposite page) may have something in his charge that it is Henry Kissinger who mesmerized Mr. Nixon into 180-degree flipflops on Red China and the Soviets. Trohan cites earlier writings of the Harvard "swinger" to show that his own "complete about face" on the Communists has been as flagrant as the President's and probably preceded it.

Nixon, be it noted, took to reversing his stands on major foreign and domestic issues only after he promoted the lady-killer to be his most trusted aide. Since then the President has vested increasing power in his "adviser for National Security Affairs," by-passing the rest of his cabinet, including Sec. of State Rogers.

Last week this culminated in the appointment of Kissinger to head up a committee which will shake up, and thereafter supervise, all the intelligence agencies including CIA. CIA's highly regarded director, Richard Helms, was booted upstairs to the nominal post of overall intelligence chief, under Kissinger's direct control.

Angry protests came from Congress, whose members charge a deliberate attempt by Mr. Nixon to erode the statutes which give them at least theoretical control of the intelligence community. Congress was furnished no details on the CIA shakeup nor the reasons for it. Meanwhile rumors persist that Mr. Nixon is taking steps to get rid of J. Edgar Hoover. Is Kissinger to take over both the CIA and the FBI?

And what is it that our double-back-somersaulting President and his fair-haired boy have in mind as new directions for the intelligence agents? Will the latter now be hamstrung in their probes of Communist espionage, already redoubled by the Soviets and certain to be stepped up by Peking's appointees to the UN?

We find the emergence of Kissinger as boss of intelligence even more disturbing than his role as de-facto Secretary of State. Who is this male Mata Hari really working for?

ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE

13 NOV 1971 STATINTL

[redacted]

Capital Fare

Get Intelligence Wholesale?

By Andrew Tully
The McNaught Syndicate, Inc.

WASHINGTON — Dr. Henry Kissinger by now is known to most Americans who are interested in the news as a White House personality who moonlights as a man-about-town with an eye for a pretty girl. Since this is evidence that President Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs is human, I am capable of restraining my enthusiasm for the role Kissinger has been given in Nixon's reorganization of the intelligence community.

Indeed, I find myself wondering whether Kissinger's power over foreign policy rivals that of the President, which is not good. It is not good because the doctor would be less than the human being he has revealed himself to be if he did not enjoy power, and use it.

Most reports on the reordering of our spy shop have emphasized that CIA Director Richard Helms will be the czar of all intelligence agencies, including those inside the Pentagon. His most powerful weapon, in a government where one name for the power game is the dollar, will be in his new assignment to draw up one budget for the entire espionage establishment.

That's splendid because Helms was not born yesterday and he is aware that President Nixon is annoyed at the high cost of international snooping — some $5 billion a year. No one has to tell Helms his No. 1 priority is to get intelligence as wholesale as possible.

But it says here that the real boss of intelligence could very well be Henry Kissinger, whose new title is chairman of the new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, charged with providing "guidance and direction" to Chief Helms. In effect, Kissinger through his committee not only will tell Helms how to run the show, but will decide which intelligence assessments find their way to the President's desk. Power in Washington lies not only in having the ear of the President; it is also in refusing the President's ear to others of a dissenting viewpoint.

In his new role, Kissinger will have it both ways. His committee and his personal staff will initiate intelligence studies, and then will edit the resulting opinions and options before presentation to the Oval Office.

To be sure, Helms has the power to submit his own recommendations directly to Nixon, and so have Secretary of State William Rogers, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But since Kissinger's job is to take the task of reviewing options off the presidential shoulders, a dissenter already will have two strikes on him. Nixon does not often give a subordinate an assignment and then second-guess him; he lives by the executive book. And you can count the occasions on the fingers of one hand when the President has overruled his highly competent national security aide.

Indeed, Nixon's reorganization has merely put into fine print what Kissinger has been doing for three years. Without any spelled-out authority, Kissinger's Senior Review Group has always been Nixon's personal State Department. Under a Presidential directive, the Group invites policy options from State, Defense, CIA, then recommends what action the President should take.

The difference now is that there is a document bearing Richard Nixon's signature which says no intelligence assessment or proposed operation will be approved until it has gone through Kissinger's shop. Richard Helms is the czar of all the intelligence czars, but only at Henry Kissinger's pleasure.

The new system may be the best possible solution to bringing the sprawling intelligence community, with its more than 200,000 employes, under Presidential control. At the same time, I don't consider it overly boorish to point out who's got the real power in this one. Contemplating Kissinger's new role, in some leafy haven across the Styx, Richelieu must be frantic with envy.

DAILY WORLD

13 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

The World at Weekend

White House conspiracy

The concentration of ever greater power in the White House and the inner circles of the Nixon Administration is continuing to an alarming extent.

The latest development is the concentration of the enormous intelligence (in plain words, spying) network in the hands of a sub-committee of the National Security Council. This sub-committee is headed by Henry Kissinger, Nixon's adviser on national security affairs. It includes Attorney General John Mitchell, an ultra-Rightist of the Nixon brand, the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), will have an enhanced "overall supervisory role."

The setup is like a dream of the military-industrial complex come true. It fits into the increasingly tighter state-monopoly capitalist framework of the United States and the developing fascistic patterns the most aggressive, oppressive and racist sections of the state-monopoly capitalist setup are imposing.

Nixon's action was caustically denounced by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) as "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community."

Nixon has on various occasions invaded the area assigned to Congress by the Constitution, as in his expansion of the powers of the Suversive Activities Control Board, or in the Treasury Department's arbitrary decision to give corporations a $37 billion tax bonanza over ten years.

Just as the Nixon economic policy contains the "seeds of a fascist economic structure," these moves are the seeds of a fascist political structure.

KEOKUK, IOWA
GATE CITY
NOV 13 1971
E - 8,930

U.S. spy network

It is amazing that in all the years that the United States has been a super power, there was not a super intelligence agency to determine the relative strategic balance between major powers. This would have enabled our defense department to correct any faults that were found, and to meet all challenges to our security.

That the Soviet buildup of nuclear arms and naval power could reach such proportions, before we took measures to counter them, is a cause for national dismay. This development is believed to have brought about the reorganization of the American intelligence community into a network that perhaps should have been organized long ago.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given 30 days to reorganize its own office so that he can become the head of the new network, to coordinate civilian and military intelligence and bring the military role under civilian control. Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Helms' deputy, will take over operating responsibilities for CIA.

Unofficially, the various intelligence agencies in the government are said to employ an army of 200,000 persons, at home and abroad, at a cost of some $5 billion a year. It is a huge and very important undertaking. Helms will supervisevise the consolidated intelligence network and the budget it will require. He will be responsible for national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of sources and methods used.

The results will be channeled to the National Security Council, which will make White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers and evaluate intelligence quality. If this plan creates the intelligence that can keep the nation at peace through strength, it will be worth the huge outlay of men and money collecting it.

STATINTL

[redacted]

MILWAUKEE, WISC.
JOURNAL
NOV 13 1971
E - 359,036
S - 537,875

Cloak and Dagger Hidden From Congress

The US intelligence network, a hydralike structure of which the Central Intelligence Agency is a major portion, has always been a headache for the executive and Congress. For the White House there has been the problem of management and co-ordination; for Congress the problem of determining accountability.

President Nixon has attempted to solve his management problem. Last week he announced a reorganization that would elevate CIA Director Richard Helms to a position of super-co-ordinator of all intelligence activities. He tied the whole apparatus more tightly into the National Security Council through a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee headed by presidential adviser Kissinger. Presumably the White House hopes to be better able to keep its thumb on intelligence operations and budgets, to suppress the petty jealousies that exist between such units as the FBI and the CIA and to cut down on the competitive duplication of work done by various intelligence organizations both in and out of the military. It is a valiant attempt. Former Defense Secretary McNamara tried it within the Pentagon structure and achieved only a modicum of success.

The administration moves, however, do not solve the needs of the money granting body, Congress. In fact, Senators Fulbright and Symington Thursday expressed strong fears that tucking the intelligence community more firmly into the White House structure will withdraw it even further from congressional monitoring.

Their point is well taken. Right now there are few requirements for the CIA to tell Congress what it is doing. Its budget is secreted in other agencies. There is every reason to believe that Kissinger will refuse to testify before Congress as he has before, claiming executive privilege. Traditional congressional checks are missing. And that is a dangerous situation.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 NOV 1971

STATINTL

Good wishes, Mr. Helms

President Nixon has made an interesting move intended to correct a condition which got his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, into a lot of trouble. We can only hope, for the sake of the future welfare of the American republic, that much comes of it.

The move is to give to Richard Helms, director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), a broader mandate aimed at coordinating intelligence gathering and weighing in Washington.

The condition that needs correcting has been documented in two recent publications. Lyndon Johnson's new book, "The Vantage Point" does it gently. The chapter on the Tet offensive carries the following statements:

". . . we did not expect them to attack as many (population centers) as they did. . . ."

"We expected a large force to attack; it was larger than we estimated."

". . . the scale of the attacks and the size of the Communist force were greater than I had anticipated."

In other words the information about the capabilities of the enemy in Vietnam which got through to the President in the White House was not very good. If better information was available, he didn't get it.

The Pentagon papers provide much more and broader detail on the same subject, and also point out where and how it happened.

They show that in the American intelligence community there are many houses, and two of them almost always got their assessments right, but that they didn't succeed in getting through to the President (perhaps in part because it wasn't what he wanted to hear).

It comes out clearly from "the papers" that Mr. Johnson agreed to the big escalation of the American commitment in Vietnam in 1965 on the assumption that a half million Americans in a relatively small Asian country would "nail the coonskin to the door" in ample time for the presidential election of 1968.

But the basis for such a mistaken evaluation did not come from either the CIA or from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These two offices were consistently skeptical about what could be done in Vietnam with the American forces allotted to the task. The optimism which lay behind the 1965 decision came from within Mr. Johnson's own White House and from the separate intelligence operations of the various armed forces at the Pentagon.

And it was from non-CIA and non-State sources that Mr. Johnson got a general impression of the military situation which caused him surprise at the time of Tet.

The logical answer is, of course, to take the top man from the agency which had the best track record on intelligence during the Vietnam war and put him in broader charge of all the much uncoordinated intelligence activities of the federal government. And this, of course, is precisely what Mr. Nixon is trying to do.

Mr. Helms is told, in effect, to survey the whole intelligence scene in Washington; try to draw it together; try to make it more efficient and less expensive; and get it in shape to produce the kind of intelligence analysis which will not mislead future presidents as Mr. Johnson was misled.

It sounds easy. It isn't. A president may try to do something like this. But there is no fury like that of an armed service deprived of its own special intelligence branch, for it is on the evaluations of its own intelligence that its appropriations for the following year are based.

Army intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Army. Navy intelligence stresses the might of the Russian Navy. Etc., etc.

Intelligence in Washington can neither be coordinated nor made less expensive by avoidance of overlapping work except after a battle on every frontier. Every department and branch thereof in Washington is a stockade of privilege and vested interest. Mr. Helms is like an Indian chieftain on the American frontier who sets out to overrun every white stockade from Fort Laramie back to the Mississippi River. We wish him well.

DAILY WORLD
12 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

Editorials

Secret police threat

The restructuring of the U.S. intelligence agencies ordered by President Nixon recalls the promotion of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris by Hitler a generation ago. Canaris was installed as head of the Nazi intelligence agencies to make them into a more effective instrument of the fascist regime.

The new responsibilities placed by the President on Henry Kissinger and Richard Helms are intended, similarly, to concentrate control of the nation's secret police in Nixon's hands.

Kissinger will head the National Security Council's intelligence committee which will also include Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Attorney General John Mitchell; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It will thus embrace the major law-enforcement, civilian espionage, and military intelligence forces.

Secret police operations will be coordinated by the United States Intelligence Board headed by Helms. The board will also include the deputy CIA director, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and representatives of the Treasury Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

The effect of the President's action is, as Senators J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington have said, to insulate the secret police operations from Congressional inquiry or control. That is to be accomplished by claiming White House "executive privilege" for them through Kissinger.

The Senate itself has abetted Nixon's moves, for the Senate subcommittee which is supposed to supervise the CIA "has not met once this year," as Symington admitted.

The centralization of control over the secret police forces is a step toward the creation of the police-state which Nixon has in mind. His attempt to subvert the Supreme Court and his creation of the Pay Board to handcuff the trade union movement are part of the same program.

The President's secret-police moves are a threat to Constitutional government as it exists in the United States. They merit the animosity and opposition of all Americans.

[redacted]

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868
NOV 12 1971

More Executive Secrecy?

A further indication of the tendency of the Nixon Administration to keep vital information from Congress is suggested by the recent White House announcement of a reorganization of the government's intelligence operations. The reorganization plan would, among other things, give Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the authority to co-ordinate his own budget with those of intelligence agencies in the State and Defense departments. But more significantly, from the standpoint of Congress, it would vest responsibility for making the so-called "net assessment" of intelligence data in a unit working under Dr. Henry Kissinger as head of the National Security Council staff.

Senators Symington and Fulbright are properly concerned that this overhaul may mean that intelligence operations will be even further beyond the reach of Congress than they already are. Despite repeated attempts in the Senate to enact bills requiring the CIA to make reports to responsible Senate and House committees and to compel the CIA at least to reveal its gross budget, Congress has so far not acted.

With Dr. Kissinger having final responsibility for making the intelligence assessment on which the President presumably will act, Senator Fulbright for good reason sees "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community." On the basis of a claim of executive privilege, Dr. Kissinger has avoided testifying before congressional committees.

While conceding that the changes could be constructive, Senator Symington wants to hold hearings on the reorganization in order to ask questions about what it means as to the assignment given by Congress to the CIA. Obviously, Congress should be kept informed about intelligence activities, not only because Congress is expected to appropriate money for them but also because, in legislating in response to presidential requests, the legislators should have access to the same data on which the executive is relying for making its judgments.

Recent disparate analyses by the CIA and the Defense Department as to the nature and strength of Soviet capabilities lead to the suspicion that the White House would like to produce an intelligence estimate over which it has firmer control and which Congress would have to accept. Such a development would hamper Congress in making independent legislative judgments and in serving as a check upon the excessive power of the executive.

DAILY WORLD
11 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

[redacted]

STATINTL

National News

White House gains by intelligence shift

WASHINGTON — Sens. Stuart Symington (D-Mo) and J. William Fulbright (D-Ark) charged Wednesday that President Nixon reshaped the U.S. intelligence network, placing more control in the hands of Henry Kissinger, his adviser on national security, to evade Congressional supervision.

Symington made the charge in a Senate speech.

Fulbright told a reporter that the reorganization of the spy and intelligence network was "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community." He pointed out that Kissinger has steadily refused to testify before Congressional committees.

The new development began with the announcement by the White House last Friday that intelligence was being reorganized to "improve efficiency and effectiveness."

Richard Helms, currently CIA director, was given charge of all intelligence operations, including those of the military services. Kissinger was put in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council whose function is to review intelligence operations. On this new subcommittee with Kissinger is Attorney General John Mitchell and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Symington asked whether this new White House committee "has been given authority and/or responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA, and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency."

He also charged that the White House action, "unilaterally decreed," did not reveal what caused the shakeup, and in effect was hiding information from Congress.

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
TIMES-PICAYUNE
NOV 1 1 1971
M - 196,345
S - 308,949

STATINTL

Tightening Up Spy System

Reforms in the structure of the nation's "intelligence community" recently announced by the President are aimed at producing three needed results: more coherent overall direction and budgeting, more control over the military agencies by the civilian agency and more control over it all by the President.

Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms is to have the government-wide coordinating role, his authority backed up by his holding the budgetary reins of the military agencies as well as his own.

A new National Security Council intelligence committee, headed by the presidential adviser on national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, will be the direct conduit to the President as both giver of orders and evaluator of results.

It is denied but openly suspected that the reforms took this particular shape because of top-level dissatisfaction with the performances of the military intelligence branches.

It is necessary for an intelligence system to have several different sources and channels of information. It may be more costly, involve some duplication and promote cross-purposes and complexity, but the alternative is a monolithic agency whose reports may not have the needed balance and cannot easily be evaluated by the chief user, the President.

Placing the smaller branches under stricter coordination by the larger, we hope, can keep the best features of this situation while eliminating many of the worst.

STATINTL

[redacted]

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810
NOV 11 1971

Washington Dateline

Senators Challenge Intelligence Shuffle

Sens. Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) and J. William Fulbright (D, Ark.) said Wednesday that President Nixon had reshaped the nation's intelligence network to vest more control in the hands of White House adviser Henry Kissinger without Congressional advice.



Sen. Symington

"Symington, in a Senate speech, called for a full review by the Senate Armed Services Committee. He charged that critical aspects of intelligence analysis had been taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in the military and the White House staff.

Fulbright, asked for comment by a reporter, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of Congressional control over the intelligence community" on grounds that Kissinger, in his position as the President's national security adviser, was insulated from Congressional scrutiny.

The White House announced last Friday that intelligence activities were being restructed to improve their "efficiency and effectiveness." CIA director Richard Helms was given control over all intelligence activities while Kissinger was placed in charge of a subcommittee of the National Security Council to review intelligence operations.

ST. LOUIS, MO.
GLOBE-DEMOCRAT

MORNING - 292,789
WEEKEND - 306,889

NOV 11 1971

Symington challenges intelligence shakeup

By EDWARD W. O'BRIEN
Chief of the Globe-Democrat Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Sen. Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, said Wednesday the "integrity" of U.S. intelligence analyses may be threatened by a recent White House move which he charged gives more power to presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

In a Senate speech Symington challenged the intelligence reorganization announced last Friday for the White House as designed to shift responsibility for "the most critical aspects" of intelligence interpretation and vest it instead in "a combination of military professionals and the White House staff."

Symington asked the Senate Armed Services Committee to hold hearings on the reorganization and obtain "answers" which have not been disclosed by the White House.

THE COMMITTEE chairman, Sen. John C. Stennis (Dem.), Mississippi, made no immediate reply.

In his speech Symington noted acidly that the Senate central intelligence subcommittee, a unit of the armed services group, "has not met once this year."

The subcommittee is supposedly one of the key agencies which Congress uses to assure itself of proper supervision of highly secret intelligence operations around the world.

Though Symington mentioned Kissinger only by job title and not by name, his speech amounted to a renewed criticism that Kissinger, as President Nixon's top security assistant, has been given tremendous powers and yet is beyond the reach of congressional committees which want to question him.

IN A PREVIOUS headline-making speech, Symington charged that Kissinger is widely regarded around town as the real secretary of state.

In his latest speech, Symington suggested that the same downgrading may be happening to Richard Helms, the highly regarded chief of the CIA.

Symington's worry, he implied, is that such critical analyses as comparisons of the United States and the Soviet in strategic military weaponry may be influenced or manipulated to make them fit presidential and Pentagon policies.

The White House announcement Friday asserted that Helms will enjoy "an unhanced leadership role" in the new setup.

BUT SYMINGTON SAID:

"How is the leadership role of the CIA director "enhanced' by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board sits not only the attorney general but also the chairman of the Pentagon joint chiefs of staff?"

The effect of the reorganization, Symington said, will be to "bring the most important aspects of intelligence production and coordination directly under the White House."

Congress already is "severely restricted" in obtaining intelligence analyses, he said, and may find itself in worse shape through increased application by the President of the doctrine of "executive privilege" in refusing to share secret information with Congress.

In an interview, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, agreed with Symington that the reorganization means "a further erosion of congressional controls" over intelligence operations.

[redacted]

STATINTL

Demands Hearings On Intelligence Changes

[redacted]

STATINTL

By LAWRENCE E. TAYLOR
A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, Nov. 11 — Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, called yesterday for congressional hearings on the Nixon Administration's reorganization of American intelligence operations.

Symington said in a Senate speech that although many questions about the restructuring were unanswered, one thing was clear: The White House "does not consider either the organization or the operations of the intelligence community to be matters of concern to the Congress."

The changes ordered last Friday by President Richard M. Nixon brought American intelligence and spying operations under closer control of the White House. There were reports, however, that the move had been made, in part, because of what Symington termed "general unhappiness about various specific intelligence estimates."

"Unfortunately, however, it has been impossible for the public, or even concerned members of Congress, to obtain enough information on this subject for informed judgment," he said.

Symington said he had asked for hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or by its subcommittee on the Central Intelligence Agency. He is a member of each.

The intelligence shake-up last week provided a stronger role for Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and created several new groups to assess and direct intelligence operations.

Among them was the establishment of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council. There were indications that one of the group's chief concerns would be an evaluation of the balance between the United States and Russia in terms of weapons, economics and politics.

In recent months Government experts have disagreed on the balance of power between the two nations. Department of Defense analysts, including Secretary Melvin R. Laird, have contended that the USSR was gaining strength rapidly. The CIA, on the other hand, had appeared more skeptical about Russian power and capabilities.

Mr. Nixon said that the reorganization was ordered after a full study by the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget.

Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem.), Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said the reorganization was "a further erosion of congressional control over the intelligence community."

He pointed out that Henry A. Kissinger, placed in charge of the review group, was insulated from congressional scrutiny in his position as the President's national security adviser.

Symington, in his address, said that the changes could be constructive, but, he said, Congress should not be eliminated from the picture.

He said that he would not accept the proposition "that our only current and continuing responsibility is to appropriate whatever number of billions of dollars the executive branch requests to handle this work."

Instead, Congress needs answers to such questions as what were the deficiencies in the U.S. intelligence operation, in what way should it be made more responsive and what is implied by the White House reference to "strengthened leadership" in intelligence?

Symington questioned how Helms's leadership role would be "enhanced," as the White House contended, "by the creation of a new and obviously more powerful supervisory committee chaired by the adviser to the President for national security affairs (Kissinger), on which new board not only sits the Attorney General but also the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"Has this new White House committee been given authority or/and responsibility which heretofore was the responsibility of the CIA; and which the Congress, under the National Security Act, vested in the agency?" Symington asked.

"How can the integrity of the intelligence product be assured when responsibility for the most critical aspects of intelligence analysis is taken out of the hands of career professionals and vested in a combination of military professionals and the White House staff?"

THE SAN DIEGO UNION
10 JAN 1973

[redacted]

EFFICIENCY NOT SOLE TEST

Intelligence Gives Security

To most Americans the intelligence gathering activities abroad by the United States of America — spying in least charitable terms — is a mysterious matter. Their closest brush with it is usually a glamorized but distorted James Bond movie.

Thus the action of President Nixon to integrate the far-flung activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and many other similar groups, is unlikely to arouse the average citizen for long, although it should. It is his own survival, as well as his tax dollar, that are at stake.

By the same token, the complexity and cryptic qualities of these agencies make the average citizen unqualified to discuss the specifics of the subject with any authority. He is obliged to speak of the problems of national intelligence in terms of goals and principles.

As a first principle, the average citizen would agree that we must always undertake whatever level of intelligence-gathering that is essential to our security. In carrying out this principle we should not be surprised if on occasion the pursuit of information is not savory, for this is a game without rules. We should not be surprised at the cost, because intelligence ranges from the observations of a lookout posted on a hill in Cambodia to information acquired by the most sophisticated and expensive electronic masterpieces.

As a second principle we should ensure that there always is a diversity of sources reporting to the President, and that there are adequate checks and balances as to the validity of the information provided.

Over the years Congress has authorized a number of intelligence agencies that range from those in the executive branch of government to those in the military services. On occasion the information that they have given the President has been conflicting, but by and large the combined effort has been sound.

Therefore, the proposed administrative action which narrows the sources of information that the government uses to develop foreign policy decisions does raise some genuine qualms.

Is it, for example, wise to have the same person who has something close to final authority on which international information should be passed on to the President also serve as the chief foreign policy adviser to the chief executive?

Further, does the consolidation have the effect of making the intelligence operations even more distant and cryptic by removing them farther from the Congress and the executive branch?

Finally, meriting some introspection, is the thought that it is better for the United States to have a degree of redundancy and even waste in its intelligence system than to have it become so efficient that it may become a security problem on its own.

'Able To Leap Tall Buildings...'



Joseph Kraft

Recasting Intelligence

THE REORGANIZATION of the intelligence community announced last week looks at first glance like a mere administrative tightening. The producers of the raw intelligence are simply being made more responsive to the needs of the consumers in the White House.

But the Nixon administration is no more free than most others of the itch to enforce conformity. Unless very carefully watched, the new set-up could be one more device for destroying independent centers of analysis and information inside government.

The reorganization has two main components. For one thing, Richard Helms, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, has been given authority to coordinate his own budget with those of the intelligence units within the Defense and State Departments.

Since Helms as CIA director is a member of most of the high-level policy committees in government he is alert to the intelligence needs of the President and his closest advisers. Presumably he will be able—perhaps with considerable saving of money—to make the work of such intelligence outfits as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency more relevant to White House needs. His part of the reorganization seems relatively straightforward.

THE SECOND PART of the reorganization involves what is called "net assessment." That is a fancy term for the answer to the question: How does the strategic balance stand between Russia and the United States? That question, with deep ramifications in politics and economics as well as foreign policy, is to the various private and public interests that come to a head in government what a piece of red meat is to a pack of starving dogs.

Under the Eisenhower administraion the net assessment was handled by a secret subcommittee of the National Security Council headed by a general officer and working out of the Pentagon. In the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, the net assessments were essentially made under the direction of Secretary Robert McNamara in the Systems Analysis Division of the Department of Defense.

Under the Nixon administration there has been no central responsibility for net assessment. The result has been a chaotic battle featuring many protagonists. In general, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, with the backing of his director of research John Foster and to the delight of congressional hawks, has tended to rate the Soviet threat very highly. The CIA, to the delight of congressional doves, has been more skeptical about the Communist menace.

Under the new reorganization, responsibility for making the net assessment will be vested in a group working under the head of the National Security Council staff, Dr. Henry Kissinger. The official immediately responsible for the net assessments will be Andrew Marshall, who now leaves the Rand corporation where he has been serving as an analyst to take a place on the NSC staff.

Mr. Marshall is by all accounts an extremely good man—experienced, reliable and discriminating in judgment. Presumably he can do a serious job of pulling together the vast range of complicated data required for making the net assessment.

BUT IT IS a serious question whether that office should be performed in such close range to the White House. For the atmosphere in the White House is heavily political. There is no great disposition toward detached analysis, still less to hear news out of keeping with prejudices and commitments.

A nice case in point is the defense program review committee set up under Dr. Kissinger back in 1969. The purpose of that group was to cast a cold, analytic eye on the defense budget, and some of the best analysts in and out of government signed on to do the staff work.

But the President has backed the big spending program of Defense Secretary Laird. The review committee has been allowed to wither on the vine. Half a dozen of the analysts connected with it have resigned, and the senior official presently concerned, Dr. K. Wayne Smith, is rumored to be leaving soon.

No serious high level critique of the defense budget is now being made anywhere in government. That is one of the reasons the Congress, and those of us in the press are floundering so when it comes to defense expenditures.

What all this means is that the new intelligence set-up should be watched with great care. It looks like a sensible arrangement. But it could easily become one more instrument for restricting information and criticism to the disadvantage of all of those on the outside of government.

THE MIAMI HERALD
7 NOV 1970

STATINTL [redacted]

Laird Sees Intelligence Merger Soon

HONOLULU — (AP) — Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said Saturday that the Pentagon is ready to carry out quickly President Nixon's new orders to consolidate federal intelligence-gathering operations.

"I believe the Department of Defense will be able ultimately to reduce costs because of these actions," Laird said in Honolulu for a stopover while he was flying from Saigon to Washington after surveying the Vietnam situation for Nixon.

DEFENSE officials said the consolidations should save millions of dollars through elimination of duplications and reductions in staff but they said it is too early to estimate accurately how much costs will be cut.

The full extent of defense intelligence operations in their various forms never has been disclosed publicly, but a hint of their magnitude can be gleaned from an estimate that they involve about 150,000 people and about $3 million a year.

Laird's statement came a day after the White House announced a reorganization of the wide-ranging intelligence apparatus of the government, giving Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms "an enhanced leadership role" and coordinating authority.

IN HIS statement, Laird appeared to be backing up the generals' and admirals' view that each armed force must have its own intelligence arms.

Recalling streamlining proposals by his own blue-ribbon defense panel, Laird said "we have paid particular attention to intelligence, including the need to maintain the intelligence capabilities of the four armed services."

Even before the White House acted, Laird had created a new assistant secretary of defense slot which he said "will increase civilian supervision of intelligence matters in my office."

The new post is held by Dr. Albert C. Hall, until recently a vice president of an aerospace company.

BUT LAIRD never has followed through on a recommendation by the blue-ribbon panel that would have stripped command of foreign intelligence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Pentagon authorities said that Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Hall rank as co-equals.

The Defense chief said that establishment of a National Cryptologic Command, to handle all code-cracking and communications intelligence, "will proceed in an orderly manner." And he said his staff is working on establishment of a Defense Map Agency and an Office of Defense Investigations.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 NOV 1971

HELMS TOLD TO CUT GLOBAL EXPENSES

Nixon Order Aims at Better Intelligence Gathering

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 6 — President Nixon has given Richard Helms, his Director of Central Intelligence, new orders—and new authority—to trim costs and improve the output of the nation's global intelligence system.

In a statement issued yesterday by the White House—under circumstances strongly suggesting it was designed to attract as little public notice as possible—Mr. Nixon disclosed details of a far-reaching reorganization.

Intelligence experts here believe that Mr. Helms, armed with his new Presidential backing, may be able in the coming months to cut $1-billion from the $5-billion to $6-billion that the United States spends yearly to ascertain, with sky satellites, electronic eavesdropping, secret agents and other sources, Soviet and Chinese Communist military developments.

The reorganization plan, which has been under study at the Office of Management and Budget for at least a year, makes three main changes, informants say:

1. It gives Mr. Helms, who is 58 years old, the first authority ever given an intelligence chief to review—and thus affect—the budgets of all the nation's foreign intelligence agencies as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, which he will continue to head. The other agencies include units within the Defense and State Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

2. It will free Mr. Helms from much day-to-day responsibility for espionage, counter-espionage and such covert operations as the White House periodically orders through its secret "Forty Committee."

This committee, named for a numbered memorandum, includes Henry A. Kissinger, the White House national security assistant, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2d, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Helms. Mr. Helms's duties here will be assumed by his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

3. It creates a new intelligence subcommittee under the National Security Council with the aim of tailoring the daily "product" garnered by the nation's vast overseas intelligence network closer to the needs of the "consumers", President Nixon and his top staff.

Presumably, intelligence sources say, the Forty Committee will be merged into the council's new subcommittee since the membership of each is identical.

Not Always Responsive

"The President and Henry [Kissinger] have felt that the intelligence we were collecting wasn't always responsive to their needs," said one source. "They suspected that one reason was because the intelligence community had no way of knowing day to day what the President and Kissinger needed. This is a new link between producers and consumers. We'll have to wait and see if it works."

Mr. Kissinger will add the chairmanship of the new subcommittee to several others he already holds.

Another development in the president's reorganization is the creation of a "net assessment group" inside Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff. It will be headed by Andrew M. Marshall, a consultant with the Rand Corporation of Los Angeles.

"Net assessment means comparing over-all U.S.S.R. forces and capabilities with those of the U.S.," said an American intelligence expert. "It's as complicated a calculus as exists. We in the intelligence world often know more about Soviet forces and capabilities than we do about our own—and this new group is intended to pull it all together in one place for the President."

Resources Committee

Under the new plan Mr. Helms will also head an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee" on which will be represented the state and Defense Departments, the office of Management and Budget and the C.I.A.

The white house announcement said that the committee will "advise the D.C.I. on the preparation of a consolidated program budget." This, in the view of experts, is Mr. Holm's new authority to supervise and, at least partly, control the volved in collecting inteligence.

The Pentagon spends $3-billion yearly on intelligence if all its activities are counted, said one source.

"This is 80 per cent of everything the United States spends for intelligence," he said. The President hasn't given Helms control of the D.O.D.'s Intelligence budget, but at least he can now see it and advise on it before it's presented as a fait accompli."

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON STAR

[redacted]

Intelligence Under Kissinger's Wing

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

President Nixon's drastic reordering of the intelligence community brings still more power to that White House adviser-extraordinaire—Henry A. Kissinger.

People most intimately involved see the erstwhile professor's passion for order and efficiency triumphing.

On one level CIA Director Richard Helms was given a mandate to become director of all American intelligence in fact, as well as in name.

But on the White House level, Kissinger was put at head of the new "National Security Council Intelligence Committee" providing "guidance and direction" to Helms.

In other words, under the reshaping ordered Friday, Helms has the job of coordinating the work of the often-warring intelligence agencies, inside and outside the Pentagon. For the first time, with an expanded personal staff, he will be in charge of drawing up one intelligence budget—now unofficially reckoned at $5 billion yearly.

Kissinger at Helm

But the direction in which his machine goes will be determined by Kissinger's committee. This group, of which Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, undersecretaries from the State and Defense Departments, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also are members, will determine the intelligence assessments which get to President Nixon.

The new committee is simply the latest addition to that national security council system Kissinger has systematically set up in almost three years in the White House. It is roughly akin to the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also heads, responsible for filtering the foreign policy options which reach the President.

According to most insiders, this Review Group has been the vehicle for Kissinger's virtually taking control of foreign policy away from more passive Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Interdepartmental groups from the state, defense and other interested departments feed policy options into the Kissinger shop, which reviews them for decision by the President.

Options Discussed

The options also are discussed by the National Security Council—whose chairman is the President, and whose members include the secretaries of State and Defense. Furthermore, the State Department, through Rogers, has the power to submit its own recommendations directly to the President on any given option.

But in nearly three years, Kissinger's driving energy and devotion to detailed staff work—plus his undisputed intellectual power—have given him the upper hand. He and his staff initiate government-wide policy studies, and precious little national security policy is decided by the President against Kissinger's advice.

In the intelligence shake-up the Kissinger apparatus will also get powers at the lower levels. The mechanism is a new Net Assessment Group (NAG) headed by Anthony Marshall, a senior member of Kissinger's White House staff.

"The functions of NAG will be just what the name suggests," said one insider — "to nag the intelligence community."

That means the group is to be responsible for suggesting to Helms & Co. that they should assess what results might flow abroad from any policy under consideration in the White House. Naturally, Kissinger, chairman of the Senior Review Group, will be in a position to know what those possible policies are. So the Kissinger shop becomes practically the coordinator between policy and intelligence.

The job of NAG also will be to produce comparative assessments of the relative strength of various world powers. It will do this by pulling together intelligence estimates from all over the government—political, military and economic. For instance, NAG would assess the strategic balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union, or between the Arab world and Israel.

All of which adds up to a major new responsibility for Kissinger. It also marks a major step in Nixon's drive to put centralized control over every vital government function in the White House.

STATINTL

STATINTL

[redacted]

BALTIMORE SUN

Nixon moves to better spy systems' coordination; Kissinger, Helms assigned broader powers

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Nixon moved yesterday to improve coordination among the government agencies involved in foreign intelligence activities.

Part of the plan would tie the intelligence effort more closely into the National Security Council apparatus headed by Mr. Nixon's most influential foreign-policy adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

The reorganization also will mean that Richard Helms, the director of central intelligence, will turn over many of his agency's day-to-day operations to his deputy and spend more time as the government's general intelligence overseer.

The CIA chief theoretically has been the head of the whole "intelligence community" since the Kennedy administration, presiding over the United States Intelligence Board. But the limits of his authority never have been defined very precisely.

The White House, announcing the new structures yesterday, said they were designed "to improve the efficiency and effectiveness" of the intelligence agencies, which together employ an estimated 200,000 persons—three-fourths of them military servicemen — and spend about $5 billion a year.

Mr. Nixon also ordered the creation of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee, which Dr. Kissinger will head. The committee, the White House said, "will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products."

This seemed to indicate that the council will have greatly expanded authority over the different agencies.

Within the council's structure a new "net assessment group," also will be created. The group will evaluate intelligence data and make studies on the relative balances [illegible]



RICHARD HELMS



HENRY KISSINGER

the world. The unit will be headed by Andrew Marshall, the Rand Corporation's former director of strategic studies.

The CIA director will be given "an enhanced leadership role," serving as chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board and also heading a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will draw up proposals for a consolidated budget for all the intelligence agencies.

Marine in charge

Officials said this means that the CIA's deputy director, Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman of the Marine Corps, will take over much of the responsibility for the CIA's own operations.

Government agencies represented on the intelligence board include, beside the CIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Defense Department's National Security Agency, which specializes in code-cracking; the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has separate Army, Navy and Air Force components working on military intelligence; the Treasury Department, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Proposals to revamp the intelligence structure have been floating through the administration for many months. The plan announced yesterday was drafted primarily by the National Security Council staff and the Office of Management and Budget.

2 failures cited

Questions about the present system's effectiveness seemed to center mainly on the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Two notable intelligence failures in Indochina have been cited as causing the failure of an attempt by U.S. troops in November, 1970, to rescue American prisoners of war from the Sontay Prison Camp in North Vietnam and as having hampered the South Vietnamese campaign in Laos last February and March.

In the Sontay attempt, the Army and Air Force raiders landed only to discover that all the P.O.W.'s had been moved out.

In the Laos campaign, the South Vietnamese Army suffered [illegible] units were sent reeling back across the border when North Vietnamese forces in the frontier zone proved to be far stronger than had been anticipated.

HARRISBURG, PA.
PATRIOT
M - 45,299
PATRIOT-NEWS
S - 159,880
NOV 6 1971

CIA Chief to Head Overhaul of All Intelligence Units

From The Patriot Wire Services

WASHINGTON — CIA Director Richard A. Helms has been given broad overall supervision in an overhaul of the United States' intelligence gathering operations, the White House announced yesterday.

Officials said Helms would be freed from some operational responsibility at the Central Intelligence Agency to assume "communitywide responsibilities of the several scattered intelligence operations."

Chairman George H. Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee, which has been among congressional critics of U.S. intelligence operations, said after a White House briefing on the reorganization that it was a step in the right direction, but it was too early to predict results.

"I believe we can save personnel and money and get more intelligence," Mahon told a reporter, but he quickly added that intelligence operations had been repeatedly reorganized with but limited success.

Rep. Lucien Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House armed services subcommittee with supervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, said he did not find the new shakeup particularly "dramatic."

But Nedzi questioned the additional duties given Helms. "I have doubts about the capacity of any one person to be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time administer the CIA," the congressman said.

The reorganization also revived the old U.S. Intelligence Board whose membership will include Helms, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the chief of the Defense intelligence agency and representatives of other agencies with a stake in intelligence operations.

Time magazine reported in its October 25 issue that Hoover recently had "effectively cut off the international from the national intelligence effort" by limiting contacts between FBI and CIA men. But officials flatly denied the report.

Time in the same article said Hoover also had abolished a seven-man FBI section that maintained contact with other U.S. intelligence units, including the defense intelligence agency.

The White House announcement listed these specific steps:

—Helms will assume "enhanced leadership" in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

—An intelligence committee will be set up within the National Security Council which will be headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser on national security affairs. The committee will include the CIA director, the attorney general, the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

—A "net assessment group" will be established within the National Security Council which will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

[redacted]

White House Shakes Up Vast Intelligence-Gathering Network

CIA's Helms Seen Possible Czar, Pentagon's Agency Downgraded as Kissinger and Staff Receive New Powers

BY DAVID KRASLOW
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The White House announced Friday a shakeup of the government's massive intelligence bureaucracy that could have major import in enabling the President to assess more accurately any Soviet threat to the United States.

Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, emerges from the long-planned reorganization as an even stronger figure with responsibility for coordinating all intelligence activities. Some sources said Helms' role could develop into that of an intelligence czar.

Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, and the National Security Council staff also are given significant new powers in the shakeup.

Budget-Clearing Procedure

The Pentagon's huge Defense Intelligence Agency is downgraded and will be required, along with other intelligence arms of the government, to clear its budget through a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee chaired by Helms.

Informed sources said the shakeup reflected the President's unhappiness with the quality of information supplied him on occasion and his belief that the splintered intelligence activities can be coordinated better.

The President also is convinced, it was said, that the government's intelligence bill — reliably estimated at about $5 billion a year now—is unnecessarily high. Administration officials hope to achieve a saving of at least several hundred million dollars along with greater efficiency.

For years many in Congress and in the executive branch have thought that the government's intelligence effort, because of growth of staff and fragmentation among various agencies, was becoming unmanageable and that the cost was getting out of hand.

The studies that led to Friday's announcement were launched secretly by the National Security Council more than a year ago.

A major change, which for the first time will give the White House the expert capability to make its own intelligence evaluation of such strategic problems as the Soviet missile threat, is the establishment of the Net Assessment Group within the National Security Council staff.

The group will be headed by a senior staff member. A White House source said that job would go to Andrew W. Marshall, now director of strategic studies at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica.

The different interpretations that the Pentagon and the CIA have given to the construction of about 90 missile silos in the Soviet Union is expected to be one of the first strategic policy problems to be put before the NAG.

The size of the defense budget and the strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians could be affected by whatever decision the President finally makes regarding the purpose of those still-empty silos.

Pentagon analysts have tended to a more alarmist reading of the silo construction, suggesting the Russians may be developing a new weapons system for offensive purposes.

While not ruling out that possibility, the CIA, it is understood, tends to the view that the silos are designed primarily to afford greater protection for missiles already in being and are therefore defensive.

Thus, where differences arise in the intelligence community on strategic questions, the NAG would be expected to reduce such disputes to manageable proportions for the President.

Helms' strengthened position will derive in large measure from his new authority over what the White House described as a "consolidated intelligence program budget."

Never before has there been a single intelligence budget. Under the present system each agency engaged in intelligence work submits its own budget request to the White House.

Under the reorganization the budget requests will go to the committee chaired by Helms and whose membership will include representatives of the State and Defense departments and the Office of Management and Budget.

Also among the "major management improvements" announced by the White House were:

—"An enhanced leadership role" for the director of central intelligence (Helms) in "planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

—Establishment of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee, chaired by the President's national security assistant (Kissinger), whose membership will include the attorney general, the director of central intelligence, the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

That committee is to "give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user."

[redacted]

STATINTL

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810
NOV 6 1972

CIA Director Is Appointed by President To Overhaul U.S. Intelligence Operations

WASHINGTON (UPI). — The White House announced on Friday President Nixon has ordered an overhall of the government's intelligence operations, assigning Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a broader overall supervisory role.

Administration officials said that Helms would be freed from some operational responsibilities at the CIA and assume "community-wide responsibilities" in the U.S. foreign intelligence gathering operations.



RICHARD HELMS
. . . *wider responsibility*

The White House announcement listed these specific steps:

—HELMS WILL assume "enhanced leadership" in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

—AN INTELLIGENCE committee will be set up within the National Security Council which will be headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Presidential adviser on national security affairs. The committee will include the CIA director, the attorney general, the under secretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

—A "NET ASSESSMENT group" will be established within the national security council which will be responsible for reviewing and evaluating all intelligence.

—AN "INTELLIGENCE resources advisory committee," headed by Helms, will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.

The White House said that a national cryptologic command, a code-breaking organization, would be set up under the National Security Agency to consolidate work now being carried out in different agencies.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN
NOV 6 1971
E - 634,371
S - 701,743

Helms Ordered To Take Over All Intelligence

Nixon Designates CIA Director to Consolidate Agencies

Washington -- (UPI) -- President Nixon has ordered the nation's scattered military andcivilian intelligence gatheringo perations to be consolidated under the leadership of Cia Director Richard M. Helms.

The White House said Helms wouldshed some of his duties as director of the Central Intelligence Agency to spy and counter-spy agencies tral Intelligence Agency to coordinate the work of U.S. spy and counter-spy agencies as the result of al engthy executive branch study of duplication of efforts in their operations.

Congressional committees have long been critical of alleged overlapping of intelligence activities and the new plan won tentative approval of one key lawmaker, Rep. George H. Mahon (D-Tex) chairman of the House appropriations Committee.

Helms will work with a new National Security Council intelligence committee headed by presidential aide Henry Kissinger and consisting of the attorney general, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and representatives of the State and Defense Departments.

Mr. Nixon also ordered reconstruction of the United States Intelligence Board to be headed by Helms and to include representativeso f the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Treasury Department, Atomic Energy Commission and the National Security Agency.

Rep. Lucian Nedzi (D-Mich), chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee with supervisory responsibility for the CIA and Pentagon intelligence operations, saidh ch ad doubts "about the capacity of any one person to be able to oversee the entire intelligence operation and at the same time timea dminister h CIeA."

Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, deputy director of the CIA, was expected to take over many helms' operating responsibilities.

Other provisions include creation of a "net assessment group" within the National Security Council to evaluate all intelligence, and establishment of a "intelligencer esources advisory committee," headed by Helms and which will advise on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget.

WASHINGTON POST
6 NOV. 1971

[redacted]



RICHARD HELMS
. . . intelligence chief



GEN. ROBERT CUSHMAN
. . . new CIA duties

Helms to Oversee U.S. Spy Network

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon announced a long-awaited reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community yesterday creating a government-wide coordinating role for CIA Director Richard Helms and bringing military agencies under closer civilian control.

The overhaul was ordered following what the White House called "an exhaustive study" of the far-flung foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. government. The various agencies are unofficially reported to employ 200,000 persons and to cost $5 billion yearly.

The aim of the reorganization, according to the White House announcement, is to improve "efficiency and effectiveness." Although the statement did not say so, high-ranking officials are known to feel that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it produces.

There also have been reports that the President and senior aides were unhappy with the military intelligence planning which went into the abortive Sontay prison raid and the South Vietnamese incursion into [illegible]. White House officials denied yesterday that reorganization is in response to dissatisfaction about particular estimates or reports.

One of the principal changes announced yesterday is the creation of a consolidated foreign intelligence program budget for the entire government, to be supervised by a high-ranking committee under Helms. Officials said Helms would be empowered to dip into any intelligence agency, civilian or military, for information to justify elements of its budget.

According to the announcement, Helms is being granted "an enhanced leadership role . . . in planning, reviewing, coordinating and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence."

Helms has been instructed to reorganize his own office within the next 30 days so that he may assume his new government-wide responsibilities, officials said.

He will turn over many of his operating responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency to his deputy director, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.

Cushman served four years as the national security aide of then-Vice President Nixon from 1957 to 1960, and is considered close to Mr. Nixon.

Helms will become chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board to consider national intelligence requirements and priorities, the security of intelligence data and the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Other members of the board will be Cushman, the chiefs of the major intelligence agencies of the Defense and State Departments and representatives of the Treasury Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Atomic Energy Commission.

Two elements of the reorganization appear to give greater control to the National Security Council staff under presidential assistant Henry A. Kissinger.

A new NSC intelligence committee, headed by Kissinger and including Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other high officials, has been established to give "direction and guidance" on national intelligence needs and evaluate the usefulness of the information received from the user's point of view.

At the NSC staff level, the reorganization created a new net assessment group to be headed by Anthony Marshall, former director of strategic studies of the Rand Corp. NAG, as it is known, will produce White House assessments of the relative strategic balance between major powers, as well as assessments of intelligence quality.

The assessment of the strategic balance is a critical factor in the battle over future military budgets. U.S. military leaders, intelligence services and some outsiders have expressed anxiety about a large Soviet buildup of strategic arms and are calling for ex-

The White House announcement also said that Mr. Nixon has ordered three consolidations in the ePntagon's intelligence organization:

- A national cryptologic command to consolidate all communications intelligence activities under the director of the National Security Agency, the monitoring and codebreaking agency with headquarters at Fort Meade, Md.
- An office of Defense investigations, to consolidate all personnel security investigations in the Defense Department.
- A Defense map agency to combine the now separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services.

Officials said the reorganization is "not a plan to save money," but they expressed optimism that some funds will be saved through the various new controls and consolidations.

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON STAR

Spending at Heart of Spying Shakeup

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The creation of a consolidated intelligence program budget is at the heart of the intelligence shakeup ordered by President Nixon, informed sources say.

Preparation of the intelligence budget should for the first time give the President and other top officials a clear picture of how much is being spent for intelligence, where it is being spent and what it is buying, these officials said.

Richard Helms, who now is head of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be responsible for preparation of the budget as part of what the White House announcement said would be his "enhanced leadership role" in the intelligence field.

Not 'Intelligence Czar'

Informed officials cautioned, however, that the changes ordered by the President would not make Helms an "intelligence czar" in the sense that he will tell the heads of other intelligence agencies within the government how to run their jobs. His control over the pursestrings will, however, give him much more control of the over-all intelligence activities of the government than he has had in the past.

The changes ordered by Nixon also give his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, an enhanced role in the intelligence field by making him chairman of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee—one of a growing number of similar committees he heads.

A new Net Assessment Group will be under Kissinger. Its job is to review and evaluate all the products of intelligence work and to make comparative studies of American and Soviet capabilities. It will be headed by Andrew Marshall, a member of the National Security Council staff.

The changes, designed to bring greater control over the estimated $5 billion a year spent and 200,000 people who work on intelligence, have been the subject of a lengthy dispute within the administration.

Packard Unimpressed

In a press conference Thursday, the day before the changes were announced at the White House, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, one of the most outspoken government officials, indicated he was not entirely pleased by the way the struggle had worked out.

"There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experience with a lot of people in the White House the last couple of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. But that's my own personal view."

Because the Defense Department spends most of the money and employs most of the people and machines involved in intelligence, the changes will have a major impact there.

Consolidation Is Key

The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense Department security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations and the consolidation of all mapping and charting activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials said these two changes won't be much of a problem.

But they said the order to set up a National Cryptologic Command under Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency, would "take some doing" because the Defense Department's code-breaking activities now are so fragmented.

Similarly, they said, the Defense Department faces some difficulties in reorganizing its tactical intelligence—the information used by field commanders rather than top officials in Washington.

National Terms

Although the tendency is to think in terms of national intelligence—the kind of information on which the President bases major decisions, for example—the bulk of the intelligence gathered by the various agencies is of a tactical nature, involving such things as the day-to-day movements of potentially hostile ships.

The White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would turn over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., so he can devote more time to the leadership of the over-all intelligence community.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee that has been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes ordered by the President place an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a "superhuman job."

"One wonders if any human is capable of that kind of responsibility," he said.

WASHINGTON STAR
5 NOV 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL



RICHARD HELMS



HENRY KISSINGER

U.S. Revamps Its Intelligence

By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star Staff Writer

The White House announced a series of steps today aimed at improving U.S. foreign intelligence.

The new setup in effect makes Central Intelligence Agency Director Richard Helms a sort of super boss of all government intelligence operations, inlcuding Pentagon activities in this field.

As the White House put it, Helms will have "an enhanced leadership role" in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.

Officials said the CIA director will delegate most of his CIA operational responsibilities to the deputy director, now Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., in order to give more time to leadership of the intelligence community as a whole.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, also is given a key role in the intelligence field as chairman of a National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

The White House said this committee "will give direction and guidance on national intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence user." The CIA director will be a member of this committee.

Much of the CIA director's new power will come from his role as chairman of a new Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which will advise him "on the preparation of a consolidated intelligence program budget."

In this role, the officials said the CIA director would have a key voice in the allocation of available resources between so-called "tactical intelligence" of the military service intelligence arms and broader-scale activities.

The CIA director also is made chairman of a reconstituted U.S. intelligence board, which includes directors of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the National Security Agency, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and representatives of the Treasury Department, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

This board, the White House said, will "advise and assist" the CIA director "with respect to the production of national intelligence, the establishment of national intelligence requirements and priorities, the supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material, and the protection of intelligence sources and methods."

Among other changes ordered by the President the White House said, a National Cryptologic Command will be set up under the director of the National Security Agency to consolidate code-breaking activities now carried out by sepearate agencies.

To Be Consolidated

Another change involves consolidation of all Defense Department personnel security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations.

The President also directed that a Defense Map Agency be created by combining the now-separate mapping, charting and geodetic organizations of the military services in order to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.

The White House said the President's objectives in ordering the changes in the intelligence field are to insure continuing review of the responsiveness of intelligence effort to national needs; strengthend leadership for the community as a whole; more efficient use of resources in the collection of intelligence information; elimination of less efficient or out-moded activities, and "improvement in the quality, scope and timeliness of intelligence information."

U.N.—What Went Wrong?

U.S. Envoy Failure, Time Lack Cited in Postmortem

By Stanley Karnow
and Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Staff Writers

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you think we lost?

A. We didn't have the votes. (Laughter)

Q. Seriously, I mean . . .

Secretary of State William Rogers' News Conference, Oct. 26, 1971

Last Monday night, the United States met a stunning diplomatic defeat as a majority of the General Assembly voted to expel Nationalist China from the United Nations and seat the Chinese Communist regime in the international organization.

The U.S. setback appeared to be devastating because so many American officials in Washington, New York and around the world had worked so hard to prevent that outcome.

Early this month, for example, Secretary of State Rogers talked with a total of 92 foreign ministers and other foreign delegates in an effort to persuade them to support the U.S. position, which favored the entry of Peking without ousting Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. George Bush, the chief American representative at the U.N., lobbied like a Texas politician to swing votes behind the "dual representation" proposal.

Meanwhile, U.S. envoys in places as familiar as London and as exotic as the Trucial Coast were striving to sway kings, dictators, presidents, premiers and lesser foreign dignitaries into backing the American stance.

What went wrong? Or was the result of the U.N. vote really a failure for the Nixon administration?

In the post mortems that follow such historic episodes, versions of what, how and why the event unfolded inevitably differ according to the viewpoint of the participant involved. In this case, accounts fall into two broad categories.

There are those, particularly inside the official U.S. foreign policy apparatus, who see it largely as a mechanical failure sustained by the bureaucracy. They contend that the day could have been saved had the United States had more time to sell its position and, among other things, had certain American ambassadors abroad performed better.

Many of these officials also argue that the administration's "dual representation" proposal was inherently contradicted by the presence of Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, in Peking just as Washington was urging nations to support a U.N. position virulently opposed by the Chinese Communists.

On the other side, several analysts in and out of the government express the opinion that the entire U.N. exercise was actually a charade staged by the administration for two essential motives—to fend off the President's conservative critics at home and to assure America's conservative allies abroad that the United States does not betray its friends.

Partisans of this thesis consider it significant that the President carefully refrained from deploring the adverse U.N. vote itself but instead denounced delegates who cheered the final score. Informants with access to Kissinger also now recall that he treated the U.N. issue "as if it didn't matter."

Straddling these divergent explanations, some sources point out that the choice facing the administration was never as clearcut as it seemed to be—and that, in reality, the White House preferred to shroud its strategy in ambiguity.

"From the President's perspective, there were risks and gains in either result, and he was prepared to accept both," says one of these sources, adding that the White House would have won either way, since Peking had agreed to the President's visit whatever the outcome at the U.N."

In terms of energey expended for results attained, then, the real American loser at the U.N. seems to have been the State Department. Its setback appears to reinforce the prevailing Washington view that its role in foreign affairs is negligible compared to the power wielded by the President, and Kissinger.

Preparations for the General Assembly vote that occurred on Monday night reach back to the U.N. debate on China that took place nearly a year ago.

For two decades before then, the United States had systematically rejected the idea of bringing the Chinese Communists into the international organization in any shape or formal. But on Nov. 12, 1970, there was a hint that the old U.S. line was shifting.

Ambassador Christopher H. Phillips, the deputy chief of the American mission to the U.N., asserted in a speech that day that the United States hoped to see Communist China "play a constructive role among the family of nations."

Phillips implied in the same speech that the United States would invoke Article 6 of the U.N. Charter to block the ouster of Nationalist China. The article stipulates that a member nation can only be expelled by a two-thirds vote.

Although it was not entirely clear at the time, the Phillips statement signalled that the United States was edging towards the "dual representation" position it would later put forth. This new approach was prompted by the 1970 vote on China.

For the first time since the U.N. struggle over Chinese representation had begun, the perennial Albanian appeal calling for Peking's entry and the expulsion of the Nationalists [illegible] failed of adoption, however, because the United States had won its motion to make the issue an "important question" requiring a two-thirds margin.

The narrowness of that victory made it plain to the White House that the United States urgently needed a new policy lest it suffer a defeat in the next round on China. On Nov. 19, 1970, consequently, Kissinger sent a National Security Memorandum to Secretary Rogers requesting the creation of a special committee to review the Chinese representation issue and to recommend a fresh strategy.

Headed by Assistant Secretary of State Samuel de Palma, chief of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, the committee comprised about 15 State Department and Central Intelligence Agency specialists. Its task was to draft a paper to be sent to the National Security Council, which inturn would advise which in turn would advise

As it held its deliberations, the committee gradually became polarized between members who favored all-out support for Peking's admission to the U.N. and advocates of both Communist and Nationalist representation in the international body. Nobody believed, in short, that the Communists could be kept out.

In February, after examining a wide assortment of notions, the committee presented the White House with two principal options available.

One of these, favored by those who wanted to see only the Communists in the U.N., became known in State Department jargon as the "sink with the ship" gambit. It recommended that the administration continue to back the Nationalists exclusively—but with a full awareness that they would lose and thus open the way for Peking's entry.

continued

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

[redacted]

Science fiction—or tomorrow's U.S.?

By Robert Barkan
Pacific News Service
Washington

"1984" may arrive ahead of schedule.

While Army intelligence agents have been quietly amassing extensive files on dissidents, scientists have even more quietly been developing the technology that will enable a computer to control "criminal" actions and emotions.

"1984" is still fiction, but no longer science fiction. The technology of the police state is ready. All that remains is for the government to implement it.

The first covert step in that direction may have already been taken. In the January issue of Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, engineer Joseph Meyer proposed attaching miniature electronic tracking devices to 20 million Americans. These "transponders" would be linked by radio to a computer which would monitor the wearers' locations and implement curfew and territorial restrictions.

Pentagon silent

Meyer, a computer specialist, has spent his last 17 years working for the Defense Department. Yet the Pentagon has made no public statement concerning his proposal. Interestingly, Meyer neglected in his article to name the particular Defense Department agency he works for and he gave his home rather than his business address, an uncommon practice in technical journals. Reached by phone in their suburban home, Meyer's wife nervously refused to divulge Meyer's telephone number at work, insisting that he could be reached only at home, early in the morning. The next day, Meyer laconically refused to name which agency of the Defense Department he works for, but a check with the switchboard operator at the National Security Agency (NSA) found an extension for him there.

Meyer's reticence in naming the National Security Agency is understandable. The NSA is the most secretive of the dozen or so agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence community. Established in 1952 by a still-classified presidential directive, the agency has remained shrouded in secrecy. The NSA has more personnel and larger facilities than the Central Intelligence Agency and twice its budget, yet while volumes have been written about the operations of the CIA, very little has been discovered or disclosed about the NSA.

A condition for bail

The transponders proposed by Meyer would be attached to the "subscribers" as a condition of bail or parole. Each subscriber would be identified by a code transmitted several times a minute to a computer via a network of transceivers deployed around town like police call-boxes. The computer would record the "subscriber's" location and compare it with his "normal schedule," checking for any "territorial or curfew restrictions." If the subscriber was out of line, the computer would instruct the transponder to "warn" the subscriber of his violation.

The transponders would be "attached" to "subscribers" in such a way that they couldn't be removed without the computer knowing it. Tampering with or discarding transponders would be a felony and a subscriber who did so would be forced into hiding "everywhere he goes," sought by the FBI. Meyer wants the transponders assigned "on a fairly long-term basis," so that the "subscriber" "will acquire long experience in not committing crimes."

The scheme's purpose, says Meyer, is to "constrain criminals and arrestees into behaving like law-abiding citizens," but in practice the computer—and its human programmer—would control the everyday activities of the people plugged into it. "Subscribers" would be identified by a code transmitted several times a minute to a computer via a network of transceivers will "stay close to home, to avoid being implicated in crimes." At work a "human surveillance system" will keep them under control.

Estimating that the number of transceivers needed for surveillance in a large city would be about the same as the number of policemen, Meyer has all the details worked out. In New York City's black community of Harlem, for example, the transceivers would be strung at one block intervals "along 110th Street, 114th, 118th, etc., from 8th Avenue to the river." North-south strings of transceivers would be installed "on 8th Avenue and several main streets to the east." Only about 250 transceivers would be "capable of monitoring the whole region on a street-by-street basis."

Like every good engineer, Meyer covers all the "system parameters" in his proposal—including its social implications. If laws, police, prosecutors, courts, prisons, news media and the "society at large" were perfect, he says, then his scheme could be approved on the basis of its "efficiency." But he admits that criminal acts are frequently a response to "the social and economic system." Most people arrested are poor, members of minority groups, or "products of deplorable circumstances."

Cost a problem

The Pentagon engineer nonetheless comes out predictably on the side of law and order. The basic problem in preventing the poor and the black from committing the "criminal acts" with which they respond to the system and their deplorable circumstances is to "persuade or condition" them to "play by the rather arbitrary rules of the social system." This can be done, says Meyer, "by providing costs for misbehavior and payoffs for compliance." But the costs are much clearer than the payoffs—"attaching transponders to arrestees and criminals will put them into an electronic surveillance system that will make it very difficult for them to commit crimes, or even to violate territorial or curfew restrictions, without immediate apprehension." Joseph Meyer recognizes that his transponder surveillance system could lead to a "police state," but "the same could be said about police, jails, courts, laws, taxes and so on."

Transponders, he thinks, will help the government protect itself from the people. For example, they might be used as "punitive devices" against political "criminals," that is, "for arrests following riots or confrontations." If the system is successful, Meyer proposes that plans be made for "monitoring aliens and political subgroups." Later, when the U.S. again meddles in the internal affairs of another country, transponders might be used for "defense purposes, to monitor guerrilla or dissident activities in foreign areas."

Rent a transponder

Meanwhile Meyer worries that his system will not work. "To evade the street-surveillance system," he fears, "tunnels could be dug under the streets or movement through the sewer system could be tried." Worse yet, there might be "massive destruction" of transponders in "mutinies and large-scale confrontations."

"An outright revolt by 25 million arrestees and criminals," Meyer warns, "would be troublesome."

Continued

WASHINGTON POST
20 OCT 1971 STATINTL

LBJ Adds Some Facts, Omits Others

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Additions and omissions mark former President Johnson's account of the 1964-65 escalation of the Vietnam war, it is evident from the excerpts from his book published today.

Probably the single most disputed issue in Mr. Johnson's conduct of the war was the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack in the Tonkin Gulf by North Vietnamese boats on two American destroyers, the Maddox and Turner Joy. Mr. Johnson declared then, and reaffirms in his book, that the evidence of the attack was conclusive. As a result he sought and got the Tonkin Gulf Resolution from Congress.

But his critics contend the attack either never took place or even if something did occur Mr. Johnson blew it up out of all proportion because he already was determined to strike North Vietnam from the air. At least three books have now been written about the affair and the thrust of each has been on the critical side.

American intercepts of North Vietnamese messages were heavily relied upon at the time to prove that the attack took place. Their texts, however, have never been made public though Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in 1968 did summarize them for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and show the texts to the senators in private. Now the former President quotes from two of the messages and concludes that "clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were attacking us."

The quotes will not satisfy the doubters. Why did not Mr. Johnson reveal the complete texts, they will ask? And why not, indeed. Cryptographic protection is the usual answer but it is not convincing, given the nature of current procedures at the time. Mr. Johnson thus would seem only to have reopened the argument.

In this installment of his memoirs the former President discusses four of the first five major Vietnam decisions. The Tonkin retaliation was one of them; the Johns Hopkins speech another; the policy of reprisal by air another. The fifth "and by far the hardest" was sending ground troops to Vietnam to join the battle.

As the former President describes all these decisions, each was reached with great soul searching. Yet, read as a whole in hindsight, there was an inevitable progression from one to the other, especially from Rolling Thunder, the air campaign against the North, to the shipment of massive numbers of troops to the South.

As he so often did while in office, Mr. Johnson saw his actions as steps logically following the policies of his two predecessors, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Omitted from today's excerpts are descriptions of Gen. Eisenhower's personal encouragement to Mr. Johnson.)

The air war simply was not enough; only ground forces could save South Vietnam. In March, 1965, Gen. William Westmoreland's request for the first two Marine battalions was granted. Then on April 1 came the big decision to beef up the manpower though the Army forces still were described as "logistic and support." It would be only a matter of time, however, until combat forces would have to go as such.

Mr. Johnson's account of the April 1 decision lists three steps as "among the specific military actions I approved." But the Pentagon papers made public something the former President totally skips: his instructions to avoid telling the American public about the major steps he was taking. This was contained in the National Security Action Memorandum 328, over the signature of McGeorge Bundy, to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the head of the CIA detailing Mr. Johnson's "decisions."

It was this memorandum which contained the statement that "the President desires" that "premature publicity be avoided by all possible precautions" on the key new military steps. "The President's desire," the memo concluded, "is that these movements and changes should be understood as being gradual and wholly consistent with existing policy."

If this decision then was to be painted as "wholly consistent with existing policy" how can it now be "by far the hardest" of five decisions Mr. Johnson had then taken about the war? Herein lies part of the credibility gap that plagued him in office and which today's installment fails to dispel.

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
8 Oct 1971

Congress Responds To Tonkin Incident

This is the fourth of 15 excerpts from former President Johnson's book, "The Vantage Point," an account of his presidency, to be published shortly.

"CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE VIETNAM 1964-1965"

In August 1964 an unexpected crisis developed, one that threatened for a time to change the nature of the war in Vietnam. During the early hours of Sunday morning, August 2, a high-priority message came in reporting that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked the destroyer USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The Maddox was on what we called the De Soto patrol. One purpose was to spot evidence of Hanoi's continuing infiltration of men and war supplies into South Vietnam by sea. Another was to gather electronic intelligence.

Another form of naval activity, not connected with our patrol, was going on in the area. During 1964 the South Vietnamese navy made small-scale strikes against installations along the North Vietnamese coast. The purpose was to interfere with Hanoi's continuing program of sending men and supplies into the South by sea. Senators and Representatives designated to oversee our intelligence operations were fully briefed on these South Vietnamese activities, and on our supporting role, in January 1964, again in May, twice in June, and again in early August. Secretary McNamara described the operations, codenamed 34-A, in a closed session with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 3, 1964.

One 34-A attack occurred on July 30. At the time, the destroyer Maddox had not started its patrol and was 120 miles away. A second South Vietnamese attack took place the night of August 3 when the De Soto patrol was at least 70 miles away. It was later alleged that our destroyers were supporting the South Vietnamese naval action. The fact is our De Soto commanders did not even know where or when the 34-A attacks would occur.

Two days later the North Vietnamese struck again at our destroyers, this time at night (midmorning Washington time) on August 4. A few minutes after nine o'clock I had a call from McNamara. He informed me that our intelligence people had intercepted



message that strongly indicated the North Vietnamese were preparing another attack on our ships in the Tonkin Gulf. Soon we received messages from the destroyer Maddox that its radar and that of the USS C. Turner Joy had spotted vessels they believed to be hostile. The enemy ships appeared to be preparing an ambush. The Maddox and C. Turner Joy had changed course to avoid contact, but they then sent word that the enemy vessels were closing in at high speed. Within an hour the destroyers advised that they were being attacked by torpedoes and were firing on the enemy PT boats. As messages flowed in from Pacific Command Headquarters, McNamara passed along the key facts to me.

We had scheduled a noon meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the situation in Cyprus, and several key advisers had assembled for that session.

I closed the NSC meeting and asked Rusk, McNamara, Vance, McCone, and Bundy to join me for lunch. The unanimous view of those advisers was that we could not ignore this second provocation and that the attack required retaliation. I agreed. We decided on air strikes against North Vietnamese PT boats and their bases plus a strike on one oil depot.

During the afternoon additional intelligence reports flowed in. We intercepted a message from one of the attacking North Vietnamese boats in which it boasted of having fired at two "enemy airplanes" and claimed to have damaged one. The North Vietnamese skipper reported that his unit had "sacrificed two comrades." Our experts said this meant either two enemy boats or two men in the attack group. Another message to North Vietnamese PT boat headquarters boasted: "Enemy vessel perhaps wounded." Clearly the North Vietnamese knew they were attacking us.

Action reports continued to arrive from our destroyers, and from the Pacific Command. A few were ambiguous. One from the destroyer Maddox questioned whether the many reports of enemy torpedo firings were all valid.

I instructed McNamara to investigate these reports and obtain clarification. He immediately got in touch with Admiral U. S. G. Sharp Jr., the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and the Admiral in turn made contact with the De Soto patrol. McNamara and his civilian and military specialist went over all the evidence in specific detail. We wanted to be absolutely certain that our ships had actually been attacked before we retaliated.

Admiral Sharp called McNamara to report that after checking all the reports and evidence, he had no doubt whatsoever that an attack had taken place. McNamara and his associates reached the same firm conclusion. Detailed studies made after the incident confirmed this judgment.

I summoned the National Security Council for another meeting at 6:15 p.m. to discuss in detail the incident and our plans for a sharp but limited response. About seven o'clock I met with the congressional leadership in the White House for the same purpose. I told them that I believed a congressional resolution of support for our entire position in Southeast Asia was necessary and would strengthen our hand. I said that we might be forced to further action, and that I did not "want to go in unless Congress goes in with me."

I was determined, from the time I became President, to seek the fullest support of Congress for any major action that I took, whether in foreign affairs or in the domestic field.

Concerning Vietnam, I repeatedly told Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that I never wanted to receive any recommendation for action we might have to take unless it was accompanied by a proposal for assuring the backing of Congress.

Because of this, it became routine for all contingency plans to include suggestions for informing Congress and winning its support. As we considered the possibility of having to expand our efforts in Vietnam, proposals for seeking a congressional resolution became part of the normal contingency

continued

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
17 OCT 1971

The Situation Room

The Nerve Endings in the White House Basement

By Aldo Beckman

Mr. Beckman is a member of The Tribune's Washington Bureau. He is assigned to the White House.

WASHINGTON—More than 1,000 intelligence reports a day pour into a plainly decorated suite of rooms nestled into a corner of the White House basement.

Many are routine but the knowledge that reports of any attack on the United States by a hostile power would reach here first creates a pressure-cooker atmosphere for the young staff that mans the facility 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

There are no holidays in the White House Situation Room, the strategically important focal point upon which the President of the United States must rely for instant information. Modern communications, well-organized dissemination procedures and a dedicated staff are intertwined with a world-wide intelligence network and aimed at a goal of informing the President of events anywhere in the world within minutes after they occur.

Dependent on Other Agencies

David McManus, 34, the quietly confident director of the Situation Room is quick to emphasize that the success of his operation is dependent, in a large measure, to similar intelligence-receiving facilities in the Departments of State and Defense, and in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"We live off the fruits of other agencies," he said during an interview in the paneled conference room, where the indirect lighting, the cork wall designed for easy stamping of world maps, and the impressive-looking rectangular conference table leave a visitor with the feeling that the room could be used as a movie prop for a White House war room.

McManus, in an obvious effort to stifle interagency rivalries that once were rampant in the United States intelligence community, estimated that 97 per cent of the reports reaching the Situation Room—which actually is [illegible] dozen rooms—are relayed thru other agencies. Diplomatic cables go first to the Department of State, intelligence reports are routed to the Central Intelligence Agency, and military up-dates are moved to the Pentagon.

However, intelligence outposts, whether they are radar stations in the frozen Arctic keeping an eye on flight patterns of Soviet bombers over the North Pole, or intelligence vessels tailing a Soviet submarine off the North Carolina coast, have the capability to flash information directly to the White House.

Dozen Teletype Machines

The overthrow of a head of state, unusual bomber deployments by a potentially hostile power, or the sighting of missiles heading toward the United States would be flashed directly to the White House Situation Room.

The reports move into the White House on one of a dozen teletype machines in the bomb shelter under the East Wing and are dispatched immediately to the Situation Room, in the West Wing, via a pneumatic tube, arriving there 34 seconds later.

One of the two or three duty officers on duty receives the report and has the authority to instantly and personally contact the President, regardless of the time of day or night, if he believes the report is of such importance. The capability for instant Presidential contact is maintained by the Army Signal Corps and is there whether the President is sleeping in the White House residence, working in his Oval Office, on board Air Force I over the Pacific, or riding in a motorcade thru downtown Belgrade.

"If the missiles are coming our way, the President has to know it," McManus explained.

Those same duty officers also have the authority to immediately contact Henry Kissinger, Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, or McManus, if a report arrives that requires some quick attention.

Kissinger Occasionally Called

[illegible] called by one of the duty officers, but Kissinger is occasionally called, and McManus receives several calls a week on the White House phone next to his bed.

He and James Fazio, 33, deputy director of the Situation Room, take turns being "on call." Whoever is on call never goes to bed without telephoning the duty officer for an update on reports and, when not in bed, is never without a "page boy," an electronic device the size of a tiny transistor radio whose buzz can be activated in the Situation Room, signalling its carrier to immediately telephone his office.

The two young intelligence analysts also take turns coming into the office shortly after dawn to put the finishing touches on the President's daily intelligence briefing.

The three or four page report, carrying 10 to 12 single or double paragraph items, represents the highlights of reports received during the previous 24 hours. Kissinger wants it by 8 a. m. and sometimes asks that items be reworded to more accurately reflect his feeling on a subject.

"It's our daily newspaper," said McManus, "but we don't try to be comprehensive." An effort is made, however, to focus on what currently is under discussion in the National Security Council.

The daily briefing, which Kissinger carries in to the President, is not intended to serve as a working paper, but is designed to present, in capsule form for the chief executive, the latest developments thruout the world.

Daily status reports on the action in South Viet Nam are included. Several weeks ago, Nixon learned the results of a bombing raid he had ordered to wipe out a fuel dump near the demilitarized zone in North Viet Nam, when he read the report from the Situation Room.

Nixon has spent little time in the room since his inauguration, in marked contrast to his predecessor.

"President Johnson was here a lot," recalled McManus, who served as liai-

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
October 1971

THE INSTRUMENTS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

By Charles W. Yost

THERE are many different ways of conducting a government. In the United States the executive authority is both more formally centralized in the President and more sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overriding the opinions both of the Congress and of the public.

In general, he has been free to conduct foreign affairs more or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right to do so. As our government is organized, he has both the responsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can make things difficult for him, but they can neither conduct foreign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course, a wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well as in form, on matters of major import, which recent Presidents have often foolishly failed to do.

Our concern here, however, is with the instruments which Presidents use for the conduct of foreign affairs. Up until the 1930s the instrument was almost always the traditional one, the Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infrequent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to carry on a particular exercise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal adviser or emissary. Nevertheless, as late as 1931, President Hoover, though not himself inexperienced in foreign affairs, relied on Secretary Stimson to deal, in so far as the United States was prepared to deal, with the Manchurian crises.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had unhappily neither the taste nor the talent for the conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, again for domestic political reasons, he remained in office for nearly 12 years, longer than any previous Secretary of State. This did not seriously disturb FDR, who was contemptuous of the diplomatic establishment and overestimated his own capacity to direct domestic and foreign, and later military, affairs personally and simultaneously.

Even Roosevelt, however, while bypassing Hull as much as he could, at first placed his own men, on whom he did to some extent rely, inside the State Department itself—Welles and later Stettinius as Under Secretary, Moley and Berle as Assistant Secretaries, and Bullitt and Kennedy as Ambassadors. On the other hand, when war came, the authority and responsibilities of

continued

SEPTEMBER 1971

Dossier on the C.I.A.

by William R. Corson

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times policy-making arm of the government. I never thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. —ex-President Harry S. Truman.

NOTHING has happened since that pronouncement by the agency's creator in December 1963 to remove or reduce the cause for concern over the CIA's development. As currently organized, supervised, structured and led, it may be that the CIA has outlived its usefulness. Conceivably, its very existence causes the President and the National Security Council to rely too much on clandestine operations. Possibly its reputation, regardless of the facts, is now so bad that as a foreign policy instrument the agency has become counter-productive. Unfortunately the issue of its efficiency, as measured by its performance in preventing past intelligence failures and consequent foreign policy fiascos, is always avoided on grounds of "secrecy". So American taxpayers provide upwards of $750,000,000 a year for the CIA without knowing how the money is spent or to what extent the CIA fulfils or exceeds its authorized intelligence functions.

The gathering of intelligence is a necessary and legitimate activity in time of peace as well as in war. But it does raise a very real problem of the proper place and control of agents who are required, or authorized on their own recognizance, to commit acts of espionage. In a democracy it also poses the dilemma of secret activities and the values of a free society. Secrecy is obviously essential for espionage but it can be – and has been – perverted to hide intelligence activities even from those with the constitutional responsibility to sanction them. A common rationalization is the phrase "If the Ambassador/Secretary/President doesn't know he won't have to lie to cover up." The prolonged birth of the CIA was marked by a reluctance on the part of politicians and others to face these difficulties, and the agency as it came to exist still bears the marks of this indecision.

What we need to do is to examine how the U.S. gathers its intelligence, and consider how effective its instruments are and what room there is for improvement. Every government agency [illegible] CIA's Director, acknowledged before the American Society

of Newspaper E
be supervised i
Intelligence Ag
The time is lo
supervisory rol
Central Intellig
War. Under this
CIA administra
of inquiry by i
and specifically
requiring disc
titles, salaries
CIA; (ii) expe
tions on exper
the Director's
without adver
Government a
the Governme
for staff abroa
their families
1949 Central I
Director a lice

With so mu
is seen by ma
stine coups,
in Guatemala
Mossadegh i
the Cuban I
failure). The
President Ke
28, 1961, w
heralded -- y
Because the
agency's "m...

[redacted]

STATINTL

representative of the unending gambitry and bigger [illegible] life human aspect of espionage and secret operations. At this level the stakes are lower and the "struggle" frequently takes bizarre and even ludicrous twists. For, as Alexander Foote noted in his *Handbook for Spies*, the average agent's "real difficulties are concerned with the practice of his trade. The setting up of his transmitters, the obtaining of funds, and the arrangement of his rendezvous. The irritating administrative details occupy a disproportionate portion of his waking life."

As an example of the administrative hazards, one day in 1960 a technical administrative employee of the CIA stationed at its quasi-secret headquarters in Japan flew to Singapore to conduct a reliability test of a local recruit. On arrival he checked into one of Singapore's older hotels to receive the would-be spy and his CIA recruiter. Contact was made. The recruit was instructed in what a lie detector test does and was wired up, and the technician plugged the machine into the room's electrical outlet. Thereupon it blew out all the hotel's lights. The ensuing confusion and darkness did not cover a getaway by the trio. They were discovered, arrested, and jailed as American spies.

By itself the incident sounds like a sequence from an old Peters Sellers movie, however, its consequences were not nearly so funny. In performing this routine mission the CIA set off a two-stage international incident between England and the United States, caused the Secretary of State to write a letter of apology to a foreign chief of state, made the U.S. Ambassador to Singapore look like the proverbial cuckold, the final outcome being a situation wherein the United States Government lied in public -- and was caught!

UNIVERSITY REVIEW
NO. 19 1971
September

A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was "off the record", the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."
—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agentry has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements and bureaucratic rivalries to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected -- be they Americans or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligance apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Group by [redacted] which publish the entire text in October, 1971.*

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for $1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, [redacted]

Continued

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

[redacted]

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY

Our National Security

STATINTL
STATINTL

John Roche is on a brief vacation, but he will continue to write his columns, with prominent political figures occasionally contributing guest columns. Today's contributor is Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey, D-Minn., former vice president and now a leading Democratic Presidential hopeful.

We have witnessed in recent years a gradual and potentially dangerous isolation and insulation of power within the Executive branch of government.

I am particularly sensitive to this situation, having served in the United States Senate for 16 years and as vice president for four.

Nowhere is the tendency toward isolation more apparent than in the field of national security. I believe it is at least in part responsible for some of the divisiveness and the search for scapegoats generated by the recent publication of the "Pentagon Papers."

WE SIMPLY HAVE NOT HAD the mechanism for adequate consultation between Congress and the Executive branch in the formulation of national security policy.

The President and key government officials meet occasionally with the leaders of Congress on an informal basis. There are several congressional committees that deal with some aspects of national security. But decision-making is fragmented.

I have proposed that we end that fragmentation and provide for closer consultation by establishing a permanent joint congressional Committee on National Security.

The News American
THE PAGE OPPOSITE
Thursday, August 12, 1971 ☆ 11C

The committee would have these main functions:

○ First, to study and make recommendations on all issues concerning national security. This would include review of the President's report on the state of the world, the defense budget and foreign assistance programs as they relate to national security goals, and U.S. disarmament policies as a part of our defense considerations.

○ Second, to review, study and evaluate the "Pentagon Papers," and other documents, whether published heretofore or not, covering U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

○ Third, to study and make recommendations on government practices of classification and declassification of documents.

○ Fourth, to conduct a continuing review of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the departments of Defense and State, and other agencies intimately involved with our foreign policy.

THE UNIQUE FEATURE of the committee would be the composition of its membership. It would have representation from those individual and committee jurisdictions that have primary responsibility in military, foreign relations and congressional leadership.

It would include the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Speaker of the House; the majority and minority leaders of both houses, and the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees on appropriations, foreign relations and armed services and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

It would not usurp the legislative or investigative functions of any present committees, but supplement and coordinate their efforts in a more comprehensive framework.

Nor is it designed to usurp the President's historic role as Commander-In-Chief, nor to put the Congress in an adversary relationship with the Executive branch.

IT IS, RATHER, A NEW BODY, to be composed of members of both parties and both houses of Congress, that will make possible closer consultation and cooperation between the President and the Congress.

The concentration of power within the Executive branch is quite understandable considering our experience in World War II and afterward. But times change, and so must our institutions and responses.

I cannot help but believe that if the Congress had shared more fully in momentous decisions, like those in Vietnam, we would be less divided as a nation by [illegible]

A new framework for the formulation of national security policy, I believe, can bring us closer to the ideal we all share for lasting peace.

DETROIT, MICH.
NEWS
E - 592,616
S - 827,086
AUG 8 1971

[redacted]

CIA losing its veil of secrecy

By GEORGE KENTERA
News Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Since it opened in the late 1950's, the headquarters of the super-secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in nearby Virginia has been screened from public view by a border of woodland.

That screen is soon to be lost. The land is to be developed by the National Park Service for camping, hiking and picnicking. And even as CIA headquarters itself becomes more visible, an effort is beginning in Congress to open a window on the CIA activities within the building.

These developments on Capitol Hill point up the efforts:

● The troubled reaction of some Senate members to the disclosure last week that the CIA and the United States were more deeply involved in a clandestine military action in Laos than was heretofore publicly known or believed.

● The appointment of an anti-war Michigan congressman, Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, Detroit Democrat, the chairmanship of a special House subcommittee on intelligence, and his hope of staging open hearings on the CIA.

● Action in Congress, already halfway through the legislative process, to put a halt to secret CIA financing of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which beam news behind the Iron Curtain.



REP. LUCIEN NEDZI

NO MEMBER OF CONGRESS asks that the operations of the intelligence agency headed by Richard Helms be an open book. But some members are miffed about the unwillingness of the executive branch to share more information with Congress and the CIA is part of the irritant.

Helms himself recognizes this situation. In dealing with it, he went so far last April as to make a public speech, his first as CIA director, outlining his views.

He firmly denied that his agency was a law unto itself or an invisible government, "engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls."

The CIA is directly responsible to the National Security Council. But the agency long has contended that it is responsive to Congress as well because of its briefing to an informal group composed of some members of the Armed Services and Appropriations committees.

In his public speech here to members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Director Helms argued that this informal congressional group is "told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency."

He added, "But how, in the end, we are to be supervised is for Congress itself to decide."

However, some members of Congress do not feel, despite the informed briefings, that procedures exist that make the CIA at least partially accountable to Congress.

NEDZI SAID THE OTHER DAY, "My feeling is that the old subcommittee (the informal group) served more as a vehicle for the Chief Executive, to enable him to say he had consulted and advised Congress. But I'm not aware that there has been any congressional oversight of the CIA . . . I think it important that the window be opened a bit."

He said later, "Everybody appreciates that elements of restraint are involved. The difficulty is in drawing that line between the national security and public disclosure."

The effort to focus more attention on the CIA is part of a trend in recent years toward more public disclosure by the Congress.

This trend has seen public reporting of congressmen's net worth and income, liberalized rules in House and Senate, the adoption of recorded teller votes in the House, reform of campaign spending and reporting of that spending, and a move toward more open hearings of congressional committees.

Publication of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report on Laos last week indicated that CIA-supervised troops numbering more than 30,000 were actually bearing the brunt of the combat against the enemy in Laos.

IT BECAME KNOWN last week that the report had led Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Montana Democrat, to call an extraordinary secret session of the Senate June 7.

A transcript of that session was placed in the Congressional Record last Wednesday and it showed that the Nixon administration was accused of withholding information and misleading Congress about growing American involvement in the Laotian war.

Senator Stuart Symington, Missouri Democrat, told the Senate that U.S. military assistance to Laos had trebled since 1967 and was now 25 times as great as when it began in 1963.

"We have been appropriating money for this war in the blind," he said.

As for Nedzi, he said the Laotian disclosures suggest "there may be a need for legislation in this area, to restrain the CIA from becoming involved in this kind of thing."

"I can understand how it happened," he said, "but I can't justify in my own mind how it happened without Congress being aware of it."

As for Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Eastern Europe, and Radio Liberty, which broadcasts to Russia, the Senate has approved legislation providing $35 million in fiscal 1972 for "open funding" of the stations, thereby eliminating, if the bill passes the House, funding by the CIA.

"The Senate has clearly shown," said Senator Clifford P. Case, New Jersey Republican and the bill's sponsor, that it will no longer abdicate its responsibilities in allowing the executive branch to pay out $35 million a year (to the stations) without congressional authorization."

For 20 years the payments were made by the CIA.

be respected in any incomes policy. However, the evolution (or the failure to evolve) of the guideposts placed too much stress on economic rationality as opposed to workability and acceptance. For example, it was no doubt a mistake to have continued to insist on guideposts which were consistent only with complete stability of the price level at a time when prices had already begun to rise more than nominally.

3. The guideposts—or, more broadly, the intervention through public and private persuasion—had a noticeable and useful impact on wages and prices, even during the period 1966–68 when demand-management policy was inappropriate and highly inflationary. There was (in this writer's judgment) no damage to the allocation of resources, nor appreciable inequity—both of which were frequently charged.

4. Locating the administration of the guideposts and related interventions primarily in the Council of Economic Advisers was not ideal. To be sure, since the policy was voluntary, it benefited from a close association with the prestige of the Presidency and from the President's personal intervention at a few crucial points. Neither the Secretary of Labor nor of Commerce would have been a suitable administrator, given his office, and, in any case, the incumbents during most of the period were not supporters of the policy. A merger of the two Departments, or the Cabinet reorganization proposed by President Nixon, would provide a more suitable office in the future.

5. Given the seriousness of the problem and the inherent limitations of a purely voluntary policy, the author favours the establishment, by legislation, of a Price-Wage Review Board, with limited powers (a) to require prior notice of wage and price changes, (b) to suspend such changes for a limited period, (c) to investigate them (including power to compel testimony), and (d) to report to the public with recommendations.[1] The Board should be authorized to study and recommend—and possibly even be given limited powers of control—with respect to certain features of price-setting or of wage contracts (e.g., the conditions under which escalator clauses could be used), or to certain trade or employment practices that tended to raise costs or reduce competition. It would not, however, have power ultimately to limit or control any price or wage.

6. The President (but not the Wage-Price Review Board) should have at all times standby authority for the compulsory control of wages and prices, wholly or in any part, with the requirement that any use of this authority be reviewed by the Congress under a procedure which would permit a Congressional veto of the President's action.

7. To the maximum extent possible, the existence of a price-incomes policy (although not, obviously, the details of the policy) should cease to be considered a partisan issue, but rather come to be regarded as a regular and permanent aspect of the U.S. stabilization system.

8. A well-developed incomes policy should be in place and working before the U.S. economy next returns to the zone of full employment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, the Chair recognizes the distinguished junior Senator from Florida (Mr. CHILES), for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. CHILES when he introduced S. 2458 are printed in the RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the Chair recognizes the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) for not to exceed 15 minutes.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS AND PROPOSED HEARINGS ON S. 2224, A BILL TO AMEND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, AS AMENDED

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators BAYH, BROOKE, CASE, EAGLETON, HARRIS, HART, HATFIELD, HUGHES, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, MATHIAS, MCGOVERN, PACKWOOD, PELL, RIBICOFF, ROTH, SCHWEIKER, STEVENSON, WILLIAMS be listed as cosponors of S. 2224, a bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has approved my request to hold hearings after the recess on the bill. It is my expectation that among those who will testify are a number of former and present officials experienced in the field of intelligence and the analysis of facts obtained by the intelligence agencies.

In introducing the bill on July 7, I said that the facts and analyses of intelligence collected by the CIA and made available by law to the executive branch under the National Security Act of 1947 should by law be made available to the Congress.

A chief purpose of the hearings is to establish that the best intelligence must be made available to the appropriate committees of the Congress and through them to the Congress as the Congress make determinations respecting legislative authority and funding of policies and programs of the executive branch, in the field of foreign policy and security. It will also be the purpose of the hearings to consider proposals for establishing guidelines in matters of classification and declassification and in establishing for the Congress effective security procedures so that the material to the Congress would be responsibly used.

When the Senate returns from its recess in September, it is my intention to state in more detail the kinds of information that should be available to the Congress and to outline suggestions as to the way the appropriate committees would maintain security for the documents made available to the Congress.

It is my firm belief that this bill provides an effective and straightforward way—and I might say, legal way—based upon the sound precedent of the law which created the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and specified the duties of the Executive branch to keep; that Committee fully and currently informed, for the Congress to better carry out its responsibilities. It is a way to insure that the decisions made by the government of this country—both the executive and the legislative—on foreign policy and national security will be the result of the consideration of the best information obtainable.

I ask unanimous consent that my statement of July 7, 1971, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 7, 1971]

By Mr. COOPER:

S. 2224. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency. Referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, by unanimous consent.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the formulation of sound foreign policy and national security policy requires that the best and most accurate intelligence obtainable be provided to the legislative as well as the executive branch of our Government. The approval by the Congress of foreign policy and national security policy, which are bound together, whose support involves vast amounts of money, the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to deter war, yet can destroy all life on earth, the stationing of American troops in other countries and their use in combat, and binding commitments to foreign nations, should only be given upon the best information available to both the executive and legislative branches.

There has been much debate during the past several years concerning the respective powers of the Congress and the Executive in the formulation of foreign policy and national security policy and the authority to commit our Armed Forces to war. We have experienced, unfortunately, confrontation between the two branches of our Government. It is my belief that if both branches, executive and legislative, have access to the same intelligence necessary for such fateful decisions, the working relationship between the Executive and the Congress would be, on the whole, more harmonious and more conducive to the national interest. It would assure a common understanding of the purposes and merits of policies. It is of the greatest importance to the support and trust of the people. It is of the greatest importance to the maintenance of our system of government, with its separate branches held so tenuously together by trust and reason.

It is reasonable, I submit, to contend that the Congress, which must make its decisions upon foreign and security policy, which is called upon to commit the resources of the Nation, material and human, should have all the information and intelligence available to discharge properly and morally its responsibilities to our Government and the people.

I send to the table a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947, which, I hope, would make it possible for the legislative

[1] The author made recommendations along these lines as early as 1958. See his paper in *The Relationship of Prices to Economic Stability and Growth* (Compendium of Papers Submitted by Panelists appearing before the Joint Economic Committee), 31 March 1958 (U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 634–6 and *passim*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Intelligence Scandal

E. VLADIMIROV

"SCANDAL is the word best characterizing the context in which most citizens have viewed, in recent times, the intelligence establishment, particularly the CIA." This is the conclusion arrived at by Professor Harry Howe Ransom of Vanderbilt University in his book* on the U.S. intelligence system which he has been studying for a good many years.

The book is by no means an exposé. The author's position is rather that of a well-wisher who would like to see the defects in the system eliminated in order that it might function more successfully. All the more noteworthy, then, is the material he has collected, as well as some of his own admissions, for they reveal the basic deficiencies of the "intelligence establishment" which are essentially a reflection of the evils of the social system that engendered it.

In Ransom's opinion the intelligence system, with the CIA at its head, is inefficient. Indeed, he considers "the CIA problem" to be one of the most urgent problems of U.S. foreign policy inasmuch as the failures of the CIA and the political scandals caused by them seriously damage the national interest and the international prestige of the United States. The same applies to the other intelligence agencies which perform functions similar to those of the CIA.

* H. Ransom. The Intelligence Establishment. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1970

The chief members of the vast espionage and subversion community, apart from the CIA, are the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with subordinate services in the army, air force and navy, the National Security Agency, the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence, the intelligence branch of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There are ten or more other departments and offices, among them the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and the Agency for International Development, Ransom tells us, which while not officially associated with the intelligence community nevertheless play their part. The annual budget of the intelligence establishment, according to the author, is in the neighbourhood of $4,000 million, of which $1,000 million each goes to the CIA and the National Security Agency. The central offices of the CIA, DIA and the NSA alone have a personnel of more than 30,000.

A large part of the book is given over to an analysis of the activities of America's principal intelligence agency, the CIA. Ransom is of the opinion that the CIA has become something more than an intelligence outfit, it has assumed a wide range of political functions in the sphere of international relations and enjoys far greater powers than were foreseen by the National Security Act of 1947. Violating the norms of international law, the CIA interferes in the internal affairs of other states. It prosecutes undeclared wars, maintains dictatorial regimes and engineers the overthrow of governments undesirable to the U.S.; it influences elections, sends its agents into public organizations in the U.S. and abroad in order to control their activity, directs the work of "free" radio stations, secretly organizes the publication of books and articles, creates "private" air companies which are used for espionage purposes. Ransom maintains that the CIA has exceeded all limits as regards the use of foreign diplomatic and other official U.S. agencies for espionage and subversion. According to the American journal *Foreign Affairs*, of the 22,000 persons on the staffs of 263 U.S. diplomatic missions, only 3,300 are employed by the State Department. The remaining 18,700 work for the intelligence and propaganda departments.

Of considerable interest is Ransom's account of how the intelligence information obtained by the American espionage network influences important government policy decisions. In the United States, according to Ransom, intelligence alone has the exclusive prerogative to make assessments concerning the situation in any foreign country and the plans of the respective government. This is all the more disturbing since the intelligence people, in the author's opinion, are stricken with what he calls "information pathology," i.e., a tendency "to interpret events in terms of how they prefer things to be rather than as they actually are" (p. 37). Anti-communism, hatred for the socialist countries lend a sinister colouring to intelligence estimates, helping to create a war psychosis in the United States and engender anti-Soviet campaigns.

Describing the state of affairs in the American espionage community, Ransom comes to the conclusion that the CIA is in need of reform. Since the unsavoury reputation earned by American intelligence is, in Ransom's opinion, due mainly to espionage, plots, political provocations, etc., which he euphemistically refers to as "clandestine political actions," he proposes removing them from the CIA's province. He suggests further that thought be given to the question of introducing censorship of the American press which, he says, writes far too much about the CIA's blunders and is hence to blame for its "bad publicity." Finally, he advocates stricter government control over intelligence agencies, with a view primarily to establishing a more effective system of operative leadership of subversive activities in order to reduce the risk of failure.

Ransom's recipes, of course, are not likely to produce the desired results, for it is not a matter of rectifying some individual flaw, but of the sum total of the sinister activities of the American intelligence. The affairs of the CIA and the other espionage agencies are conducted with the knowledge and consent of the President and on instructions from the National Security Council. This means that all its activities are directed by the top men in Washington in keeping with the requirements of the foreign policy strategy of American imperialism. The adventurous nature of that strategy makes it safe to predict that new "scandals" are in store for U.S. intelligence in the future as well.

WASHINGTON POST

21 JUL 1971

Viet Document Urged Atom 'Demonstration'

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

High-ranking U.S. military officials twice recommended a 'demonstration" drop of atomic weapons in Indochina, in late 1964 and early 1965, according to documents published yesterday by the conservative magazine National Review.

The documents were among 14 pages of supposedly "top secret" official papers printed by the magazine to "thrust into an appropriate context" the earlier revelations of Pentagon papers by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers. The magazine, which is edited by William F. Buckley Jr., said the new documents were supplied by an informant who believed The Times account conveyed a "distorted impression" of what happened in Vietnam.

The National Review documents do not appear to be among the Pentagon papers reported by The Times and The Post. The National Review documents tend to show—like some of the papers revealed earlier—that one group of high officials argued in the mid-1960s that the Vietnam war could be won by sudden, massive escalation but could not be won by military "gradualism."

According to the papers published by the National Review, Air Force and Central Intelligence Agency members of an interdepartmental committee in October 1964 recommended a "sharp knock" or "quantum escalation" strategy, including such measures as the closing of Haiphong and Sihanoukville harbors, rapid destruction of all North Vietnamese thermal power installations and destruction of rail lines linking China and North Vietnam.

These members also recommended destruction of the Red River dikes in North Vietnam, neutralization of Hainan Island off the Vietnamese coast and "demonstration drop of nuclear device . . . followed by use of nuclear devices where militarily suitable, if GNVN [Government of North Vietnam] does not re-

In connection with the nuclear "demonstration," the document cited a May 26, 1954, recommendation from Adm. Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. That recommendation, which was contained in the Pentagon secret history and published by The New York Times, advocated "employing atomic weapons, whenever advantageous" if the Chinese Communists intervene in Indochina.

The October 1964 document published by the National Review argued that the United States could prevent a Communist takeover in Vietnam only by adoption of massive escalation. The document concluded that "if, for whatever reason, it is decided to be paramountly undesirable to adopt such a strategy—and therefore as a consequence impossible to achieve our objective—the U.S. should renounce its commitment in Southeast Asia, and withdraw as rapidly as is physically possible."

The National Review said the Air Force-CIA statement was a "minority" report that went further than the approved text of the interdepartmental study. The magazine said it was not clear whether this minority statement was ever placed before the National Security Council or President Johnson.

Cable to Joint Chiefs

Another document published by the National Review was said to be a February 12, 1965, cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp, then Commander in Chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific (abbreviated CINCPAC). The cable said Sharp concurred in the "general approach" of "Annex November" of Opplan (Operations Plan) 65-34K. Sharp added that he did not concur in the "postdrop airborne monitoring requirements" for the plan because additional facilities [illegible] South Vietnamese units in the Gulf of Tonkin of "predicted fallout patterns, if any."

"CINCPAC [Sharp] concurs that increased risk of tensions with Chicoms (Chinese Communists) and USSR will result from successful completion of demonstration drop. However, if this is primary criterion for determining scope and nature of military operations in SE Asia, it is clear to me that withdrawal is preferred course of action," the cable said.

The document added that "total impact of a successful high altitude drop off Haiphong harbor on DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Vietnam] leadership impossible to estimate directly. However, CINCPAC finds it difficult to visualize any other course of action for us in present conflict which would be more likely to (a) bring DRV to conference table (b) enable us to settle conflict on favorable terms for ourselves and GVN [Government of Vietnam—South Vietnam] and (c) save lives of American fighting men."

Another National Review document dated Feb. 10, 1965—two days before the date of the Sharp cable—indicates that Secretary of State Dean Rusk was strongly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. This paper is said to be the text of a handwritten note by Rusk summarizing the results of a high-level departmental meeting to discuss a possible U.S. declaration of war.

According to the Rusk notes, a declaration of war by the United States "conjures up prospect of use of atomic weapons which we do not want even to suggest."

'Precedent of Korea'

Among the other reasons for opposing a declaration of war, the Rusk notes show, were the "precedent of Korea as an undeclared war," the prior commitment on many occasions of U.S. troops by presidential order and the fact that it was uncertain whom the United States should declare war against.

The notes said the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of August 1964 was a sufficient authority for "a short term effort"—and estimated that "sharp actions" proposed by the Joint Chief of Staff would make possible the conclusion of overt U.S. military operations in 90 days. "After that, only mopping up operations," the note said.

Other documents published by the National Review include:

- A June 1963 paper by Prof. Daniel Boorstin (now director of the Smithsonian National Museum of History and Technology) reporting to President Kennedy that a committee of historians and cultural anthropologists concludes the American public does not tend to support "protracted war."
- A December 1963 report attributed to the head of the "Division of Psychological Assessment, CIA" arguing that a protracted war would have "disastrous results" in Vietnam and divide the American public — but that a one-to-two-year war would not.
- June 1964 assessments attributed to the CIA reporting that the Soviet Union would not be likely to take nuclear action in Vietnam and estimating that China would intervene directly in the war only if North Vietnam was "on the point of total defeat."
- The December 1964 report of "an eminent private citizen," whom the National Review suggests may have been Dean Acheson, recommending that the United States should not involve its forces in overt fighting in Vietnam unless it is willing to discontinue the existing "policy of accommodation" with the Soviet Union.

In an editorial, the National Review said it was publishing only fragments of the material made available to it and might publish more later. The magazine said it had established to its satisfaction that the documents being printed do not damage U.S. national security and in fact "advance the national interest."

There was no comment on the National Review papers from the Defense Department or the Justice Department.

Acheson, Dean
CIA 3.03 USSR

BOSTON GLOBE
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

[redacted]

Topless Secrets: A Political Fad

A few U.S. senators and their journalistic allies have renewed a heavy-handed attempt to force the secrecy and subtlety of the Central Intelligence Agency under the thumb of Congress.

Critics of U.S. foreign policy, in Indochina and elsewhere, are especially eager to call the CIA to account and thus by asserting accountability to restore what is commonly referred to as the usurped "congressional responsibility in the making of foreign policy."

The erroneous implication is that Congress is primarily responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, whereas Congress is only one source of authority in relations with other nations and in national security affairs. Senators Cooper, Case and McGovern want the real fount of foreign policy — the Executive Branch — brought under much closer congressional control and influence, which is impracticable and improbable.

The CIA makes a convenient scapegoat, especially for those who disagree with the foreign policies of the incumbent administration and even more especially for those who fail to understand the functions (and limitations) of the CIA as an adjunct of the National Security Council, responsible directly to the President.

Undue secrecy in government is deplorable, but it does not follow that there must be no secrets or that the intelligence garnered by the CIA must be shared with 535 members of Congress. Some congressional oversight of the functions of the intelligence community, of which the CIA is only one member, is desirable and in fact it is now and has for years been exercised at the President's discretion through ranking congressional leaders.

But where congressional oversight ends and congressional control begins is a moot point. Congress in the past has wisely recognized the restrictions its sheer size and the scope of its concerns impose on its dealings in day-by-day international affairs. It has, therefore, given the Executive Branch the tools with which to exercise the President's pre-eminent constitutional authority in foreign affairs, the mechanics of which involve the very security of the United States.

WASHINGTON POST 16 JUL 1971

[redacted]

President Agrees to Visit China

Groundwork Laid By Kissinger, Chou In Secret Meeting

By Carroll Kilpatrick
Washington Post Staff Writer

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif., July 15—President Nixon announced tonight in a dramatic television broadcast to the nation that he had accepted an invitation from Premier Chou En-lai to visit China sometime before May, 1972.

The invitation was extended to the President by the Chinese leader through Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs, who visited Peking on his recent round-the-world tour.

This was the first time a high American official has visited the Chinese capital since the Communists gained control of the country more than two decades ago.

It was believed that Kissinger had been in Pakistan on July 9 to 11, but in fact, the President disclosed, Kissinger had gone to Peking.

Mr. Nixon said in his extremely brief statement, delivered from the NBC studios in Burbank, Calif., that he would undertake the journey to the Communist capital because of his "profound conviction that all nations will gain from a reduction of tensions and a better relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China."

"It is in this spirit that I will undertake what I deeply hope will become a journey for peace, peace not just for our generation but for future generations on this earth we share together."

The announcement caught official Washington by surprise but the reaction was generally favorable. House Republican Leader Gerald Ford of Michigan called it "singularly significant in the pursuit of world peace." Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (Mont.) described himself as "flabbergasted . . . but very pleased and happy that the President has accepted Peking's invitation."

No advance text of any kind had been distributed, and no one outside an extremely small group knew what the President would say when he began speaking shortly after 10:30 p.m. EDT. Kissinger accompanied the President from his San Clemente home to the studios in Burbank.

The disclosure came in the fourth sentence when Mr. Nixon said that in pursuance of the goal to establish more normal relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China, he had sent Kissinger to Peking [illegible] talk with Premier Chou.

The President then read an announcement which he said was being issued simultaneously in Peking.

It disclosed that the two men met in Peking at a time it was being said in Pakistan that Kissinger had become ill and would delay his flight to Paris by a day to rest.

The joint announcement said further: "Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the People's Republic of China, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the government of the People's Republic of China, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May, 1972. President Nixon accepted this invitation with pleasure."

Mr. Nixon said that the meeting is "to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

The President emphasized that his action in seeking better relations with the Communist regime, which controls some 750 million persons, "will not be at the expense of our old friends," meaning the Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan.

He also said the new relationship is "not directed against any other nation." This was believed to be a reference to both the Soviet Union and Taiwan, which are expected to view the new turn of events with obvious concern and dismay.

"Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy," the President declared.

The extraordinarily well-kept secret of the Kissinger visit together with the astonishing announcement tonight will have repercussions world-wide [illegible] politics in the United States.

No other trip the President could make, even one to the Soviet Union, could attract so much attention as a visit to China. And it will be on the eve of his reelection campaign.

After the Ping-Pong match in ePking between U.S. and Chinese table tennis teams in April, Mr. Nixon told a news conference that he hoped to visit China in some capacity during his lifetime and that he hoped his children would be able to go there.

At the time, no one expected that he might be able to undertake such a visit while still in the presidency. And even after the liberalization of trade announced last month, high administration officials were dubious about a U.S. presidential visit.

Kissinger departed Washington July 1 for an announced visit to Vietnam, Thailand, India, Pakistan and Paris. He went in one of the presidential jets and arrived here Tuesday morning after a nonstop flight from Paris.

He has conferred extensively since then with the President and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and almost no one else.

The story of how the secret of his visit was kept has not been told, but it may be disclosed Friday. White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler has scheduled an early morning briefing.

It was considered almost certain that Kissinger would have discussed U.S.-Vietnam relations while in Peking. Only yesterday, Gough Whitlam, the Australian opposition leader, who had been in Peking at the same time as Kissinger, reported that Premier Chou indicated a willingness [illegible] Geneva conference on Indochina.

Continued

WASHINGTON STAR
JUL 19

Kissinger's Alter Ego

By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star Staff Writer

SAN CLEMENTE, Calif. — Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. doesn't see his name in the paper very often — and that's the way he likes it.

So it's not surprising if his name seemed unfamiliar when you read on three days in succession last week that he was conferring with President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers at the President's office here.

As deputy assistant to the President for national security affairs — Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's alter ego—Haig was substituting for Kissinger in the presidential councils while Kissinger persued a fact-finding mission in Southeast Asia.

An ambitious professional military man, Haig figures the less personal publicity the better for his career in the Army.

Actually, he is one of a new breed of armed force officrs that has developed since World War II — politico-military specialists, as much at home in the jungle of diplomacy as on a battlefield.



GEN. HAIG

It was his extensive background in politico-military affairs, plus his recent combat experience in Vietnam, that led to his transfer from deputy commandant of West Point to senior military adviser to Kissinger in January 1969, when the Nixon administration came into office. He was made Kissinger's deputy in June last year.

He and Kissinger work together on the full range of matters coming before them as foreign policy advisers to the President and the top of the NSC staff.

Haig coordinates the NSC staff work and tries to make sure that NSC papers going to the President represent the most honest and objective possible articulation of views from all government departments concerned.

In the Hot Seat

For the past 10 days or so, Haig has been sitting in Kissinger's hot seat, dealing directly with the President. He often sees the President when Kissinger is around but otherwise occupied, but such occasions rarely are publicized.

Kissinger is due here tomorrow to report on his mission to South Vietnam, Thailand, India and Pakistan, winding up with a conference in Paris today with Ambassador David K. E. Burce, chief US.. negotiator in the Vietnam peace talks.

On Kissinger's return, Haig will resume his work behind the scenes.

Haig, 46, is a 1947 West Point graduate.

As part of its program to develop senior officers who are savvy about political and diplomatic affairs as well as combat, the Army sent him to graduate school at Georgetown University, where he received a master's degree in international relations in 1961.

Other Programs Completed

Haig also is a graduate of the ground general school at Ft. Riley, Kan.; the armor school at Ft. Knox, Ky.; the Navy War College and the Army War College.

He served as military assistant to the secretary of the Army and, from 1963 to 1965, as deputy special assistant to the secretary and deputy secretary of Defense. During these assignments, his duties included policy planning for Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Latin America, and laison with the White House.

Hs assignments with troops include service as a rifle platoon leader in the 1st Cavalry Division, Far East Command, in 1948 and 1949. He served in five campaigns during the Korean war.

In Vietnam, Haig served with the 1st Infantry on the division staff and subsequently as a battalion and then a brigade commander in 1966-67.

He has been decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with oak leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, the Distinguished Flying Cross with two oak leaf clusters, and the Air Medal with 27 oak leaf clusters.

NEW YORK TIMES
9 JUL 1971

C.I.A. Says Plan Seeks to Embarrass U.S.

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the new Vietcong peace proposal is aimed at embarrassing the United States "both at home and overseas" and encouraging the opponents of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam.

Other negative comments on the plan were contained in a detailed analysis submitted to Mr. Nixon and other top Administration officials last Friday a day after Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, the chief Vietcong delegate, offered her proposals at the Paris talks.

The agency's evaluation, according to senior Administration officials, was one of several top-level studies of the Communist plan on which President Nixon and Secretary of State William P. Rogers based their decision to instruct the United States delegation in Paris to seek further clarifications today from the Communist side in "restricted sessions," or private talks.

Reservations Expressed

The evaluation as well as the parallel studies prepared in recent days by the State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council staff have expressed numerous serious reservations about the Vietcong plan.

But all the studies also found new elements in the plan. The C.I.A. paper, for example, noted that "it softens" the Communist position on the American prisoners of war and presents "two new nuances" on the South Vietnamese political settlement. For this reason, senior officials said, the Administration chose to seek to engage in what officials here termed "meaningful negotiations."

Senior officials emphasized that they did not consider the fact that the Communists had not responded immediately to the proposal for "restricted" sessions, made today in Paris by David K. E. Bruce, the chief United States negotiator, as an outright rejection.

They said that "something resembling a negotiating process may be in the making."

At San Clemente, Calif., where President Nixon and Mr. Rogers conferred for the third time this week on strategy in the Paris talks, a White House spokesman, Gerald L. Warren, said that Mr. Bruce was attempting to start "meaningful negotiations."

The State Department press officer, Charles W. Bray 3d, said here about the Bruce proposal that "we regret that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong did not respond affirmatively to this suggestgon but continue to hope that they will do so."

Nixon Expected to Wait

Highly-placed officials indicated their belief that President Nixon would refrain from publicly expressing his views on the developments in the talks until the situation became "much clearer" through public or private exchanges in Paris.

They said that only after such clarifications would Mr. Nixon address the nation on the state of the negotiations. They recalled that last year he had waited nearly three weeks after the Communists presented their peace plan on Sept. 17 before making his counter-proposal on Oct. 7.

"At this stage, we are not prepared to reject or to accept anything as a package," a senior official said. "We are looking and we are probing because this is the business of diplomacy."

Other officials said that the negotiating situation would be reviewed again when Henry A. Kissinger joins Mr. Nixon and Mr. Rogers in San Clemente on Sunday. The next scheduled session of the Paris talks is next Thursday.

Mr. Kissinger, the President's special assistant for national security affairs, visited Saigon last weekend and is to confer with Mr. Bruce in Paris on Saturday.

Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, whose agency was reported to have drafted the first analysis of the Vietcong plan, participated in the discussions on the United States response to the Communist proposals after he flew to San Clemente with President Nixon and Mr. Rogers last Tuesday.

Officials familiar with various Administration evaluations of the Vietcong plan said that the C. I. A. analysis was "perhaps the most pessimistic—but also the most realistic—of the lot."

Its over-all conclusion, contained in the first paragraph of the document, said:

"The Vietcong's new seven-point proposal softens the Communists' position on the prisoner-of-war release but retains and amplifies a very tough line on United States disengagement from the war. In addition, it repackages Hanoi's demands for a political settlement in South Vietnam in a superficially more attractive form."

New Nuances Recognized

The analysis recognized, however, that "there are two new nuances in the Communist position on a political settlement in South Vietnam."

The principal features of Mrs. Binh's plan were the Communist readiness to start releasing United States war prisoners as American troops begin withdrawing from Vietnam after a date "in 1971" is set by Washington, and the dropping of the Communists' long-standing insistence on a coalition regime in Saigon as the condition for a political settlement.

But after analyzing the plan, the C. I. A. offered this assessment of the Communist motives in presenting their July 1 proposals:

"The Communists doubtless hope that their iniatiative on the prisoners—coupled as it is with a restatement of their basic position on United States withdrawals—will make things awkward for the United States Government both at home and overseas."

"They may also believe that their political proposals will appeal to many in the United States who are looking for a face-saving way out of the war. They probably are also hoping that the new proposal will fuel worries in Saigon about Washington's longer-term support.

"The new formula for a political settlement in South Vietnam, by its fuzziness and air of reasonableness, is designed both to encourage individuals in South Vietnam whose support of the war is wavering and to give some ammunition to those who are already working to build an anti-Thieu, anti-war constituency."

Coincidence of Beliefs

This aspect of the analysis was known to coincide with the belief in other Administration quarters that the Communist peace plan was launched, at least in part, to influence the outcome of the October elections in South Vietnam, where President Nguyen Van Thieu is seeking re-election.

In this context, the analysis noted that "among other things the Communists seem intent on creating the impression that the election of Big Minh could prove an initial step toward peace."

"Big Minh" is Gen. Duong Van Minh, a potential but undeclared presidential candidate upon whom Hanoi and the Vietcong had looked with favor in the past.

The analysis said that the Vietcong plan's first "new nuance" was that instead of demanding a coalition regime in Hanoi, it "simply demands that the United States 'cease backing the bellicose group' headed by Thieu."

The other nuance, it said, is that the Communists no longer ask a "three-segment" regime, including Communists, but a broad "government of national concord" to be negotiated by the Vietcong with a "post-Thieu administration."

"The Communists seem to be trying to leave the impression that the form of government is open to negotiation," the document said. "Moreover, the language of this section—and indeed much of the statement—is cast to convey an image of conciliation and reasonableness without committing Hanoi to anything specific."

The analysts also warned against pitfalls in the Communist proposal for releasing the American prisoners in exchange for the withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam under a set deadline. This has appeared to be the most attractive aspect of Mrs. Binh's peace package.

But the analysis said that while "the formulation on the prisoner-release question is new," the Communist demand on total United States military disengagement "is as firm as ever."

"Moreover, by including for the first time civilian as well as military prisoners, the Communists are opening the whole thorny problem of the Communist civilian cadre who are now held by Saigon," it said.

[redacted]

STATINTL

KEY VIETNAM TE
THE KENNEDY YE

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communistic in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation. Otherwise we risk losing country out of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question [illegible] President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

WASHINGTON POST
JUL 1971

Viet Combat Role Urged on JFK in '62

GENERAL LEMNITZER
. . . a grim chart talk.

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The year 1962 opened for President Kennedy with the grim word that he had not done enough to save South Vietnam.

According to documents from the Pentagon study available to The Washington Post, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared one of those Pentagon flip-chart talks for Mr. Kennedy. Although there is no direct evidence, it seems a reasonable assumption that the talk was delivered. In any case, it is likely that the dreary word reached the President.

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then the JCS chairman, was prepared to discuss China's problems (things must be bad because wheat had been purchased from Canada and Australia), the setup of the 16,500-man Vietcong military establishment and the belief that North Vietnam then was running a training center near the city of Vinh "where pro-Vietcong South Vietnamese receive an 18-month military course interspersed with intensive Communist political indoctrination."

"Two 600-man battalions already have completed training," said Lemnitzer's "talking paper" for the Jan. 9 meeting with the President, "and another two battalions began training in May, 1961." Here were signs of danger.

Then Lemnitzer, if he followed the "talking paper" prepared for him, was to quote the President to himself:

"The President on 22 November 1961 authorized the Secretary of State to instruct the US Ambassador to Vietnam to inform President Diem that the U.S. Government was prepared to join the GVN (Government of South Vietnam) in a sharply increased effort to avoid a further deterioration of the situation in SVN (South Vietnam)." Next, were listed the military steps the President had approved less than two months earlier.

One chart showed "approved and funded construction projects" including improvements at airfields at Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tansonnhut (Saigon). Here was the commitment thus far. But, the "talking paper" indicated, that was not enough.

Some of the projects listed, such as defoliation were characterized as having "all the earmarks of gimmicks that cannot and will not win the war in South Vietnam." The documents do not show that the President had yet committed himself to "win the war" but that was the clear premise. The "commitment of US units" in support of President Ngo Dinh Diem's forces in one form or another "should make it obvious to the Vietnamese and the rest of the world that the United States is committed to preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

Yet "all of the recent actions we have taken may still not be sufficient to stiffen the will of the government and the people of SVN sufficiently to resist Communist pressure and win the war without the US committing combat forces."

The documents available do not indicate what the moves Lemnitzer was to put to Mr. Kennedy. But a National Security Action Memorandum of Jan. 18, nine days later, shows that the President was focusing not on sending in combat forces but on counterinsurgency.

He ordered establishment of "a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)" to "assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries." The new group was to be headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor. An annex to the memorandum listed the "critical areas" assigned to it as Laos, South Vietnam an Thailand.

The same day Gen. Lemnitzer sent a memorandum to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, who had been dealing with insurgencies for years, stating that "now a strong case can be made for increased direct participation by US personnel in the planning and supervision of Vietnamese counterinsurgency operations. Inherent in such increased direct participation should be some assurance of US support for Diem personally."

Lemnitzer was responding to Lansdale's statement that Diem was worried about a coup against him and that this had made him reluctant to let his field commanders "implement the task force concept that was an important part of the over-all plan of operations against the Vietcong."

On Jan. 26, the State Department came up with some suggestions. Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson suggested to Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric that if the Vietnamese armed forces were to be increased at the time "we would envisage strategic plans made in Saigon giving priority to areas to be cleared and held and setting forth general methods to be used. We believe these should be accomplished by numerous small tactical actions planned and executed by American and [illegible] spot to meet the local situation at the moment."

Johnson wrote that State felt "our training program for ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) be based primarily on the concept that the Vietnamese army will start winning on the day when it has obtained the confidence of the Vietnamese peasants. As a specific example I suggest that we immediately seek Vietnamese implementation of a policy of promptly giving a small reward in rice, salt or money (commodities in which the Vietcong are in short supply) to every person who gives information to the army. Similarly, villages which show determination to resist the Vietcong should receive the prompt-test possible support."

The Joint Chiefs were concerned with the larger view. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara sent the President a memorandum that illuminated their frame of mind.

Entitled "The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland," the Jan. 13 paper was signed by Lemnitzer for all the chiefs. It began this way:

"1. The United States has clearly stated and demonstrated that one of its unalterable objectives is the prevention of South Vietnam falling to communist aggression and the subsequent loss of the remainder of the Southeast Asia mainland. The military objective, therefore, must be to take expeditiously all actions necessary to defeat communist aggression in South Vietnam. The immediate strategic importance of Southeast Asia lies in the political value that can accrue to the Free World through a successful stand in that area. Of equal importance is the psychological impact that a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world—both free and communist. On the negative side, a United States political and/or military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian area would have an adverse psychological impact of even greater proportion, and one from which re-

continued

WASHINGTON STAR 1 JUL 1971

Johnson's Wracked By Doubts

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

The secret Pentagon papers depict the Johnson administration as wracked with doubts and uncertainties about Vietnam during Johnson's first year in office—unwilling to scale down ambitious policy goals, but also unwilling to escalate the U.S. military commitment.

A "summary and analysis" of the early Johnson phase in Vietnam, from November 1963 to April 1965, pictures U.S. policymakers in a dilemma between open-ended goals and sharply constricted military options. It contends that members of the National Security Council avoided debate over whether U.S. goals were realistic, and avoided the hard military decisions as well.

This summary appeared at odds with earlier published material from the study, which was interpreted as showing that the administration committed itself to escalating the war before President Johnson's election in November 1964.

Only a limited selection of the Pentagon papers was made available to The Star, so it was not clear whether the differences involved conflicting interpretations by reporters studying the documents, or whether they arose among the authors in various parts of the massive analysis.

The papers made available suggest that the 1964 elections played an important — but unspoken — role in Vietnam decision-making. But the suggestion is that the President and his advisers were paralyzed into inaction, refusing even to discuss the possibility of modifying U.S. objectives to take into account the deteriorating situation, and at the same time refusing to face the alternative of a massive military commitment.

"While U.S. policy objectives were stated in the very most comprehensive terms," the analysis says, "the means employed were both consciously limited and purposely indirect.

"That is, the U.S. eschewed employing all of its military might — or even a significant portion of it — in a battle which was viewed in Washington as determinative of the fate of all of Southeast Asia, probably crucial to the future of South Asia, and as the definitive test of U.S. ability to counteract Communist support for 'wars of national liberation'."

What limited resources the U.S. did commit, the summary says, were further diluted because they were applied indirectly through the weak and beleaguered South Vietnamese government.

"AN AGONIZING, year-long internal debate took place against the double backdrop of this dilemma and presidential election year politics," the summary says.

". . . Yet there was no serious debate in Washington on the desirability of modifying U.S. objectives. These remained essentially fixed even as the means for their realization—limited U.S. material support for the government of Vietnam—underwent one crisis and disappointment after another."

Declared policy "raced far ahead of resource allocations and use decisions," the study says, and as the situation continued to deteriorate "the U.S. pursued an ever-expanding number of minor, specific programmatic measures which [illegible] inadequate."

Contingency plans "for increasing pressures against North Vietnam" were drafted at this time, the summary says, but no similar plans were drafted for the use of U.S. ground troops in the South.

"In the aftermath of President Johnson's landslide electoral victory in November 1964, and in the face of persistent instability in South Vietnam, the administration finally expanded the war to include a limited, carefully controlled air campaign against the north," the summary says.

"EARLY IN 1965 it deployed Marine battalions to South Vietnam. By April 1965, while continuing to follow the announced policy of efforts to enable the government of Vietnam to win its own war, the U.S. had adumbrated a policy of U.S. military participation which presaged a high degree of Americanization of the war effort."

To "adumbrate" is to "shade" or sketch lightly the outline of an object. The analysts apparently one suggesting that U.S. policy continued to be a vague outline right up to the time when the country's men and prestige were committed to the war.

One widespread interpretation of early disclosures of the documents from this period was that the Johnson administration saw clearly where it was headed but misled the public.

A number of discrepancies between official public statements and internal documents have been pointed out to make this point.

But, if the "summary and analysis" of this period is an accurate representation of the Pentagon papers, such a conclusion was apparently not drawn definitively by the authors.

The evolution of policy during the period is shown through the substance of some crucial National Security Action Memorandums, each of which delineates a little further what was to become a massive U.S. commitment.

THE FIRST memorandum was written November 26, 1963, and "was intended primarily to endorse the policies pursued by President Kennedy and to ratify provisional decisions reached in Honolulu just before the (Kennedy) assassination," the study says.

President Diem had also been assassinated a short time before, and the Nov. 26 NSAM "[illegible] U.S. preferences which had been unwarranted by Diem," such as directed curing the Mekong Delta.

"Now was the time, many of the top U.S. policymakers hoped, when convincing U.S. support for the new regime in Saigon might allow the government of Vietnam to start winning its own war," the summary concludes.

But very soon it was discovered that progress reports from Vietnam had been grossly exaggerated, and that the deterioration that was viewed as related to the anti-Diem coup was actually well underway months before that time. Secondly, "the hope for political stability was never even established before it disintegrated in the Kanh coup of January, 1964.

BY THIS TIME the military assistance command was arguing that "military effort could not succeed in the absence of effective political leadership," and the Central Intelligence Agency was arguing that "military victories were needed to nourish the popular attitudes conducive to political stability."

Thus, the summary says, "there was a sufficiently broad awareness within U.S. officialdom to permit a useful debate on U.S. action . . .

"The debate did begin, but in hobbles . . . Mid-1964 was not an auspicious time for new departures in policy by a President who wished to portray 'moderate' alternatives to his opponent's 'radical' proposals.

"Nor was any time prior to or immediately following the elections very appealing for the same reason. Thus, while the debate in high official circles was very, very different from the public debate, it still reflected the existence of the public debate," the summary states.

In March of 1964, immediately after Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and prospective Ambassador Maxwell Taylor had visited Vietnam, another NSAM was written, taken "verbatim" from the McNamara-Taylor report.

This memorandum concluded that the situation in Vietnam was serious and deteriorating and that the loss of Vietnam would endanger Asia all the way to Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

But the memorandum also rejected the idea of sending U.S. troops, despite the magnitude of the impending disaster, because, the Pentagon reduce U.S. combat troops for the protection of Saigon under

Continued

WASHINGTON STAR

1 JUL 1971

Eisenhower Ringed By Hawks

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

Documents in the secret "Pentagon archives" on Vietnam reveal how far planning went inside the Eisenhower administration in 1954 for military intervention in Indochina and perhaps war with Communist China.

The documents, obtained by The Star, confirm the already-public picture of Eisenhower as a president surrounded by advisers who recommended military action in Indochina—but ultimately rejecting their advice.

But the documents show, for the first time, the depth and extent of plans prepared by the military for possible intervention.

Early in 1954, the French were facing a crisis in their war against the Communist Viet Minh. The United States, committed to France, was providing military and economic aid to Paris.

Later in the year, the French were forced to compromise and withdraw after the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel into North and South.

The U.S., certain that French defeat would open Asia to Chinese communism, sought to prevent a Viet Minh victory.

On April 5, 1954, with military intelligence showing that the French military position was crumbling and the French fortress at Dien Bien Phu was doomed, a top secret paper of the National Security Council analyzed in detail the extent of plans for U.S. intervention.

"It is estimated," said the Army portion of the memo, NSC Action No. 1074-a, "that seven U.S. divisions or their equivalent, with appropriate naval and air support, would be required to win a victory in Indochina if the French withdraw and the Chinese Communists do not intervene."

If the Chinese did not intervene and the French still withdrew, the "equivalent of 12 U.S. divisions would be required to win a victory in Indochina." If the French should remain, and the Chinese intervene, seven U.S. divisions would be needed. According to the Army.

It estimated, furthermore, that air and naval support of ground operations would require:

"A. Five hundred fighter bomber sorties per day exclusive of interdiction and counter-air operations.

"B. An airlift capability of a one division drop.

"C. A division amphibious lift."

(In April 1969, at the height of U.S. involvement, there were 543,400 American men in Vietnam—8½ Army divisions and two Marine divisions. In addition, there were three divisions of allied troops.)

THE NSC PAPER went through various contingencies for channeling the U.S. intervention.

If French forces remained, it said, no U.S. ground combat forces would be needed initially, but naval forces totaling 35,000 men and air forces totaling 8,600 men (one fighter wing, one light bomber wing, one tactical control squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron) would be required.

The main paragraphs of the NSC directive noted that the planning was being carried out within the framework of a memorandum approved by President Eisenhower Jan. 16, 1954.

This previous National Security Council memo, circulated a NSC 5405, was the basic document of the period outlining the administration's determination to keep Indochina from falling to Communists.

The memo laid out what Eisenhower himself later was to name the "domino theory" of Southeast Asia—if Indochina fell to the Vietnamese Communists sponsored by Peking and Moscow, the U.S. position in Asia, possibly the Middle East, and the offshore Pacific islands—including Indonesia, the Philippines and Japan — would be gravely jeopardized.

"In the conflict in Indochina," began the lead paragraph of the Jan. 16 memo, "the Communist and non-Communist worlds clearly confront one another on the field of battle. The loss of the struggle in Indochina, in addition to its impact in Southeast Asia and in South Asia, would therefore have the most serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in Europe and elsewhere."

The paper then set out the various "courses of action" the U.S. might follow to bolster and even replace the French in the on-going fight against the Communists.

"IN THE EVENT the United States participates in the fighting," said a key sentence, "there is a substantial risk that the Chinese Communists would intervene."

Short of direct Chinese intervention, the paper said, the U.S. should build up the "associated states" —Cambodia, Laoe and Vietnam — in the fight with the French against the Communists, should strengthen, "as appropriate, covert operations designed to assist the achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia," should take measures to promote "coordinated defense" with regional allies of Southeast Asia (the forerunner of SEATO).

The paper said the U.S. would flatly oppose any coalition with the Communists in Vietnam or any cease-fire prior to negotiations.

A cease-fire, it said, would result "in an irretrievable deterioration of the Franco-Vietnamese military position in Indochina."

This basic NSC paper of Jan. 16, while sanctioning immediate U.S. help to France to eliminate the VietMinh threat by "mid-1955," also looked to what U.S. should do if Communist China were to intervene "overtly."

Either alone, or in concert with Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand and the Associated States, the United States —according to NSC paper —should provide air and naval assistance for "resolute defense of Indochina itself" and provide the "major forces" for interdicting the Chinese in an outside China.

Additionally, the U.S. would "intensify covert operations to aid guerrilla forces against Communist China," utilize Nationalist Chinese forces from Taiwan against the mainland and in Southeast Asia and Korea, help the British in Hong Kong, and help evacuate French civilians and military people from Indochina.

FURTHERMORE, the Jan. 16 paper continued, if Britain and France agreed, the three powers "should take air and naval action against all suitable military targets in China which directly contribute to the war in Indochina, avoiding insofar as practicable targets near the USSR boundaries."

An additional paragraph added that "if the UK (United Kingdom) and France do not agree to such expanded military action, the United States should consider taking such action unilaterally."

If such action is taken, "the United States should recognize that it may become involved in an all-out war with Communist China, and possibly with the USSR and the rest of the Soviet bloc, and should therefore proceed to take large-scale mobilization measures."

It was exactly the threat of such expanded war between China and the United States which was causing the British government to drag its feet on American proposals for united action in Indochina—just as it caused Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson to resist the advice of their more belligerent advisers.

On April 25, the British cabinet, in an extraordinary Sunday-morning meeting, decided against any immediate military intervention, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden told U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles immediately. Eden has said that he felt the British government was being asked to "assist in misleading the Congress (of the

continued

LOS ANGELES TIMES

30 JUN 1971 STAT/NTI

Documents Not Always Reliable, Ellsberg Says

Pentagon Study Figure Warns Internal Papers May Not Show President's View

BY DAVID KRASLOW
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — The man who has admitted leaking the top secret Pentagon study of Vietnam policy cautioned in a magazine article last month that internal bureaucratic documents are not necessarily a reliable guide to a President's thinking.

That cautionary note by Daniel Ellsberg is especially relevant to one of the major controversies that erupted following partial publication of documents from the 47-volume study tracking this nation's involvement in Vietnam.

The documents published so far suggest that President Lyndon B. Johnson, while campaigning as a peace candidate in 1964, knew two months before the election that he would inevitably have to order the bombing of North Vietnam.

Losing Battle

Some authorities say this is an erroneous interpretation drawn from an admittedly incomplete and therefore distorted historical account — that while the issue was discussed, contingency plans drawn, and a consensus of some advisers achieved, there was no decision by Mr. Johnson.

Former Undersecretary of State George Ball, a Dove in the Johnson administration who fought a losing battle against deepening American military efforts in Vietnam, has said since publication of the papers that Mr. Johnson did not decide the bombing question until early in 1965. The regular bombing of North Vietnam was begun in March, 1965.

Some 35 authors who put together the massive Pentagon study at the direction of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara operated under acknowledged handicaps.

They apparently were given complete access to Defense Department records, but had no access to White House or State Department files and they were enjoined from interviewing any principals involved in the decision-making.

Writing in the May issue of the Public Policy quarterly published by the Kennedy Institute at Harvard, Ellsberg said:

"Certain general considerations caution the analyst/historian not to take the mosaic of bureaucratic inputs to presidential decision as a close or highly reliable guide to the President's own view of a matter, his private expectations and aims."

In the lengthy article, a commentary on Vietnam policy decisions by four Presidents, Ellsberg also said:

"Documentary evidence on the internal decision-making process is far from adequate to answer the critical question of what considerations were salient to presidential attention at a given moment.

"The President—having no formal need to persuade a superior, to coordinate a proposal or to justify a decision internally—puts much less down on paper than other participants in the bureaucratic process."

Ellsberg asserted that because of a President's overlapping roles, "he conceals or dissembles his own views even more than other participants, except selectively to his closest associates. They in turn guard them closely, for reasons of loyalty, their own access, and politics, even when they later come to write 'history.'"

Mr. Johnson is expected to present some now-secret evidence of what he was thinking about on Vietnam during the 1964 campaign in his memoirs to be published next November.

In fact, Mr. Johnson's use of classified documents in his memoirs is part of the defense raised by the Washington Post in its court fight against the Nixon Administration's effort to suppress the Post's continued publication of the Pentagon study.

Benjamin Bradlee, executive editor of the Post, said in an affidavit to the federal district court that the Johnson manuscript, which he examined at the invitation of the publisher, "contains extensive, verbatim quotations from classified documents contained in the materials involved in this case."

White House files, of course, contain in addition to presidential and National Security Council papers copies of many of the classified documents that originate elsewhere.

When Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser for national security affairs, reported for duty at the White House in January, 1969, he found the cupboard bare.

The numerous file drawers of the NSC, which is Kissinger's domain, were empty. The walk-in vault of the Situation Room in the basement of the White House, where the most sensitive NSC documents are stored, contained not a scrap of paper.

Even the log book had disappeared. The log [illegible] ger a fairly good idea of what secret papers—including probably the Pentagon's Vietnam study—the NSC had received from other agencies during the Johnson administration.

Following what apparently has become presidential tradition, Mr. Johnson had all of the NSC files taken to Texas.

Presumably, this material now is in the Johnson library at the University of Texas, and presumably, it will be made available to historians many years later.

One top foreign policy official during the Johnson era has suggested that even under the best of circumstances historians will never get at the whole truth on Vietnam.

NEWSWEEK
8 JUN 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

BY STEWART ALSOP

'BREACH OF SECURITY'

WASHINGTON — It is interesting — and rather wryly amusing—to juxtapose a couple of editorials that have appeared in The New York Times. One appeared on June 16 after a Federal judge ordered the Times to suspend publication of the top-secret Pentagon studies of the U.S. role in Vietnam.

The Times called this "an unprecedented example of censorship," which indeed it is. But then, the verbatim publication of great masses of top-secret papers is also unprecedented.

"What was the reason that impelled The Times to publish this material in the first place?" the Times asks rhetorically. "The basic reason is, as was stated in our original reply to Mr. Mitchell, that we believe 'that it is in the interest of the people of this country to be informed' . . ." The editorial continues on that lofty note: "We publish the documents and related running account not to prove any debater's point . . . but to present to the American public a history—admittedly incomplete—of decision-making at the highest levels of government . . ."

The other editorial, which was even more righteously outraged, appeared in the Times some years ago. It was entitled "Breach of Security," and it denounced an article "purporting to tell what went on in the executive committee of the National Security Council . . . The secrecy of one of the highest organs of the United States has been seriously breached."

'MC CARTHY TECHNIQUE'

"What kind of advice can the President expect to get under such circumstances?" the Times asked, again rhetorically. "How can there be any real freedom of discussion or of dissent; how can anyone be expected to advance positions that may be politically unpopular or unprofitable? Does no one in Washington recall the McCarthy era and the McCarthy technique? . . . The various positions of the members of the NSC taken during deliberation must remain secret . . . The integrity of the National Security Council, and of the advice received by the President, is at stake."

The article that inspired the Times to this burst of righteous indignation was a Saturday Evening Post piece on the Cuban missile crisis by Charles Bartlett and this writer. It too was an attempt "to [illegible] public a history—admittedly incomplete—of decision-making at the highest levels of government." Although the Times, fortunately, could not know it at the time, the article had been read in advance (and rather badly edited) by no less an authority on national security than the President of the United States. It contained no word from any NSC paper, or from any other secret document.

REASONS—AND REASONS

The writers' reasons for writing the article were perhaps less lofty than those claimed by the Times in its recent editorial. They included a desire to do a good reportorial job (the account was later confirmed in detail in Robert Kennedy's book on the Cuban crisis). They even included a desire to make a bit of money. But like most reporters, we also believed that "it is in the interest of the people of this country to be informed . . ."

No doubt a desire to inform the people was a major reason for the Times's decision to publish the secret papers. But (to adopt the Times's own rhetorical style) might there not have been other reasons too? Does it not matter a great deal to the Times who does the informing? Is it not the Times's criterion that if the Times does the informing, that is in the national interest, and if somebody else does it, that is "a breach of security"?

And is the Times really indifferent to whether or not the information, which it is "in the interest of the people of this country" to publish, supports the views of the Times? The article that so enraged the Times pictured the late Adlai Stevenson, then a major Times icon, in a somewhat dubious light, and that perhaps had something to do with the rage. The Times has long passionately supported the cause that the leaking of the Pentagon papers was obviously intended to serve.

The purloined papers printed by the Times were first offered to Sen. George McGovern and Rep. Paul McCloskey, the leading doves in the Senate and House. Obviously, the purpose of the leak was to prove that this country became involved in Vietnam by a process of stealthy deception; and that therefore the United States should withdraw forthwith, leaving the South Vietnamese to their fate.

[illegible] prove what they are intended to prove. Allowing for the need for contingency planning, and allowing also for Lyndon Johnson's well-known passion for concealment, there is less deception of the public in the documents than self-deception.

There is the ancient American illusion that wars can be won cleanly in the air, rather than bloodily on the ground, of course. But the basic self-deception was the illusion that, if the United States could only find the right combination of sticks and carrots, the Vietnamese Communists would (in Robert McNamara's phrase) "move to a settlement by negotiation." The unswerving goal of the Communists, then and now, was and is the imposition of Communist rule on all former French Indochina. There is no stick short of "bombing them back to the stone age," and no carrot short of turning Saigon over to their tender mercies, that will divert them from that goal.

No American President who was also an honorable and humane man could hit them with that stick, or offer them that carrot. Yet the illusion that the North Vietnamese are capable of "reasonable" compromise is amazingly persistent, especially among liberal Democrats—its most recent manifestation is the "Clifford Plan," strongly supported by the Times.

NONSENSE

Despite its ineffable self-righteousness, the Times is certainly a great paper, though not as great as when it had the Herald Tribune to worry about. Moreover, anyone who has been around Washington for some time knows that a lot of governmental nonsense has been perpetrated in the name of "security." Most reasonably diligent reporters, including this one, have been investigated by the government for publishing information the government found it inconvenient to have published.

Yet surely there is a problem of security worth worrying about when "the various positions of the members of the NSC," as well as National Intelligence Estimates and secret coded messages from foreign governments, are reproduced verbatim in great quantities. Indeed, the Times series, by the Times's own standards, is the most serious "breach of security" in modern history. Yet those who wait [illegible] this particular breach will have a long wait.

MIAMI HERALD
25 JUNE 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Since Truman, Our Indochina Policy Has Been 'Dominoes,' Papers Show

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — On March 27, 1950, President Harry S Truman gave his approval to "NSC 64," the first National Security Council memorandum to deal solely with Indochina.

That spring, the echoes of World War II could still be heard. The chill of the cold war had set in. Mainland China had fallen to Mao. And the Korean War would soon begin.

Against that background, according to the opening chapters of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, "NSC 64" gave birth to the "domino principle" — the theory that if one country falls, others will follow.

As the history of the Vietnam conflict and the Pentagon papers available to Knight Newspapers make clear, the domino principle spawned its own set of dominoes which fell successively on the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower and Kennedy and Johnson.

ADOPTED BY the Truman Administration as official policy, NSC 64 began with the observation: "The threat of Communist aggression against Indochina is only one phase of anticipated Communist plans to seize all of Southeast Asia.

"It is important to U.S. security interests," the still secret NSC memo said, "that all practicable measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area of Southeast Asia and is under immediate threat.

"The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a Communist-dominated government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard."

Dean Acheson
... dominoes

THE FRENCH had granted limited independence, in early February 1950, to Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

On Feb. 2, Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended, in a memo to the President, U.S. recognition of the three new states.

Two weeks after Acheson's memo, France requested American military and economic assistance to fight the Communist-dominated Viet Minh. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson recommended to Truman the request be approved.

The United States, in March 1950, sent to Southeast Asia the first of countless missions. And on May 1, Truman approved the first military assistance funds for Indochina — $10 million.

The French installed as their head of government the emperor Bao Dai, a playboy who had spent the war and the Japanese occupation of [illegible]

"The loss of any . . . of Southeast Asia to Communist control . . . would probably lead to . . . swift submission . . . by remaining countries . . . India and . . . the Middle East . . . (and) would endanger the stability and security of Europe."

A secret document providing the basis for the "domino principle."

RELUCTANTLY, because Bao Dai was the only non-Communist Vietnamese leader available, the United States agreed to support him.

On the emperor's return from exile, the Pentagon study shows, Acheson sent a priority cable to Edmond Bullion, head of the American legation in Saigon, asking that he deliver it personally to Bao Dai.

"The U.S. government is at present moment taking steps to increase amount of aid to French Union and Associated States (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) in their effort to defend the territorial integrity of IC (Indochina) and prevent the incorporation of the Associated States within the Commie-dominated bloc of slave states . . .," Acheson said.

As more millions of American dollars headed towards Vietnam (more than $1 billion had been sent by 1952) the Truman Administration was also deep in the Korean War and under criticism that it was "soft on communism."

PARTLY AS a consequence, the Pentagon analyst writes, "the 'domino principle' in its purest form was written into the 'general considerations' section of NSC 124-2," adopted in June 1952. It said:

○ "Communist domination by whatever means of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

○ "The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to Communist control as a consequence of overt or covert Chinese Communist aggression would have critical psychological, political, and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with commuism by the remaining countries of this group . . . an alignment with Communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East . . . would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe."

The National Security Council memo went on to warn that Communist control of Southeast Asia "would" seriously endanger the American position in the Far East and the Pacific and could force "Japan's eventual accommodation to communism."

A FEW MONTHS after the memo was adopted, Dwight D. Eisenhower came into the presidency, John Foster Dulles became his secretary of state, and in the spring of 1953, they sent a special study commission to Indochi-

Continued

NEW YORK TIMES
25 JUN 1971

Coast Paper Says U.S. Barred Aide's '63 Plan to Quit Vietnam

The New York Times is restrained by Federal court order from publishing further articles in its Vietnam series. This dispatch was based on an article in The Los Angeles Times and was distributed by The Associated Press to all its newspaper, radio and television subscribers.

LOS ANGELES, June 24 (AP)—The Los Angeles Times reported in today's issue that the National Security Council rejected a recommendation by a State Department expert in 1963 that the United States should pull out of Vietnam because it could not win the war against the Communists.

The newspaper said it learned of that facet of the war in studying what it termed previously unpublished sections of the secret Pentagon report on American involvement in Vietnam.

The newspaper said that the recommendation had been submitted by Paul M. Kattenburg, then head of the State Department's Vietnam Working Group.

Mr. Kattenburg's suggestion was overruled by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who reportedly viewed it as "speculative," the newspaper said.

The Secretary of State was quoted as having said that "it would be far better for us to start on the firm basis of two things—that we will not pull out of Vietnam until the war is won, and that we will not run a coup."

Supported by Johnson

Mr. Rusk, the newspaper added, was supported in his view by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

The report on the National Security Council's session on the matter is contained in a memorandum written by Lieut. Gen. Victor H. Krulak of the Marines, who was the Pentagon's top expert on counter-insurgency warfare, The Los Angeles Times said.

The council meeting, the newspaper said, was a key session held after a group of South Vietnamese generals had failed to stage a coup against the South Vietnamese Government headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem. Mr. Diem was later overthrown and assassinated.

Mr. Kattenburg was quoted by General Krulak as having suggested at the Security Council meeting that "at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out immediately," The Los Angeles Times reported.

President Diem's last hours, three months after the National Security Council meeting and before his overthrow and assassination in November, 1963, also were revealed in the Pentagon-Vietnam study, the newspaper reported.

Telephoned to Lodge

Mr. Diem telephoned Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., United States Ambassador to South Vietnam, from the Saigon Presidential Palace while the building was under seige by rebel generals, The Los Angeles Times said.

The rebellious generals reportedly had promised Mr. Diem and his brother, head of the secret police, safe conduct out of the country.

The study indicated that Mr. Lodge's role was to conceal that American officials had been in close contact with the plotters and to conceal the United States Government's position that the coup was desirable if it could succeed, the newspaper said.

President Kennedy, according to the study, was "personally stunned" by Mr. Diem's death "particularly in view of the heavy United States involvement in encouraging the coup leaders," the newspaper reported.

"It was Kattenburg's view," the paper said General Krulak had reported to the Security Council, "that Diem will get little support from the military and, as time goes on, he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily downhill."

WASHINGTON STAR
25 JUN 1975

[redacted]

STATINTL

ADVISERS ON MILITARY

JFK Panel Screened 'Dirty Tricks'

The Kennedy Administration's control over the covert "dirty tricks" of the military and the Central Intelligence Agency was centered in a secret top-level group known as the 303 Committee.

The committee, named for the room in the Executive Office Building where it met, was set up by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the spring of 1961 — a situation in which he felt he did not have enough control over the government's intelligence operations.

Original members of the committee were McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to the President; Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric; Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and Richard Helms, then deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although the name and composition of the group has not previously been made public, the existence of such a high-level group to advise Kennedy on covert operations — what Dean Rusk called "back alley fighting" — has been no secret. In fact, leaders of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations have all insisted that covert activities are controlled at the very highest levels of the government.

The 303 Committee operated in the shadow of a larger and more public group—the Special Group (Counter Insurgency), which was headed by Kennedy's military adviser, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and had as its co-chairman the president's brother, Robert F. Kennedy.

According to some reports, the attorney general created a courtroom atmosphere in the weekly meetings of the SGCI and badgered government officials called as "witnesses." But Taylor said such reports were "nonsense," although he described the younger Kennedy as a very active participant in the meetings.

The 303 Committee was largely responsible for the unofficial policy of the government and managed covert operations — most often carried out by the CIA or the Army's Special Forces — throughout the world. The SGCI, on the other hand, was responsible for the open official activities of the government in responding to the Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." They were both, in different ways, deeply involved in the growing struggle in Southeast Asia.

Both the 303 Committee and the better known SGCI were created as part of President Kennedy's effort to find a better decision-making apparatus than the rather rigid National Security Council of the Eisenhower days and to assert firmer control over covert activities so as to avoid the embarrassment of another Bay of Pigs.

They were part of a great proliferation of committees in the White House in the administrations of both Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

'They Came and Went . . .'

In a study of the national security process written for the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1968, Chester L. Cooper, a former White House official, described the situation this way:

"There were a bewildering variety of . . . ad hoc groups during the Kennedy and Johnson years, with uncertain charters and fluid missions. They came and went with the ebb and flow of crises. Some have likened them to floating crap games, in which the locale, the stakes, and the players all churned about in perpetual motion."

The biggest game in town during all this period, of course, was the Vietnam situation and both the number of committees and the amount of attention devoted to that part of the world was considerable.

The 303 Committee reportedly gave its approval to four major covert operations involving the U.S. in a secret war in Southeast Asia and begun by Kennedy within six weeks after he assumed office.

They were listed as the training of the Montagnard tribesmen, Operation Farmhand, the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations.

Sabotage in the North

Operation Farmhand was the first covert program approved by the committee for Vietnam and involved airlifting South Vietnamese into North Vietnam to "commit sabotage, spy and harrass the enemy."

Frequently, according to one report, the men would show up drunk or fail to show up at all and were invariably arrested as soon as they landed in the North.

Although started covertly, the training of the Montagnards has long since become well known and they are organized as Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

The other two covert operations — the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations — have since become controversial because they were both directly involved in the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 in which two destroyers were attacked by gunboats. The North Vietnamese apparently assumed they were involved in a shelling attack.

Under the DeSoto plan, destroyers were sent close to the shores of North Vietnam and China to gather electronic intelligence. The DeSoto patrols were reportedly approved by the President in 1962 and placed under the Joint Center for Intelligence at the Pentagon.

The 34a operation reportedly did not begin until February, 1964, three months after Johnson had succeeded Kennedy.

Personal OK Required

After the Tonkin incident, the 303 Committee reportedly exerted greater control over activities by adopting a policy whereby every member was required personally to approve each order of a 34a operation.

Later in the Johnson White House, many of the most important decisions concerning the war were made at the weekly Tuesday luncheons, which brought together the President and his closest top-level advisers.

The SGCI remained in use until 1966, by which time it was almost a general-purpose standing committee. It was replaced then by the new Senior Interdepartmental Group — designed to give the secretary of state clearer authority in directing and coordinating overseas activities.

STATINTL

[redacted]

SYRACUSE, N.Y.
HERALD-JOURNAL
E - 129,656
HERALD-AMERICAN
S - JUN 24 1971

Secrets guarded by NSC

By DON BACON
Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The National Security Council (NSC), which perhaps handles more highly sensitive documents than any other government agency, has taken elaborate precautions to avoid the kind of security breach that stunned the Pentagon last week.

The principal forum for presenting national security issues to the President, the NSC receives some 800 documents a month for information and action.

These papers, most carrying the highest security classification, come primarily from the departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and other security-related government offices, as well as private research organizations working under contract with the NSC.

Few Breaches

"We have very few security breaches and we discipline rather severely for that," said Mrs. Jeanne Wilson Davis, director of the NSC secretariat, in testimony last month before a House appropriations subcommittee. Her testimony, given behind closed doors, was made public recently.

Speaking prior to The New York Times' publication of a "top secret" Pentagon report on Vietnam, Mrs. Davis described some of the "drastic changes in our physical security" undertaken by the NSC in the last two years.

Constant Battle

Security, said Mrs. Davis, "is a battle we wage constantly."

The NSC, which has offices in the White House west wing, has "created a new specially protected area," she said, where most documents are now kept, "with some very elaborate precautionary devices."

"Fortunately," she added, "we are located in a rather compact area so that we are not spread out all over a building, so it makes it a little bit easier to control our access. Security is never perfect but I think we do a pretty good job."

Didn't Have Report

Until last week, the NSC had no copy of the 47-volume Pentagon report. The Defense Department gave a copy to the council in 1968 but, according to the White House, President Lyndon Johnson acquired it for the LBJ library at the completion of his term. After The New York Times began publishing the documents June 13, President Nixon requested a new copy for the NSC's files.

Mrs. Davis told the subcommittee that all NSC personnel are screened with extreme care before hiring, even those who have previously received security clearances from other government agencies. Clearances must be renewed every three yars. A formr agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation serves as the NSC's personnel security officer.

Mrs. Davis said "we have disciplinary measures available to us if we should need them for security violations." She did not elaborate.

The amount of important papers handled by the NSC each month has risen from an average of 150 under previous administrations to about 800 under Nixon.

WASHINGTON POST

24 JUN 1971

STATINTL

[redacted]

Memo to NSC Remains Secret

The White House yesterday declined to make public a directive President Nixon sent to the National Security Council on Jan. 15, 1971, ordering a study of the declassification process.

The White House had announced Tuesday that the President sent such a memo to the NSC. Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said in reply to a request by the Washington Post for a copy that it was "an internal paper" and would not be released.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
23 JUN 1971

Leaks of Secret Study Frustrate Government

Questions of Theft, Distribution Remain in Addition to Publication of Documents

BY DAVID KRASLOW
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON —The staggered leaks to various newspapers of portions of a top-secret Pentagon study on the Vietnam war are bedeviling the government in its effort to prevent further publication of the documents.

And this so far successful strategy also is circumventing court orders against single newspapers to temporarily halt publication until judges can decide the government's requests for permanent injunctions.

While the source or sources of the leaks appear well on their way toward achieving their objective of making public the significant content in the Pentagon report, the resulting historic confrontation between a free press and governmental authority has not been reduced to a moot episode.

Called a Theft

Wholly aside from the constitutional struggle, an Administration official noted Tuesday, is the relatively simple question of solving what the Justice Department has alleged was the theft and distribution of highly classified government property.

And he said the possible prosecution of newspaper reporters and executives under the espionage and censorship statute for receiving and publishing state secrets had not been foreclosed.

Whether the staggered leak strategy simply evolved or was the preconceived plan of an individual or a group of antiwar critics acting in concert has not been disclosed.

So far only one suspect has been named—Daniel Ellsberg, faculty member at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former Defense Department official who apparently worked on the Pentagon study.

A Justice Department spokesman confirmed Tuesday that the FBI had been searching for Ellsberg since last week, but he said no warrant had been issued for his arrest. He said at this point Ellsberg was merely wanted for questioning.

Named as Source

Ellsberg was named last week by Sidney Zion, a former New York Times reporter, as that newspaper's source for the Pentagon documents. And Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R-Calif.) disclosed that Ellsberg had given him papers on Vietnam policy that bore no classified markings.

When two FBI agents went to McCloskey's office Tuesday to question him about the papers and his dealings with Ellsberg, they were confronted by a television camera crew and 10 other reporters and photographers. They apparently had been notified by McCloskey's staff after the agents asked to see the congressman.

"I wanted to start this meeting in public, but if you can convince me it ought to be private, I'll be glad to honor it," McCloskey told the agents.

"Under the circumstances," an agent said, "I think our conversation should be confidential."

At a 15-minute private meeting, McCloskey said, the agents told him they were investigating the "unauthorized disclosure of confidential documents." McCloskey said he told the agents he considered his conversations with Ellsberg as confidential.

Even in the unlikely event that the leaks to newspapers are plugged, McCloskey's actions and a statement Tuesday by Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggest Congress will be in a strong bargaining position in seeking to make more of the Pentagon papers public.

Fulbright disclosed that the committee had for some time some of the material published last week and said he felt that the Administration should supply the entire report to the panel.

"They have grossly abused their assumed right of classification," Fulbright said.

Faced with newspaper publication of numerous documents and building congressional pressure for additional disclosures, the Administration announced Tuesday it had ordered a review of all 47 volumes in the Pentagon study to determine what material can be declassified.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said the decisions would be made within 90 days.

And on the eve of the opening today of congressional hearings on classification procedures, White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler revealed that President Nixon last Jan. 15 ordered several agency heads to review such procedures.

Ziegler said that in a National Security Council directive the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Defense and Justice Departments were instructed to study whether more information can be made public through less original classification and speedier declassification procedures.

[redacted]

STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST
23 JUN 1971

Secrecy Rule Review Was Sought by Nixon

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Early this year, President Nixon ordered a top-level review of all government procedures for classifying documents, the White House revealed yesterday.

Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said that ordinarily such presidential directives to the National Security Council — the government's top security advisory body — are not made public. But, he said, public interest in the current fight over publication of the top secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war now made the disclosure of the President's move on Jan. 15 appropriate.

Ziegler said the presidential directive called for broader and speedier declassification procedures and for a continuing review of the process.

Ziegler said the purpose was "to enlarge the American people's right to know by making more information available to the public not less."

Ziegler said that Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird was following the President's directive yesterday when he spoke on Capitol Hill about the Pentagon study.

Laird, earlier yesterday, told newsmen he had ordered Pentagon censors to speed up work on declassifying as much of the controversial Vietnam war papers as possible.

Laird — not mentioning the White House directive — indicated that his move was prompted by dsclosure of portions of the top secret papers in three newspapers.



MELVIN R. LAIRD
... pledges classification review

WASHINGTON STAR
23 JUN 1971

Secrecy Study Attributed to Nixon Order

The White House says Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's announced speedup in declassification of the secret Pentagon study on the Vietnam war resulted from an order issued by President Nixon early this year.

Nixon last Jan. 15 ordered the National Security Council to "review current classification procedures to enlarge the American people's right to know more, not less," press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said yesterday.

Ziegler said the January order to the Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Central Intelligence Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission from President Nixon "looks to broader and speedier reclassification procedures."

The review "has been undew way since January. This is what Laird referred to. The secretary of Defense is being responsive to this directive, he added.

Ordinarily Ziegler said, NSC orders are not made public. But over the weekend in Key Biscayne, he added, the President decided to make the fact known that he had directed the NSC to make this declassification study.

Uncertain of Action

Asked what declassifications had been accomplished since January as a result of the order to the NSC, Ziegler replied that documents are being declassified all the time. He said he was unable to say which declassifications have taken place since the order.

Laird, who has refused demands from senators and congressmen to provide them with the full 47-volume study of U.S. involvement in Indochina from World War II to May 1968, said yesterday that he had ordered that declassification be speeded up. He estimated that a declassified version of the study, already published in part by newspapers, may be made public in about 90 days.

Ziegler said he regarded 90 days as an outside limit. There is a task force at work on it, he said.

Fulbright Has Parts

On Capitol Hill, meantime, Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said yesterday that it has had parts of the study "for some time." He refused to say where the committee had obtained the material. He said he has been rebuffed twice in the last 18 months in efforts to get complete copies from the administration.

Asked why he had not turned over the classified information to the executive branch, Fulbright replied:

"We're all cleared for top-secret here. "We're not only cleared, we're entitled to such information."

The Foreign Relations Committee was to decide today whether to conduct its own investigation of U.S. involvement in Indochina. Fulbright said he thought his committee was the proper forum for such hearings.

He said the Nixon administration had "only itself to blame" for the furor created by the publication of the Pentagon study.

"The documents would not have created as much of a splash if the administration had taken the proper course and turned over the documents to the committee," Fulbright said.

WASHINGTON STAR

1 8 JUN 1971

[redacted]

CARL T. ROWAN

Top Aides to Johnson Misled on War, 'Used'

President Lyndon B. Johnson and a handful of intimates were misusing the National Security Council as an approval "cover" for clandestine war operations that were never discussed in Security Council meetings.

Johnson asked top aides to approve retaliatory bombing raids on North Vietnam even while keeping it secret from those aides that the United States was provoking the Communists into the acts against which we were retaliating.

This critical point has not yet been made clear in the New York Times' articles that have made it appallingly obvious that the Johnson administration misled the public and duped the Congress into giving early support to U.S. military intervention in Vietnam.

On Feb. 7, 1965, a Security Council meeting was called after 8 American servicemen were killed and 62 wounded in a Viet Cong raid on Pleiku. The Security Council was asked to approve "retaliatory" raids on North Vietnamese targets despite the added risks flowing out of the fact that Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin was in Hanoi.

The Council did "approve" such raids, which were the beginning of round-the-clock bombings of North Vietnam, although months of U.S.-inspired commando raids, mercernary bombings, sabotage and other assaults against North Vietnam under "Plan 34A" had not been revealed to:

1. Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, a statutory member of the National Security Council.

2. Edward A. McDermott, director of the Office of Emergency Planning and also a statutory member of the council, or to his successor.

3. This reporter, who was then director of the U.S. Information Agency, and who sat on the Security Council at the invitation of the President.

There were others present who were asked by the President to say yea or nay on the bombing raids (the council is advisory only, the President alone making decisions), but who were being asked to endorse grave actions without being given all the facts.

Only intuition, suspicion and a piecing together of vague references in certain "top secret" and "no distribution" telegrams enabled some who sat on the council to know that there was a "plan 34A."

"When I read '34A' I thought they were talking about a hotel room," Humphrey told me. "I swear I'd never heard of it until I read it in the Times. Those papers revealed by the Times were as secret to me as they were to the general public."

Certain highly classified data is made known to government officials only on a "need to know" basis, and very clearly President Johnson or his top advisers decided that the vice president and others in the Security Council meetings did not have a "need to know."

The Times revelations have made it clear to people holding topmost jobs in the Johnson administration that they were being used as a "cover" for clandestine operations planned and ordered by the President and a handful of intimate advisers.

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, CIA Director John McCone, presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, sometime-presidential-adviser and sometime-ambassador-to-Saigon, were the key men calling the signals that Johnson asked the Security Council to endorse.

The Tonkin Gulf episode, five months before the Pleiku raid, was a similar case of misuse of the National Security Council. Some members of the council knew of the U.S. Desoto patrol, but were left to believe that it was just an innocent surveillance operation that was attacked wantonly by the North Vietnamese.

The full Security Council never was told that the allies had carried out two destructive 34A raids against North Vietnam only hours before North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy. Nor was the Congress told this before it voted, 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House, for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that broadened the President's war-making powers.

These are facts that the public, the courts, the Justice Department, the White House and everyone else ought to ponder before they get too busy harassing and hounding the New York Times, trying to halt the flow of information that the people should have had years ago.

The Times has revealed things that certainly are embarrassing to the United States internationally, and damning of some individuals domestically. But Defense Secretary Melvin Laird must face the fact that embarrassment is not the same as "damaging to national security."

This tragic episode tells us that political leaders who try to dupe the public and the Congress get burned—and that the truth comes out anyhow.

It also tells us that a passion for secrecy, which Johnson had, is dangerous in a democracy. When a President limits great decisions on war and peace to a small clique of advisers, callously using others as a cover, he is more likely to lead the country into trouble.

Instead of trying to curb the Times' freedom to continue what has been a monumental public service, the Nixon administration would better devote its time to figuring out how it can avoid the errors that brought tragedy to Lyndon Johnson.

Laird Refuses in 1969 Fulbright Request For the Pentagon Study on Vietnam

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 16—Eighteen months abo, in a letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright, the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, described a secret Pentagon study of American involvement in Vietnam as a "compilation of raw materials to be used at some unspecified, but distant, future date."

Mr. Laird declined in the letter to give the study to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Mr. Fulbright heads. The Secretary said that to do so "would clearly be contrary to the national interest."

The letter offered no specific reason why the national interest might be jeopardized. Mr. Laird contended that the material was sensitive because contributors to the study had been guaranteed confidentiality.

The Pentagon spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, declined today to expand on the meaning of Mr. Laird's remarks in the letter, dated Dec. 20, 1969.

Mr. Firedheim said that he assumed that Secretary Laird has stated "what he means" in the letter and that "it sounds to melike he thought it was a historical document."

The Justice Department obtained a Federal Court order yesterday, temporarily halting publication of parts of the Pentagon study in The New York Times.

Secretary Laird said Monday that publication of the documents "violated the security regulations of the United States." He emphasized, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that he thought it served no useful purpose to make public sensitive information.

Stress on Senstivity

In his 1969 letter to Mr. Fulbright, the Defense Secretary similarly stressed the sensitivity of the subject rather than its potential impact on national security.

He said the study had been commissioned in 1967 by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

"It was conceived as a compilation of raw materials to be used at some unspecficied, but distant, future date," the letter said. "On the basis of the understanding that access and use would be restricted, the documentswere designed to contain an accumulation of data of the most delicate sensitivity, including N.S.C. [NNational Security Council] papers and other Presidential communications which have always been considered privileged.

"In addition, the papers included a variety of internal advice and comments central to the decision-making process. Many of the contributions to this total document were provided on the basis of an expressed guarantee of confidentiality."

Access Highly Limited

Mr. Laird's letter continued: "As intended from the start, access to and use of this document has been extremely limited. It would clearly be contrary to the national interest to disseminate it more widely. However, the Department of Defense is naturally prepared to provide the committee information with respect to executive branch activities in Vietnam for any portion of the period covered by this compendium."

Mr. Freidheim said today in response to a telephone request for clarification that "it is obviously what Larid thought at that time." The spokesman for the Secretary said that he could not "add any words to what the letter says."

He expressed surprise that the correspondence had been made public. It was part of a series of written exchanges between Senator Fulbright and Secretary Laird that was inserted in the committee's record by Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri following the hearing Monday.

Senator Fulbright first asked for a copy of the Pentagon study in a letter to Mr. Laird on Nov. 11, 1969. In another letter, on Jan. 19, 1970, the Senator urged that Mr. Laird reconsider his refusal to provide the material.

After one of Mr. Laird's assistants had replied that the Secretary was studying the matter, Mr. Fulbright wrote in April and again in July of last year to ask what Mr. Laird's response was.

On July 21, 1970, Mr. Laird again rejected the request.

"My letter of Dec. 20, 1969, indicated that access to and use of this document, as intended from the start, has been and remains extremely limited," Mr. Laird wrote. "For the reasons expressed in that letter, I have again concluded that it would be clearly contrary to the national interest to disseminate the compendium more widely."

Last April 30, Senator Fulbright again asked for the study in a letter to Mr. Laird and asked whether "executive privilege is being invoked by the President" as authority for withholding the study and other requested documents.

Along with the letter the Senator sent Mr. Laird a copy of a Presidential memorandum dated March 24, 1969, in which Mr. Nixon said his policy was "to comply to the fullest extent possible with Congressional requests for information" unless, "in the most compelling circumstances" it was necessary to invoke executive privilege. Even then, the memorandum stipulated, the privilege would not be invoked "without specific Presidential approval."

NEW YORK TIMES

KEY TEXTS F[redacted]
PENTAGON'S VIETN[redacted]

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors correted.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Pnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equili[illegible] try. Moreover, we have some concern that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our po-[illegible] would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15 and that su[redacted] precondition [redacted] ference. Que[redacted] ritorial gain[redacted] vided they c[redacted] practice bro[redacted] equilibrium [redacted] no longer n[redacted] Lao withdra[redacted] tion to 14-n[redacted] fact though [redacted] curred to So[redacted] is also touc[redacted] to Butler ([redacted] Souvanna a[redacted] PDJ withdr[redacted] evitably ins[redacted] gains, and [redacted] arrangemen[redacted] present fa[redacted] division. I[redacted] were to be [redacted] best be don[redacted] it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicoms could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

STATINTL

Continued

U.S. Planned Before Tonkin For War on North, Files Show

By Murrey Marder
and Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Johnson administration planned for major American military action against North Vietnam nearly five months before the 1964 Tonkin Gulf incident, according to secret government documents made public yesterday by The New York Times.

These plans were made, the documents show, at a time when the United States already was directing clandestine sabotage operations in the North.

Two months before the attack on two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, the administration sent a Canadian diplomat, J. Blair Seaborn, on a secret mission to Hanoi where he is quoted as telling Premier Pham Van Dong that "in the event of escalation (of the war) the greatest devastation would result for the D.R.V. (North Vietnam) itself."

It was the Tonkin incident—called totally unprovoked by the administration—which led Congress on Aug. 7, 1964, to pass a resolution declaring that the United States was "prepared, as the President directs, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," to assist South Vietnam. It was on this resolution that President Johnson subsequently leaned heavily to widen the war.

The documents are part of a multi-volumed collection of records and comments assembled under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The bulk of the documents disclosed thus far by the Times are of military origin but include some White House and State Department papers that reached the Pentagon. Other documents were only alluded to or quoted from in the newspaper's story.

A National Security Action Memorandum of March 17 1964, presumably the result of a presidential decision, set out both the administration's political aims and the basis for its military planning. A cable sent three days later by the President to Henry Cabot Lodge, then the American ambassador in Saigon, illuminates his intentions.

The memorandum says that "we seek an independent non-Communist South Vietnam" but "do not require that it serve as a Western base or as a member of a Western alliance. South Vietnam must be free, however, to accept outside assistance as required to maintain its security."

Repeating language from a McNamara memorandum of March 16 to the President (language in part drawn in turn from a memorandum to McNamara on Jan. 22 from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor) the National Security Council document reflects the prevailing belief in what President Eisenhower had called the "domino effect" of the loss of South Vietnam.

Unless the objective is achieved in South Vietnam, it says, "almost all of Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance" or accommodate to Communism. The Philippines, it was judged, "would become shaky" and "the threat to India on the west, Australia and New Zealand to the South, and Taiwan, Korea, and Japan to the north would be greatly increased."

The policy decision, then, was to "prepare immediately to be in a position on 72 hours' notice to initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian 'border control actions'" as well as "the 'retaliatory actions' against North Vietnam and to be in a position on 30 days' notice to initiate the program of 'graduated overt military pressure' against North Vietnam . . ."

The President's cable to Lodge says that "our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis" on grounds that "overt military action" then was "premature." Mr. Johnson offered as one reason that statement that "we expect a showdown between the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties and action against the North will be more practicable after than before a showdown."

The President also told Lodge that part of his job then was "knocking down the idea of neutralization" of Vietnam, an idea advanced by then French President Charles deGaulle, "wherever it rears its ugly head and on this point I think that nothing is more important than to stop neutralist talk wherever we can by whatever means we can."

The resulting contingency planning is shown in several documents. But other documents also show that as early as Dec. 21, 1963, a memorandum from McNamara to President Johnson referred to "plans for covert action into North Vietnam" that "present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations" that should "provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

This clandestine program became "Operation Plan 34-A," launched on Feb. 1, 1964. It was described in a National Security memorandum the next month as "a modest 'covert" program operated by South Vietnamese (and a few Chinese Nationalist)—a program so limited that it is unlikely to have any significant effect . . ."

One source yesterday said, in retrospect, that these covert operations were in fact "very modest—and highly unsuccessful." But they came to have profound significance in the Tonkin Gulf incident. McNamara, even in 1968 testimony reexamining the 1964 Tonkin affair, professed to know little about the plan 34-A operations. He told Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.) that they were carried out by South Vietnamese against the North, "utilizing to some degree U.S. equipment."

"I can't describe the exact [illegible] Senator," he told Fulbright, although I will be happy to try to obtain the information for you."

It was charged by then Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) that the South Vietnamese attacks on North Vietnamese forces in the Gulf of Tonkin caused the North Vietnamese to fire upon U.S. destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy. McNamara, in 1968, told the Senate committee, however, that it was "monstrous" to insinuate that the United States "induced the incident" as an "excuse" to take retaliatory action. The retaliatory action was the opening rounds of U.S. bombing attacks upon North Vietnam.

According to the information disclosed by the Times, the Plan 34-A operations against the North during 1964 ranged from U-2 spy plane flights to parachuting sabotage and psychological warfare teams into the North Vietnamese citizenry, sea-launched commando raids on rail and highway bridges and bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

These attacks were described as being under the Saigon control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, then chief of the U.S. military assistance command, with joint planning by the South Vietnamese who carried out the operations themselves or with "hired personnel."

Even before these covert operations began, however, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were reported recommending "increasingly bolder actions" including "aerial bombing of key North Vietnamese targets" and use of "United States forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

After the August, 1964, Gulf of Tonkin breakthrough to more open U.S. involvement in the fighting, the published documentation shows recommendations for considerably expanded covert operations against the North.

A memorandum prepared for Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy shows that part of the clandestine operations against the North were suspended immediately "after the first Tonkin Gulf incident" on Aug. 2, 1964, but that "successful maritime and airborne operations" were carried out in October.

The documents discuss clandestine operations carried out not only from South Vietnam but from Laos, against North Vietnam and against enemy-held areas of Laos. One docu-

continued

THE NATION

Insecure Council

In the shrouded pyramid of ascending levels of governmental secrecy, the National Security Council stands at the apex. Yet when it meets and turns out the lights for a briefing, an outsider can walk right in. So, at least, claims former Presidential Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, who reveals that such a bizarre incident in his first novel, *On Instructions of My Government*, was based on an actual happening in 1961.

As Salinger tells it, Seattle Television Executive Elroy McCaw (who died in 1969) arrived in Washington to attend a Pentagon meeting of a volunteer citizens' advisory group of which he was a member. The meeting was canceled because the Berlin crisis was hot and the top military chiefs were attending an NSC meeting at the White House. Unaware of this, McCaw called Air Force General Curtis LeMay's office and was directed by a confused secretary to the meeting at the White House. According to Salinger, Brigadier General Chester ("Ted") Clifton, President Kennedy's military aide, escorted McCaw to a darkened room where slides of Soviet troop concentrations were being shown. When the lights were turned on, McCaw was astonished to find the President there —and the generals were even more shocked to see McCaw. To ensure security, they considered recalling him to active Air Force duty, but finally accepted his pledge of total secrecy.

NEW YORK TIMES
13 JUN 1971

KEY TEXTS FRO PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key d the Pentagon's study of the Vietna December, 1963, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except wher the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has [illegible] to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

This g
inantly
capital a
complish
started
Situation
areas is
not seem
tially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily [illegible] immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

THE OPERATIONS SIDE OF FOREIGN POLICY*

by Roy M. Melbourne

UNDERSTANDABLY, the literature on foreign policy has tended to dwell on policy concepts and to scant their operational context. There is an attraction to a broad vista of policy that seemingly does not hold for the more mundane prospect of operations. Yet no true grasp of either can be gained without an understanding of their fusion of relation and purpose.

An old-timer, interviewed on his golden wedding anniversary as to the reason for his successful marriage, declared, "My wife and I made an agreement at the outset whereby I would make all the big decisions and she would handle the day-to-day ones." Pausing pensively, he added, "It's strange, but in fifty years none of the big problems have come up."

The analogy is not inappropriate for foreign policy and operations. It has even been paraphrased: Let me control your operations and I will control your policy. Many have been bemused by the manifold analyses of successive Administrations' varying use of the National Security Council machinery and struck by Robert Cutler's working image of "policy hill," with plans going up, being designated as policy, and coming down to serve as operations guides. There is nothing wrong with this except that some may not stop to think just how much labeled policy the NSC machinery — and in fact all government — systematically handles. The NSC may handle no more than the tip of the iceberg. Meanwhile officialdom, to give it its due, attends to a daily flow of subsurface operations questions which, over time and by reason of operational precedent, have become "policy."

The holder of a most demanding position in the Nixon Administration is said to consider that perhaps his chief policy guidance role is to be consistently and persistently involved in coping with daily operational questions. This exemplifies the belief that only through painstaking attention to and direction of how matters actually are handled can the ship slowly be veered the degrees necessary to approximate the desired policy course.

Perhaps with the wisdom of hindsight, Dean Acheson in commenting upon his international era seems to merge both policy and operations as guides. In retrospect, policy lines were not abstractions, doctrines or rules but grew into a kind of code by a method analogous to common law precedent "to aid the judgment of those who must make decisions." He emphasized "practicable objectives, concretely and realistically conceived."[1]

The distinguished public servant, Robert A. Lovett, had admonished, "if planning is removed too far from operating responsibility, a misleading lack of realism results."[2] When he was Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter emphasized this also by testifying: "You get more realistic planning from those in constant touch with the operational problems than from those who are completely divorced . . . from any operational relationships."[3]

continued

NEW YORK TIMES

Charles Yost: On Affairs at State

By CHARLES W. YOST

The National Security Council was established in 1947 by an act of Congress which was primarily designed to bring about unification of the armed services. President Truman reports in his memoirs, however, that in proposing establishment of the council, "I wanted one top-level permanent setup in the Government to concern itself with advising the President on high policy decisions concerning the security of the nation." The council was intended, he said, to give him "a perpetual inventory of where we stood and where we were going on all strategic questions affecting the national security."

The council has since 1947 reviewed not only the major problems of concern to the defense establishment but also many of primary concern to the Department of State. This is of course a significant change from the primitive state of affairs which existed before World War II when, if a foreign policy problem requiring Presidential attention arose, Cordell Hull or Sumner Welles simply walked across the street and took it up with Roosevelt. It is my strong impression that such powerful postwar Secretaries of State as Acheson and Dulles, while utilizing council machinery for necessary coordination, continued for the most part to seek and obtain Presidential decisions on foreign policy by the same simple process.

Decision-making in the field of foreign affairs, traditionally the responsibility, under the President, of the Secretary of State and his department, has in recent years become more and more enmeshed, encumbered and distorted in this machinery, originally designed for quite different purposes. Enmeshed because powerful and energetic national security advisers close to the President have seen to it that almost every foreign-policy question of any significance, whether or not it could be reasonably defined as a "strategic question affecting the national security," must pass through the council machinery. Encumbered because that procedure usually entails a duplication in the White House of a painstaking review and debate which has already taken place in the State Department, and hence causes further interminable delays in the already constipated decision-making process. Distorted because the military orientation of the council, which is of course appropriate in view of its origin and mandate, almost inevitably accords undue weight in military factors in assessing foreign policy problems, many of which in other contexts would be seen to be overwhelmingly political or economic.

The evolution of the council and its machinery under the last three Presidents has therefore imperceptibly but drastically broadened the scope of the council and the influence of the national security adviser.

Moreover, the officers in this privileged layer of the bureaucracy are not required, as are the Secretary of State and his principal subordinates, to appear before committees of the Congress to give accounts of their stewardship. The shift of power to those exempt from this healthy requirement has contributed to the cleavages on foreign policy between executive and legislative branches which have become increasingly common and increasing prejudicial.

Much is now made of the value to a President of submitting foreign policy issues to him in the form of "options." Actually the council process for manufacturing, presenting and debating a variety of options often tends to resemble a charade in which, no matter how many guesses one is given, there is only one possible answer. Insofar as there are significant differences of opinion and real choices to be made by the President, these have almost always clearly emerged long before the issue ever got to the council, could be expressed succinctly on paper by a single intelligent civil servant, and could be submitted to the President for decision by the Secretary of State, accompanied by the Secretary of Defense or any other Cabinet officer whose interests were substantially involved.

If a President should judge that his State Department is not performing its functions satisfactorily, as several have, he is perfectly free to reform it in any way he wishes. It has certainly become far too large, as of course has the Pentagon. It is, however, neither in the President's own interest nor in the interest of effective government to allow to grow up in the White House not a coordinating but a competing instrument for the conduct of foreign affairs, one moreover which by its very nature and composition overemphasizes the military ingredient which since 1947 has so often tended to color and warp those affairs.

Mr. Yost served two years in the Nixon Administration as U.S. delegate to the United Nations. He is now [illegible] ulty of Columbia University's School of International Affairs.

WILKES BARRE, PA.
RECORD

M - 24,810
MAY 25 1971

STATINTL

The President's Men

Recent statements that President Nixon has surrounded himself with the largest White House staff in history are probably correct, although the official figures are somewhat misleading. Nixon's fiscal 1972 budget requested 540 permanent personnel positions in the White House Office---more than double the budget figure of 250 actual staff positions in 1970.

Administration spokesmen argue that all Nixon has done is to consolidate existing personnel slots under the White House payroll. The fiscal 1971 budget announced the step as a "new departure, proposed in the interest of candor and accuracy" to honestly reflect staff costs which "traditionally have been dispersed and obscured."

Every President in recent years has been assisted by numerous staffers on leave from other departments or agencies, and paid by them. The Civil Service Commission estimates this number has ranged from 200 to 300 each year, and its figures do not include CIA or NSA personnel. In accordance with his new "truth in staffing" policy, Nixon's budget appropriation request went from $3.9 million in 1970 to an estimated $8.5 million in 1971 and $9.1 million for fiscal 1972.

Comparing Nixon's White House Office staff to that of his predecessors is revealing. President Eisenhower's staff hit a low point of 246 in 1954, then climbed steadily to hover between 365 and 395 during his remaining years in office. President Kennedy tried to cut back the large staff he inherited, believing that it was too apt to become institutionalized, but met with little success. His staff grew to 423 in 1962, largest official size until Nixon took office.

Despite Administration claims that the new staff figures represent frankness, not expansion, considerable criticism of staff growth, real or imagined, has surfaced. Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) recently said funds routinely appropriated every year for the White House, Office of Management and Budget, and National Security Council proved his argument that "authority was becoming too concentrated around the Chief Executive and immune from congressional review."

Symington singled out the National Security Council, which he said had a staff of 110 persons and was requesting funds for fiscal 1972 ($2.3 million) four times the amount spent in fiscal 1968. Since that speech, figures supplied by the National Security Council reveal its total staff is 140, with only 79 on the NSC payroll and the rest paid by other agencies.

NEW YORK POST
14 MAY 1971

Disarm CIA: Badillo

Washington, May 13 (AP)—Rep. Herman Badillo (D.-N.Y.) asked Congress today to prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from organizing or supervising secret military operations of any kind. Badillo said a loophole in the 1947 law that set up the CIA as an intelligence-gathering organization "is apparently being used to justify the fact that . . . tribal guerrillas and the Royal Laotian Army have been . . . led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war." He said more than 300 CIA men are involved in the Laotian secret army.

Badillo

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

[redacted]

E - 702,637
S - 368,841
MAY 13 1971

Badillo Urges: Get CIA Out of Guerrilla War

By ANTONY PRISENDORF
N. Y. Post Correspondent

WASHINGTON—A bill prohibiting the CIA from organizing or supervising guerrilla armies in foreign countries was introduced today by Rep. Badillo.

The legislation, Badillo said would close a loophole in the National Security Act of 1947 that authorizes the CIA to undertake "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security" if directed to do so specifically by the National Security Council.

This widely interpreted provision, Badillo said in remarks prepared for delivery on the House floor, "is apparently being used to justify the fact that for several years, at least, tribal guerrilla troops and the Royal Laotian Army have been trained, financed and led by the CIA as a covert adjunct to the Indochina war."

And, Badillo charged, the CIA is "mainly responsible" for the air bombardment of Laos, which he said has made "a wasteland of this tiny nation and turned its people into refugees in their own land."

Under the main provisions of his bill, Badillo said, the National Security Council could not authorize the CIA "to engage, in any manner or to any extent, in the organization, supervision, or conduct of any military or paramilitary operation of any kind" that involves either regular or guerrilla forces in a foreign country.

Badillo, a Democrat elected to Congress last year representing a triboro district encompassing parts of Manhattan, the Bronx and Queens, first disclosed that he was drafting the bill during his speech at the massive April 24 antiwar demonstration at the Capitol.

At that time, Badillo told the huge, peaceful crowd, "we must make sure that the Central Intelligence Agency can no longer run clandestine wars, as it has been doing for years in Laos."

In his brief speech today, Badillo said that based on information supplied by "well-informed sources," more than 300 CIA agents, many of them former special forces troops, are in Laos "supplying and training government guerrillas and leading commando and reconnaisance teams."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 MAY 1971

[redacted]

Nixon Reported Weighing Revamping of Intelligence Services

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Nixon is said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs.

Those familiar with the plan say that the options range from creating a new Cabinet-level department of intelligence to merely strengthening the now-imprecise authority of Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, over the global intelligence operations of the Pentagon and other federal agencies.

The reorganization plan has recently been presented to President Nixon. It covers 30 to 40 typewritten pages and was prepared primarily by James R. Schlesinger, assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget, and K. Wayne Smith, a former Pentagon systems analyst now on the National Security Council staff.

The informants say the plan grew from instructions Mr. Nixon gave his staff last autumn, to draft various reorganizational and cost-cutting studies.

Complaints Voiced

Both the President and Henry A. Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, have frequently expressed dissatisfaction over the erratic quality of the foreign intelligence provided them. Some White House officials estimate that at least $500-million could be cut from the $5-billion spent annually on national intelligence.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have said that while occasionally intelligence of extreme usefulness — such as the incredibly detailed information on Soviet and Chinese Communist missile development obtained from spy satellites — has been produced, the service has frequently failed to forecast such sudden developments as the riots that forced a political reshuffle in Poland last December.

Mr. Nixon is particularly dissatisfied, his associates say, by the cost and size of the Government's global intelligence operations when compared with their results. In addition to the Central Intelligence Agency, five federal agencies are involved in intelligence overseas. At least 200,000 people are involved, 150,000 of these uniformed personnel in the Defense Department.

The President was seriously irritated, aides say, by two recent failures of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, which numbers 3,000 and spends an estimated $500-million yearly. One was faulty intelligence prior to the abortive prison-camp raid at Sontay, in North Vietnam, last November. The other was failure to forecast North Vietnamese resistance to the South Vietnamese Army's incursion into Laos Feb. 5 to March 25.

'Their Estimates Were Better'

"Hanoi threw 35,000 men or four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," said one qualified source. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North — and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

The most drastic option open to Mr. Nixon would be the creation of a new department of intelligence to be headed by an official of Cabinet rank. It would combine the Central Intelligence Agency with 15,000 civilian employes; the Defense Department's code-cracking National Security Agency with 100,000 uniformed personnel and tis Defense Intelligence Agency with 3,000. The C.I.A. spends about $500-million yearly; the National Security Agency $1-billion and the Defense Intelligence Agency $500-million.

The merit, some experts say, would be to concentrate in one department the collection of foreign intelligence now performed not only by the C.I.A. but also by the Army, Navy, and Air Force separately around the world. However, opposition would be forthcoming from vested interests in the armed services and in Congress. They say, therefore, that Mr. Nixon is unlikely to adopt it.

At the other end of the scale, informants report, Mr. Nixon could merely issue an executive order defining — thus strengthening — the authority of Mr. Helms over the intelligence operations of such powerful federal agencies as the Pentagon, the State Department, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Officers Meet Weekly

Their principal intelligence officers meet weekly as members of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Helms, as the President's chief intelligence adviser and head of the C.I.A., presides, but his authority is unclear. It derives from a letter written by President Kennedy in 1963 to John A. McCone, one of Mr. Helms,s predecessors, and has never been updated.

While Mr. Helms has full control over the C.I.A., the Pentagon's worldwide intelligence activities [illegible] which Robert F. Froehlke, an Assistant Secretary of Defense has estimated costs $2.9-billion yearly.

"When you have the authority but don't control the resources," a Defense Department official observed, "you tend to walk very softly."

The President is said to regard Mr. Helms as the nation's most competent professional intelligence officer. Last month, informants disclose, Mr. Nixon wrote Mr. Helms congratulating the C.I.A. on its recent annual estimate of Soviet defense capabilities.

To provide control over the huge intelligence system and make it responsive to his needs, Mr. Nixon is likely, his staff associates say, to choose one — or a combination of — the middle options before him that do not require Congressional approval.

Closer Ties Possible

It is likely, oficials say, that Mr. Nixon will eventually bring Mr. Helms and a top-level staff of evaluators from C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va., closer to the White House, possibly into the National Security Council staff.

Officials concede that under a reorganization Mr. Helms might relinquish to his deputy, Lieut. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, of the Marine Corps, some of his responsibility for the C.I.A.'s day-to-day collection operations and concentrate, instead, on intelligence evaluation for the President. One possibility envisaged under the reorganization would be the creation by Mr. Helms of an evaluation staff in the White House drawn from the C.I.A.'s Office of Current Intelligence and its Office of National Estimates. The latter prepares long - range studies in depth of potential trouble spots.

Another would be the creation by Mr. Nixon of a White House intelligence evaluations staff made up of Mr. Helms, General Cushman, Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and Ray S. Cline, director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

[redacted]

WASHINGTON POST
9 MAY 1971

STATINTL

[redacted]

Jack Anderson

Envoys Ignore Drug Menace

THE PRESSURE Washington is trying to bring upon drug producing countries to cut off the flow of heroin into this country at the source apparently isn't being applied by our uninterested diplomats.

This is the conclusion of Reps. Bob Steele (R-Conn.) and Morgan Murphy (D-Ill.), just back from a 24-day world drug tour, who will report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that our embassies aren't using their diplomatic leverage on their host countries.

Steele told us he had received a far better hearing on his drug views at the White House and State Department than at our embassies in the opium-producing lands. He found "bored nonchalance" about the drug problem among the striped-pants set from Ankara to Bangkok.

Most heroin in the U.S. underworld market comes out of Turkey. Stern orders have gone out from Washington to our embassy in Ankara to place all possible pressure upon Turkey to control its production. Only recently, another federal narcotics agent was dispatched to Turkey to help discover how the stuff is being smuggled.

But all this has brought only pained reactions in the embassies. Grumped one diplomat: "What do they think we're running, a police department?"

Thailand has now become the second biggest supplier or heroin to the the United States. Indeed, federal agents have confiscated as much Thai heroin in the last six months as they did in the previous six years.

Yet in Bangkok, Deputy Chief of Mission George Newman confessed to Steele: "Every time I see one of those cables from Washington about getting action on the narcotics problem it drives me up the wall."

Another U.S. diplomat in Thailand told Steele with a straight face, "I had no idea there was such a problem in the U.S."

In Italy, the Mafia directs much of the drug smuggling into the United States. Steele was told by a federal U.S. narcotics agent, stationed in Rome, that he receives little cooperation from the Italian police.

Yet Wells Stabler, the deputy chief of mission, told Steele with a sniff: "There is not really anything we have to be overly concerned about regarding Italian cooperation or commitment in checking the international narcotic traffic."

Steele and Murphy are highly concerned about U.S. embassy cooperation and are preparing a blistering report to House Foreign Affairs Chairman Thomas Morgan (D-Pa).

Asian Rivals

THE SECRET STUDIES of the National Security Council, if they should be converted into official foreign policy, indicate that the United States will withdraw from Southeast Asia and leave those strategic countries to the mercy of the great Communist powers.

The secret assessment is that the United States, moving cautiously of course, can safely cut bait in the warm waters of Southeast Asia. The rivalry between Russia and China, it is suggested, will prevent the area from becoming a threat to the United States.

In other words, the United States increasingly will be able to play the role of spectator as Russia and China struggle for pre-eminence in Southeast Asia. The secret assessment acknowledges that eventually the nations of Southeast Asia may have to choose between Moscow and Peking.

Washington can continue to encourage these nations at least to remain neutral. But as American power is withdrawn from the area, these nations will be tempted to side with one of the great Communist powers that will dominate Southeast Asia.

The United States, according to the secret studies, should be able to play off China and Russia against each other, tipping the balance of power in whatever direction is most beneficial to Washington at the moment.

[redacted]

STATINTL

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
28 APRIL 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

'Radio Free' Grip Of CIA Opposed

By JOHN P. WALLACH
News American Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — President Nixon is being urged by his top advisers to submit legislation that would turn over control of Radio Free Europe (RFE), now largely supported by secret Central Intelligence Agency funds, to a public corporation funded by Congress, U. S. officials disclosed today.

As a result of high-level administration backing for the public corporation idea, upcoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings are expected to become an unusual "love-in" at which Sen. Clifford M. Case, R-N. J., probably will agree to introduce an administration bill.

CASE HAS spearheaded a Senate drive to strip RFE of what he alleges are subsidies of "several hundred million dollars" from "secret" CIA funds which, he contends, have for 20 years provided the bulk of RFE's budget.

Case agreed to postpone the hearings, which had been scheduled to begin today, to May 24 after key administration officials indicated more time was needed to put finishing touches on the public corporation measure, and to seek Nixin's approval.

Case had threatened to conduct hearings that would have seriously embarrassed the administration, calling former RFE staffers to testify, among other things, that they had to sign an oat to keep secret CIA involvement or face a maximum $10,000 fine and 10-year prison sentence.

SOURCES CLOSE to Case said today that the May 24 hearing date is the final extension that the administration will be granted. If the White House does not by then come up with an acceptable substitute for CIA funding, "adversary" hearings will ensue, the sources warned.

Although Nixon has not yet acted, the public corporation proposal is understood to have the blessing of the administration's super-secret "Forty Committee," also known as the "Covert Action Group," where a review was recently undertaken.

Although chaired by National Security Council chief Dr. Henry Kissinger, the mechanism is used only when a subject is considered too hot to go to the President through regular NSC channels.

THE PUBLIC corporation idea reportedly appeals to State Department officials because, although funded by Congress, RFE would retain a semi-private character that would allow the U. S. government, whenever convenient, to deny association with RFE broadcasts.

This "hands-off-when-convenient" policy is considered essential to RFE's ability to survive in an area that does not duplicate the work of the Voice of America, the official U. S. propaganda agency.

Funding a public corporation to run RFE would not involve any new money, congressional sources explained, since the government is already footing the bill. It would allow transferring the $33 million annual subsidy from secret CIA coffers to the open, congressional appropriation process.

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
[illegible] 1971

[illegible] of the C[illegible]

By BENJAMIN WELLES

WASHINGTON.

"I CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of The Times.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 58-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in lavish mystery, jetting secretively around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of insouciance—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can recall precisely what [illegible] place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

Continued

Noyes urges ASNE members to guard their perspective

By Luther Huston

Newspaper editors must achieve a more serious, more sophisticated perspective on their jobs. Revise their basic concept of news and quit being "suckers" for either side of the proponents of change, Newbold Noyes, president of The American Society of Newspaper Editors, told several hundred editors at the opening session of the society's annual convention in Washington April 14.

"The newspapers," said Noyes, who is editor of the *Washington* (D.C.) *Star*, "are not exactly writing a glorious chapter" in the history of the profession and have "a good deal to answer for at the bar of public opinion."

If the reader confidence in the newspaper press is at a low ebb it is because "we are lazy and superficial in much of our reporting" and fail to give readers the information and understanding that will "permit them to sort out the forces at work in society and to decide where their true interests lie."

After Noyes "keynote speech", the society adopted a report of its freedom of information committee which recommended enactment of a National Shield Law to protect newsmen from disclosing confidential information or the sources of such information: agreed to let Congress know that it opposed efforts of the Staggers subcommittee to subpoena Columbia Broadcasting Systems and transcripts of its documentary on "The Selling of the Pentagon"; voted against a proposal to establish national press councils but authorized formation of an ad hoc committee to select some specific ethical violation by a newspaper and conduct a "dry run" trial to see how the press council idea might work.

Noyes criticized the press for maintaining stero-typed standards of news coverage. "Not only do we devote 80 per cent of our time and space to stereotyped happenings, but we also insist these happenings are newsworthy only if they meet certain stereotyped standards", Noyes said, "there is no story in a speech or a press conference or what have-you unless it involves conflict or surprise. Before a situation is worthy of our attention, it must burst to the surface in some disruptive, exceptional (and hence newsworthy) event. Even when we know what is happening under the surface, we are forever waiting for a traditional news peg to hang the story on. What are we thinking of, sticking to such old-fashioned concepts in a time of revolutionary movement? If we have so little faith in the intelligence of our readers, how can we expect them to have faith in us? No wonder the readers constantly feel that events are overwhelming them, unawares." Newsmen, Noyes said, are not "merely spectators on the unfolding scene." We are the people who never, whether we like it or not, decide what is worthy of public attention and who must determine the way it is to be presented. The difficulty of this task has made it convenient for us to hide behind simplistic, even childish formulas as to what is news, the simplest and most childish being that this, after all, is what people naturally want to read."

New techniques must be developed that will permit newspapers to convey to readers the truest possible picture of what transpires, Noyes asserted. He acknowledged that he did not know what these techniques are but told the editors that "we must grow up, must change, because our readers are changing and growing up. They are demanding more of us now, and they are entitled to more from us than what they are getting."

"Change we must have," Noyes went on, "but the trick is to give our readers a basis, factual and intellectual, for assessing the paths of change into which they are being pushed, form rational choices while the choice is still theirs.

"I think the worst of our lazy and superficial performance today is that we of the press are allowing ourselves to be manipulated by various interests—some for change and some against it—some powerfully in support of the system, some destructively seeking to tear it down—all clever in the business of using our weaknesses, our laziness, our superficiality, our gullibility. No doubt the Pent
makes suckers of
but no more eas
New Left does. We
to me, tragically
velop for our read
ingful perspective
ties of such specia

In the first publ
has made as dire
Central Intelliger
Richard Helms tol
can Society of Nev
tors that the work
criticized CIA is
"permit this countr
in a fearsome worl
its way into a bet
peaceful one."

"We are, after
this democracy, ar
in it," Helms, a for
and advertising s
"We would not
our work distort
and its principles.
to adapt intelligence to Amer-
ican society, not vice versa."

Helms said that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before. He said that the "intelligence community—a name for all of the intelligence assets at the disposal of the United States, comprised the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence components of the various armed services, the National Security Agency, the intelligence elements of Department of State and—when appropriate, those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission." All of these agencies are represented on the United States Intelligence Board, chaired by the director of Central Intelligence, not as head of the CIA, but as the principal intelligence adviser to the president and the National Security Council."

"By necessity" Helms said, "intelligence organizations do not publish the extent of their knowledge and they do not challenge criticism of their operations. We answer to those we serve in government."

The CIA, he said, is the only one of the organizations named many to handicraft a special kind of report for a very few."

Helms gave a detailed report of the CIA's part in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He cited the agencies success in disproving various reports, such as that light bombers were being stored in a particular cave and that what was reported as a rounded dome covering missiles was actually a relatively new movie theatre in Havana.

"Our intelligence files in Washington, however — thanks to U-2 photography of the Soviet Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped—included a wealth of information on Soviet missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their transporters and other associated equipment and characteristic sites in the Soviet Union. We knew what to look for.

"Guided by this background, the interrogators were able to sort out from the flood of reports the ones which established the arrival of MRBM and IRBM equipment in Cuba. We were then able to locate the sites under construction and tell President Kennedy the exact scope of the threat."

The CIA's efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country, Helms said, "have generated some of the most virulent criticism of the agency. They have led to charges that

continued

THE NEW STATESMAN

The Long Slide

GEOFFREY McDERMOTT

The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam *by* CHESTER COOPER *MacGibbon & Kee £3.75*

The Military Art of People's War: Selected writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap *edited by* RUSSELL STETLER *Monthly Review Press £3.90*

We in the West can take hope from both of these utterly contrasting books about Vietnam: in utterly contrasting ways, of course.

Chester Cooper was the leading expert on Vietnam in the Central Intelligence Agency for much of the 1950s and 1960s. His excellent book is a study in frustration, both personal and national. He is a living proof that, contrary to what many people believe, there are members of that powerful agency who take infinite pains to judge critical international problems objectively, and to suggest doveish rather than hawkish policies as far as possible. Unfortunately, the hawks both in the CIA and the US government have too often had the last word, so far. If there is something missing from Cooper's account, which is both comprehensive and subtle, it is perhaps an analysis of the conflicting influences inside the National Security Council, including the CIA; but this is easily comprehensible, even in the absence of an Official Secrets Act in the US.

Cooper's style shows that great diplomatic affairs can be effectively described *con brio* and without dryness or pomposity, which is seldom the case in books written by British diplomats. While never in favour of action for action's sake, he comes across as an activist amongst diplomats; so he was, and this characteristic gave me much pleasure in my close collaboration with him. His attitude to Britain, where he has many friends, is always objective; he has no time for illusions about 'the special relationship'. He lays bare the enormity of the part played throughout by France, right up to De Gaulle's fatuous suggestion that all South-East Asia should be neutralised. This suggestion is being revived, equally inanely, in some British government circles today.

The whole dreadful story of escalation is related with both objectivity and passion, from the foundation of the Viet Minh in 1941 up to 1970. Ho Chi Minh – 'He who Enlightens,' formerly named 'He Who Will be Victorious' and 'The Patriot' – is of course central to developments right up to his death in September 1969. Cooper reminds us that Giap in 1945 paid tribute to 'the particularly intimate relations with China and the United States, which it is a pleasant duty to dwell upon'. In Giap's book the pleasure has turned into rage and vituperation where the US is concerned.

Cooper gives a most human, and often humorous, account of the Geneva Conference of 1954, which he calls 'blueprint for a house of cards'. For the first time Communist Chinese and Indochinese attend a conference in the West. Eden irreparably offends Dulles. Dien Bien Phu falls in the middle of the conference, without the atomic intervention by the US which had been predicted. 'What finally emerged was not very attractive . . . such pious platitudes as "observing the principles of Geneva" are good political slogans but bad policy.' I agree. Successive British governments were too often to ignore this fact. It would not be too cynical to say that the Geneva 'agreements' were signed – by other participants but not by the US government – because the word 'democratic', freely used in their texts, meant diametrically opposed things to the two sides. From Geneva Cooper rushed off to Manila to help Dulles set up Seato, the most effective achievement of which was to provide the US with a justification, on paper, for intervening in Vietnam. The Dulles dominoes theory followed logically enough.

The serious escalation of US forces in Vietnam began under President Kennedy and his whizz-kid Secretary of Defence McNamara. With a weak Secretary of State in Dean Rusk, the military-industrial complex headed by McNamara increasingly took over. Where there had been some 700 'military advisers' in Vietnam when Kennedy became President, the troop level had reached 16,500 by his death in 1963. Cooper was now an adviser in the White House, but he was unable to stem the flow. McNamara's attitude of 'what is good for Ford is good for the US and the world', and his extraordinarily dehumanised approach to the problem throughout his baneful reign of seven years, emerge very clearly from his own disagreeable little book, *The Essence of Security*.

Under President Johnson, McNamara and the near-Strangelove type General Westmoreland were completely let loose on their policy of 'more is better'. Forces and modern armaments were poured into the war, because the human computer McNamara calculated that sheer weight was bound to win; and what general, even if brighter than Westmoreland, has ever declined to have more forces under his command? Moreover, at about six-monthly intervals, top US political authorities – as often as not septuagenarians – would rush about all over Asia and elsewhere, and report that the situation was vastly improved and would shortly be under control completely. President Johnson was not sensitive to the widening of the credibility gap, or the ever mounting protests against the war, in the US and far beyond.

Cooper was a first-class official; but try as he might he could not restrain the boys in the big league. He quit the White House but kept in the closest touch with Vietnamese problems as assistant to Averell Harriman. In this capacity he took part in the abortive, and sometimes farcical, Wilson-Brown-Kosygin peace discussions in 1966-7, which I described in the NS of 18 December 1970. For some of the time he was, peculiarly, used by Wilson as a sort of Permanent Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office. All rather frantic, and unavailing. And in 1969 the new President Nixon inherited a legacy of 541,000 US troops stuck in the theatre, not to mention some tens of thousands of naval and air force personnel. Not a single Russian or Chinese was fighting there.

Where, then, is the hope in all this that I mentioned? In Cooper's last chapters, and in President Nixon's policy. In 'No More Vietnams' and 'Crusades, Commitments, and Constraints' Cooper deals with the besetting sin of US foreign policy in the past, misdirected moral fervour, and pleads for a more realistic approach to the major problems, in the nuclear sphere and that of relations with the Soviet Union in general, together with those of a gravely disunited society at home in the US. He chides President Nixon for his Cambodian adventure, and would no doubt say as much about Laos. But the facts now are that the US forces are being reduced, the South Vietnamese are stronger, and a relatively stable government rules in Saigon.

Giap depicts the other side of the coin. He too covers the history of Indochina since the 1940s. He defines his curious title at length on pages 175-6, emphasising

> the revolutionary, class, and Party character of our military art. Its characteristic is to defeat material force with moral force, defeat what is strong with what is weak, defeat what is modern with what is primitive . . .

In the context of Vietnam he never considers it necessary to mention nuclear weapons; and the communists simply do without air power. 'The strategic orientation is to promote a war by the entire people, a total and protracted war.' He repeatedly praises 'revolutionary violence'. He echoes Cooper's metaphor of the US seeing itself as a knight on a crusade. On a point of fact, it is interesting that he dates the first US bombing of Hanoi, in June 1966, eight days earlier than Cooper.

It is indeed possible to admire the military achievements of the various communist forces in Indochina, both in opposition to the French and to the Americans and their allies. They have, up to a point, put into practice the principles enunciated by Giap; and no doubt his style of writing and rigid Marxist-Leninism are a heady brew for the faithful. It strikes a non-communist, however, quite differently, for a variety of reasons. Giap carries de-humanisation a whole stage further than McNamara. The word 'I' is never once used; nor are any individual names save Uncle Ho – always revered – and, scattered about, those of half a dozen men who performed particularly heroic martial deeds. Even Giap cannot take all the drama out of his account

NEW YORK TIMES
15 APR 1971

Excerpts From Speech by Helms to Society of Newspaper Editors

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14—Following are excerpts from an address by Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors:

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an intelligence service in a democratic government.

In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dispelled:

On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has ever been before.

On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that our Government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments, there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

I am referring to the assertions that the Central Intelligence Agency is an "invisible government," a law unto itself, engaged in provocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society and subject to no controls.

This is an outgrowth, I suppose, of an inherent American distaste for the peacetime gathering of intelligence. Our mission, in the eyes of many thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the traditions and ideals of our free society.

May I emphasize at this point that the statute [National Security Act of 1947] specifically forbids the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena or law-enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical security of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information, we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any; we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.

In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the President and his National Security Council want what we call "national" intelligence—evaluations which reflect the considered and agreed judgment of all of the intelligence components of the United States Government. The production and dissemination of this national intelligence is the responsibility and the primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts—the agreed facts—and the whole known range of facts—relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the estimate function—the projection of likely developments from the facts—but not to advocacy.

Ironically, our efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country have generated some of the more virulent criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role, but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him.

If there is a competent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United States Government, we may well try to hire him.

The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious and pervasive secret government, our words "interview" and "hire" translate into suborn, subvert and seduce, or something worse.

We use no compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to us, we go away quietly. If some student groups object to our recruiting on campus, we fall back to the nearest Federal office building.

Similarily, we welcome the opportunity to place research contracts with the universities, but again, these are strictly voluntary.

And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our democratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy, because it is axiomatic that an intelligence service—whatever type of government it serves—must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate effectively.

If we disclose how much we know, the opposition is handed on a platter highly damaging indications of how and where we obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who may have helped us. He can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up the agents, and shut off the flow of information.

I cannot give you an easy answer to the objections raised by those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic principles. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service. I can assure you that we are, but I am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.

I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively and continuously.

Starting with the executiv branch, the Central Intelligence Agency operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken without the prior approval of an N.S.C. subcommittee which includes representatives of the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, we report periodically and in detail on the whole range of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of men who have distinguished themselves in Government, industry, education and the professions.

Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management and Budget and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.

There are elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees in both the Senate and the House which—like the President's board—are told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most of the personnel in our highly compartmented agency. But how, in the end, we are [illegible] Congress itself to decide.

In short, the Central Intelligence Agency is not and cannot be its own master.

The same objectivity which makes us useful to our Government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we understand as well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign intelligence operations on behalf of a free society.

We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.

We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a better and more peaceful one.

[redacted]

STATINTL

15 APR 1971

Helms Defends the C.I.A. As Vital to a Free Society

Rare Speech Discloses Some Russians Aided U.S. in Cuban Crisis

Excerpts from Helms address will be found on Page 30.



Associated Press

Richard Helms addresses editors in Washington.

By RICHARD HALLORAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 14 — The Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, vigorously defended his agency today as necessary to the survival of a democratic society and asked the nation to "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

Mr. Helms asserted, in his first public address since becoming head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1966, that "we propose to adapt intelligence work to American society, not vice versa."

He spoke with the specific approval of President Nixon before a luncheon meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

In a footnote to history, Mr. Helms revealed that American intelligence in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis was aided by "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians."

He told reporters later that he was alluding not only to Col. Oleg V. Penkovsky, who was identified previously, but also to others who provided information on Soviet missile systems. When asked for their names, Mr. Helms laughed.

Colonel Penkovsky was a Soviet intelligence officer secretly working for the Americans in 1961 and 1962. He was detected in October, 1962, and executed in May, 1963. The publication of his alleged memoirs in the West in 1965 aroused considerable controversy over their authenticity.

Mr. Helms asserted today that United States intelligence would have "a major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms."

Noting that the Soviet Union had rejected proposals for inspection of arms limitations, Mr. Helms said the United States could undertake an agreement to limit such arms "only if it has adequate intelligence to assure itself that the Soviets are living up to their part."

China Held Police State

At a time when the visit of an American table tennis team to mainland China has generated official hopes for better relations with Peking, Mr. Helms told his audience that "some of our most important intelligence targets lie in totalitarian countries where collection is impeded by the security defenses of a police state—for example, Communist China."

Mr. Helms's rare public appearance today was initiated by Newbold Noyes, editor of The Washington Star and president of the society of editors. When Mr. Helms said he could speak only with the approval of the White House, Mr. Noyes wrote to Herbert G. Klein, the President's director of communications.

Mr. Klein said today that President Nixon had readily approved Mr. Helms's appearance. He said the Administration thought it a good time for the American public to have Mr. Helms explain the role of the C.I.A., since the agency was not under the kind of fire that had been directed toward it in the past.

Mr. Helms noted in his address that in Britain and other European democracies, "it would be unheard of for the head of intelligence services to talk to a nongovernmental group as I am talking to you today."

Dulles Talks Recalled

A spokesman for the C.I.A., in response to an inquiry, said later that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence from 1953 to 1961, spoke publicly about twice a year. But he could not recall an instance in which Mr. Dulles's successors, John A. McCone and Adm. William F. Raborn, delivered public addresses. Thus, Mr. Helms's speech was probably the first from an intelligence director in 10 years.

Mr. Helms, who has a reputation as a skilled administrator, said, "There is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency.

"It is difficult for me to agree with this view," he said, "but I respect it. It is quite another matter when some of our critics, taking advantage of [redacted] engaged in intelligence, say things that are either vicious or just plain silly."

No Domestic Functions

Mr. Helms emphasized that the agency had no domestic security functions and had never sought any.

"In short," he said, "we do not target on American citizens."

The agency was discovered in 1967 to have financed several international activities of the National Student Association and to have given subsidies to unions, foundations and publications.

More recently, the agency was implicated in the Government's surveillance of political dissidents in the United States by the testimony of former military intelligence agents given before a Senate subcommittee.

Mr. Helms asserted that the agency had no stake in policy debates.

'Must Not Take Sides'

"We can not and must not take sides," he said. "When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council, to which he is an adviser, "I do not and must not line up with either side."

If he recommended one solution to a problem, those recommending another would suspect "that the intelligence presentation has been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of C.I.A. goes out the window," he said.

Mr. Helms, after asking that the nation believe that the agency's operations were compatible with democratic principles, said "I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively, intensively, and continuously."

He said the National Security Council, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the Office of Management and Budget and four committees of Congress regularly reviewed the agency's operations, plans and organization.

[redacted]

NEW YORK TIMES
6 APR 1971

Watching the Watchers

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, April 1—The recent disclosures about extensive Government spying on private citizens raises a practical question: Why not a domestic intelligence advisory board to help the President maintain a balance between the security of the nation and the rights of its citizens? In short, a counterpart in the domestic intelligence field to the excellent committee of distinguished citizens now serving as President Nixon's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board?

The foreign intelligency board was originally proposed by the Hoover Commission and established by President Eisenhower on a limited basis in 1956, when it was discovered that separate intelligence operations were spreading from the State and Defense Departments into other agencies of the Government without effective coordination and often without the knowledge of the President himself.

When President Kennedy stumbled into the Bay of Pigs disaster in Cuba in 1961, he revived this board and gave it wider powers to supervise the operations of all foreign intelligence gathering agencies. No such protection has been provided for the President and the people in the domestic intelligence field, however, despite the fact that the F.B.I., the armed services, and other arms of the Government, aided by all the new technological means of gathering, storing and retrieving information, have been increasing their surveillance over private citizens.

Much has been written about both the dangers of subversion and crime on the one hand, and the dangers of unregulated Government snooping on the other, but the question now is what can be done about it? The Government clearly has a duty to preserve "domestic tranquility" and needs to gather accurate information to prevent or detect serious crimes or threats of rebellion, but this dilemma cannot be resolved either by relying on what the Justice Department calls the "self-discipline" of the intelligence community, or by abolishing secrecy.

Intelligence operations, as a distinguished and experienced lawyer here has pointed out, are not the same as the usual methods of public scrutiny. Giving the Congress or the public access to the security files could in many ways do greater harm to the rights of individuals than the present policy of rigid secrecy.

At the same time, the recent disclosures about the F.B.I.'s use of informers, telephone operators and postal employees on university campuses, and the close surveillance of individuals who attend antiwar demonstrations

WASHINGTON

or go to the Soviet Union for a few days clearly indicate that relying on the self-discipline of J. Edgar Hoover is scarcely the answer to the problem.

Paid informers have the perspectives and prejudices of their trade. They are trained to gather and use information, not to weigh its value or worry too much about the civil liberties of the people. Also, officials at the top of the Government who use this kind of information don't always have time to police the methods used by the snoopers or the means to check the accuracy of the information or limit its distribution.

Even if the Congress takes the armed services out of the business of spying on private citizens and politicians at home, there will still be a need for some kind of organization to supervise the projects and methods used by the various intelligence agencies, and here the instructions to the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board suggest a useful guide.

It was instructed to advise the President concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities making up the national intelligence effort; to conduct a continuing review and assessment of intelligence and related activities; and to report to the President on its findings, appraisals and recommendations.

More important, in his Executive order establishing the board, President Kennedy instructed the heads of all foreign intelligence agencies "to make available to the board any information with respect to foreign intelligence matters which the board may require," and provided the board with an adequate independent staff to help meet its responsibilities.

The evidence is that this system worked well, first under Dr. James R. Killian Jr. of M.I.T., later under Clark Clifford before he became Secretary of Defense, and now under Admiral George W. Anderson (retired).

Much depends, however, on the independence, integrity and knowledge of the members of the board, and particularly on the confidence and cooperation of the President. In President Kennedy's case, he regarded the board not only as a protection to the nation, but as a means of knowing what was going on, and therefore as a protection for himself and his Administration.

He did not, however, have a similar [illegible] in the domestic intelligence field, nor does President Nixon today. In fact, even Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, who has been looking into this problem, still does not know who was supervising the Army's domestic spying operations.

"I doubt," said Jerome B. Wiesner, the new head of M.I.T., "that anyone is aware of the full extent of the surveillance and information collection activities that go on in this nation," and nobody yet has come forward to remove his doubts.

The President, however, has the power to create an advisory committee without delay and is now considering doing so. All he has to do is sign the appropriate Executive order, and this would have the support of almost everybody in the capital, with the possible exception of J. Edgar Hoover.

THE NEW REPUBLIC
27 MAY 1972

STATINTL

The Nixon Watch

Kissinger and Rogers

After saying at a press conference on March 4 that Secretary of State William P. Rogers is "the foreign policy adviser for the President" and "the chief foreign policy spokesman for the President," Mr. Nixon continued: "Now, the role of Dr. Kissinger is a different one. He is the White House adviser to the President. He covers not only foreign policy but national security policy; the coordination of those policies." There was a sufficient and convincing answer to the question to which the President was addressing himself. The question, as he stated it a moment later, was "whether either Secretary Rogers or Dr. Kissinger is the top adviser," and the answer implicit in what Mr. Nixon had said was that Henry A. Kissinger is "the top adviser." But the President didn't leave it at that. He felt that he had to repeat himself and say that the answer to the question as he had phrased it "is very simply that the Secretary of State is always the chief foreign policy adviser and the chief foreign policy spokesman of the Administration."

It was a sensitive question for the President, one that had been rubbing him raw since early February. His reaction then to a casual and generally overlooked statement by George D. Aiken, the Republican dean of the Senate, showed when it became known that Mr. Nixon was beginning to realize that his prized system of foreign and national security policy development had seriously impaired the position and effectiveness of Secretary Rogers. A brief news item quoted Aiken's remark that Rogers did not seem to be involved in major foreign policy decisions. Mr. Nixon immediately wrote a letter to the senator, assuring him that Rogers was involved in all major foreign policy decisions. Aiken said nothing about the letter until March 2, when a Nixon assistant startled him by asking him not only to release it but to publicize it at a press conference. Senator Aiken declined to call a press conference, but he agreed to answer any questions that he might be asked about the letter and to have it printed in the *Congressional Record*.

The request to Aiken was one of several White House responses, capped by the President's remarks on March 4, to the complaints of two other senators that Henry Kissinger had damagingly overshadowed Rogers and, what was worse, had done it in a fashion that denied Congress as a whole and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular their proper roles in the evolution and execution of foreign policy. The committee chairman, Senator Fulbright, and one of its members, Stuart Symington, raised the old and tattered issue of "executive privilege." They said that Kissinger, by invoking it and refusing to submit to committee questioning, had frustrated them and their colleagues in their right and efforts to get at the real origins and intent of Nixon policy. Symington, graphically detailing the structure of departmental committees, groups and staff processes that Kissinger devised and directs, said that the President's assistant for national security affairs is "the most powerful man in the Nixon Administration next to the President himself" and asserted that his immunity from committee interrogation "nullifies the basic concept of advice and consent." Fulbright drafted a bill that would require Kissinger and other Presidential assistants to appear upon command before the Foreign Relations and other committees, if only to say that they had been specifically directed in writing by the President to refuse to testify. It was a feeble threat, likely to die in Fulbright's committee, and the President would probably have ridden out the furor in silence if Kissinger's ascendancy had not been related to what Symington called "a resultant obvious decline in the prestige and position of the Secretary of State and his department."

Symington also said in a Senate speech, "Wherever one goes in the afternoon or evening around this town, one hears our very able Secretary of State laughed at. People say he is Secretary of State in title only." That did it. A White House assistant forthwith got in touch with Senator Aiken, as noted. Mr. Nixon ordered his press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, to tell reporters that "President Nixon has the utmost confidence in the Secretary of State" and that "those who may have the impression that the Secretary of State is not the President's chief adviser on foreign affairs are misleading themselves and others." The staff of *Monday*, a weekly propaganda sheet put out by the Republican National Committee, polled two Washington society columnists and four "prominent Washington hostesses" and reported their "unanimous" testimony that "they had never heard the Secretary of State laughed at."

Mr. Nixon made the difficulty for himself and for his Secretary of State when he fulfilled his campaign pledge "to restore the National Security Council to its preeminent role in national security planning." Henry Kissinger's preeminence, his own skills apart, is a product of that promised and accomplished preeminence. Symington recognized this when he maintained, on the Senate floor and personally to Rogers, that he was aiming at neither Rogers nor Kissinger but at "the concentration of foreign policy decision-making power in the White House" and at the isolation of that power center from Congress. Senator Jacob Javits, agreeing with Symington that "excessive use of executive privilege" had impeded congressional oversight of foreign policy, went to the core of the matter when he asked, "Why should we not hold the President himself responsible rather than Dr. Kissinger for the effect upon Congress of the organization of his Presidency respecting international security affairs?" Mr. Nixon, reacting in behalf of his "closest and dearest friend in the Cabinet," the Secretary of State, acknowledged the re-

continued

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001300400001-6

THE PERISCOPE

THE 'VICTORY' WESTMORELAND LOST

A confidential Pentagon paper details the plan the military had three years ago to end the Vietnam war. Gen. William Westmoreland, then top man in Saigon, and Gen. Earle Wheeler, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, worked it out during the height of Hanoi's Tet offensive in 1968. Westmoreland read Tet as a shift to all-out war by Hanoi and wanted to match it. He also viewed it as a last gasp that would leave North Vietnam's army badly mauled. His plan called for 206,000 more men (a total of 731,000) and moves on all fronts—stopping anticipated assaults from the north, seizing sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia, blocking the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in those countries, invading North Vietnam and bombing the port of Haiphong.

On Feb. 12, the proposals were discussed at a White House meeting involving LBJ, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, CIA chief Richard Helms, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Clark Clifford, Walt Rostow and Wheeler. On Feb. 23, Wheeler met Westmoreland in Saigon and after three days brought details of the plan back to Washington. Shortly afterward, the 206,000-man request was revealed in a Pentagon "leak"—a move, Westmoreland says, designed to "prejudice the President's appraisal." On March 24, Wheeler met Westmoreland privately in Manila. The word: no new bombing, no invasions, no 731,000 men. The only thing Wheeler could not tell his field commander was something he did not know himself—that on March 31, LBJ was bowing out of the war and out of the White House.

RUSSIA ORBITS ANOTHER RIDDLE

The Soviet Union seems about to write a new chapter in manned spaceflight—but no one knows what it will reveal. In November and December and again last month, the U.S.S.R. fired off three shots that all looked like tests of a new manned vehicle. The first two satellites evidently carried recorded voices; they executed maneuvers that outdid any by previous manned satellites. U.S. experts say they don't quite fit a program for a manned space station (which the Russians are working on) nor a moon shot. Beyond that, the experts are baffled.

TROUBLE ON THE WELCOME MAT

Chile's new Marxist government faces a delicate problem in its efforts to forge new, friendly links to Red China. After President Salvador Allende granted Peking diplomatic recognition, the Nationalist Chinese envoy left but gave the Chinese Embassy (bought by China before World War II) to Chile's League Against Cancer for use as a hospital. Peking's ambassador wants it back, and Allende's opponents in the Chilean Congress have vowed to block the move.

MOSCOW DROPS A HINT

For the first time in memory, a Soviet radio broadcast this week listed all Russian vessels moving to and from North Vietnam. (Except for a tanker, all carried non-military cargo.) The reason, U.S. analysts think, is that Moscow, fearing that the U.S. may resume full-scale bombing in North Vietnam, is hinting at immunity for its ships from American aircraft.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 MAR 1971

Sealing Her Lips Part of Job

BY MARLENE CIMONS
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Whenever Jeanne Wilson Davis goes to parties, she usually keeps quiet when the cocktail conversation gets around to foreign policy. "I'm sure everyone must think I'm terribly stupid," she said.

But there's a very good reason for her silence.

"If I were to comment on foreign affairs," she said, "I couldn't always be sure whether I was saying something I'd read in a newspaper that morning—or in a top-secret document."

She was exaggerating somewhat, of course, but Mrs. Davis still must exercise great caution. As staff secretary to the National Security Council and head of its secretariat, she has access to every piece of classified foreign policy information that passes among members of the highest levels of the U.S. government.

High Security

"We're all very conscious of our responsibility," she said. "We're always aware of the extremely high security classification. I guess because of this, you learn to live with it always in the back of your mind. It's already a part of my life."

Mrs. Davis, a tall, slim, gray-haired woman of 50 who was born in Long Beach, came to the National Security Council and its chief, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, in March, 1969, "on-loan" from the State Department where she had held a similar job.

She describes herself as "sort of a traffic manager," who prepares briefing books for Kissinger and the President, coordinates staff work and has installed procedures for the flow of paperwork among the National Security Council system to and from the President, the Cabinet departments and agencies, the White House staff, Congress, foreign governments and the public.

"We get about 800 pieces of paper a month," she said. "Our system is designed to control it and keep track of every document. We have a document control organization that, as each piece comes in, assigns it a number, a security classification, and keeps a record of who sent it and where it's going."

Extreme precautions are taken to protect the security of the system.

"We have safes and vaults where the classified material is stored," she said. "This building is secured and everyone who comes in must be cleared.

"Every document is handcarried. We have a security officer who watches for unintentional breaches. And, of course, everyone involved in this operation has had a thorough security clearance."

Mrs. Davis had to undergo a simliar clearance when she moved over from the State Department, an elaborate clearance involving interviews with neighbors, employers and friends.

Thorough Check

"They check every address, every place you've ever worked," she said. "They examine your loyalty—asking such things as 'Has she ever said anything against this country?', 'Has she belonged to any subversive organizations?' 'What are her drinking habits?' "

The probe didn't bother her.

"If I were on the outside and someone else had this job, I would want to know that they were completely trustworthy," she said. "I would want the government to be aware of their personal habits and weaknesses."

She is close to her boss Kissinger but says that, because she is not a policy-maker, the less contact she has with him, the more successful she is. "My job is to keep the machinery running smoothly," she said. "If he is ever aware of that machinery, then I've failed.

She describes Kissinger as a man of "fantastic energy and intellectual capacity" who works very long hours.

"He's here before 8 a.m. and often doesn't leave until after 11 p.m.," she said. "He's very demanding of his staff, but doesn't demand anything he won't do himself.

"He has a knack for asking the questions you hope he won't ask—the hard ones. He has a marvelous wit. And I must say, I think his social image has been grossly exaggerated."

Government Role

Mrs. Davis, a recent recipient of the Federal Woman's Award for her career accomplishments, feels that women have an important place in high government positions.

"I've never thought of my sex as a handicap," she said. "I've been very fortunate. I've always had bosses who have judged me as an individual, and I had a very understanding husband."

Her husband, a former attorney with the State Department, died four years ago. Her 16-year-old daughter attends school in Connecticut.

"I've always had men working for me," she said. "Many people have asked me if I've had problems. I figure if a man is troubled because he's working for a woman—he has the problem, not me.,

Her day begins at 7:30 a.m. when she leaves her 50-acre farm in Broad Run, Va., for the 40-mile drive to Washington. It's a long commute (at least an hour each way) but she loves it — especially the drive home. "After the tension of the day, it's like a decompression chamber," she said.

TIME
8 MAR 1971

The Predominance of Kissinger

IN its orderly march of ideas, its thoroughness and its conceptual breadth, President Nixon's wide-ranging foreign policy report demonstrates again the predominant influence of Henry Kissinger, his articulate National Security Assistant. The former Harvard professor's strength is his abhorrence of sloganeering in world affairs and his knack for breaking complex problems down to their more specific and manageable components. At one and the same time, claims one White House observer, he is "Richard Nixon's Richelieu, and his Metternich."

Kissinger began to solicit suggestions for the report last October from the Department of State, the Defense Department and the CIA. On the day after Christmas he took five of his 49 aides to San Clemente to begin drafting the document. He discussed its outlines in detail with Nixon in January. A rough draft was then circulated to the key agencies for their comments, and the National Security Council reviewed both the draft and the comments. The final policy decisions were made last month by Nixon, Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers at Key Biscayne.

As the drafting and the final polishing continued, Kissinger drove his staff with all the harshness of a plantation overseer. It was easy to detect which members of his staff had worked on the final drafts, Kissinger says. "They had maniacal expressions on their faces." As the deadline for the final draft approached, Kissinger kept telephoning his men with last-minute thoughts. Exasperated, they finally stopped taking his calls so that they could complete their work.

Tyrannical taskmaster that he is, Kissinger has already run through three administrative aides, who decided to escape the pressure. But the irrepressible Kissinger can readily joke about his reputation as a ruthless boss. Says he of his overworked staff: "The circles under the eyes don't bother me. It's only when I see the flecks of foam at the corners of the mouth that I worry."

THE CHICAGO, ILL. SUN-TIMES
7 March 1971

How a presidential aide comes into vast power

By Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON -- This provincial capital of the non-Communist world was struck dumb last week when a former pillar of the establishment stood up and said the emperor's minister has no clothes.

It has long been part of the insider's wisdom here that Sec. of State William P. Rogers plays a secondary role to White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger in the formulation of President Nixon's foreign policy.

High ranking officials have been saying as much privately for more than a year and newspapers have been speculating about it even longer. But it was considered bad form in this protocol-conscious town for any titled member of the government to say so publicly.

Then, last Tuesday, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo), once a proper member of the Cold War Club, rose on the Senate floor to declare to the outside world that Rogers is "laughed at" on Washington's cocktail circuit because Kissinger is considered "secretary of state in everything but title."

SYMINGTON, a former secretary of the Air Force and a hawk turned dove on Vietnam, asserted that Kissinger is "the actual architect of our foreign policy."

The senator's point was that either Rogers' power should be restored or he should be replaced by Kissinger as the President's spokesman in testimony before Congress.

Mr. Nixon promptly called a press conference to defend "my oldest and closest friend in the Cabinet." But his remarks did little to change any minds and, in fact, implicitly conceded Symington's case.

For the President, while describing Rogers as "the chief foreign policy spokesman of the administration," indicated that Kissinger has a broader role — "not only foreign policy but national security policy — the co-ordination of those policies."

In other words, Kissinger stands at the focal point not only of the State Department's recommendations but also those of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, which command much more money and probably have more influence over U.S. operations abroad.

KISSINGER'S POWER grows out of his position as director of the National Security Council which, under Mr. Nixon, has been restored to its original pre-eminence.

The NSC was created in 1947 to enable President Truman to conduct the cold war with the same type of strong, central control that Franklin D. Roosevelt exercised in World War II. By statute, it includes the President, the vice president, and the secretaries of State and Defense.

Under Mr. Truman and President Eisenhower, it was dominated by two forceful secretaries of state, Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, and developed an elaborate staff that represented a mini-State Department-Pentagon-CIA.

Gen. Eisenhower ran it much like a military staff with the director presiding as chief of staff over a wide range of committees that prepared meticulously detailed position papers on foreign countries and issues.

The members of the NSC then debated, revised and approved the papers and the director was charged with seeing that they were put into effect. President Kennedy decided, even before he took office, that the NSC routine had degenerated into bureaucratic formalism. In one of his first official acts, in the words of his adviser Arthur Schlesinger, Mr. Kennedy "slaughtered committees right and left."

The stated object was to restore the President's personal control over foreign policy and also to re-assert the prerogatives of the secretary of State, which had begun to wane under Dulles' successor, Christian Herter.

However, Dean Rusk failed to assert himself to Mr. Kennedy's satisfaction and, again according to Schlesinger, he was soon complaining: "dammit, (McGeorge) Bundy and I get more done in one day in the White House than they do in six months at the State Department."

Bundy, Mr. Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, was seen exercising the powers of the NSC without the old encumbrances of the committee structure and the formal debates among the members.

Meanwhile, Defense Sec. Robert S. McNamara was cutting into the State Department's domain by issuing an annual "posture statement." A precursor to the state of the world message now prepared by Kissinger for Mr. Nixon, it was full of sweeping foreign policy pronouncements.

DESPITE McNAMARA'S COMPETITION, Bundy wielded considerably more power than any previous director of the NSC. And his successor, Walt W. Rostow, sustained the status of the job under President Johnson despite a resurgence in Rusk's influence.

When Mr. Nixon took office, he restored the Eisenhower-type staff structure to the NSC but, at the same time, retained the Bundy-type dominance of the director. Thus, Kissinger inherited the best of both worlds, a large, loyal staff and a tradition of equality with the Cabinet officers.

Defense Sec. Melvin R. Laird has not achieved the influence of McNamara under Mr. Kennedy. And Rogers, who lacked his predecessor's diplomatic background, has not achieved Rusk's influence under Mr. Johnson.

Kissinger, a brilliant scholar of foreign affairs and a surprisingly aggressive administrator, has filled the vacuum to become, in the opinion of practically all experts here, the dominant administration figure in international affairs.

As such, Symington, Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) and other critics of the war have sought to hold him accountable, particularly on Vietnam.

KISSINGER HAS AGREED to a number of informal meetings, including at least one visit to Fulbright's home. But the senators want him on more formal terms, possibly under the hot lights for a televised hearing.

Mr. Nixon has refused, invoking "executive privilege", the theory that the President has the right under the constitutional separation of powers to decide who should and who should not testify before Congress.

The senators have counterattacked with the argument that the Constitution directs the President to seek the Senate's "advice and consent" on foreign policy.

The conflicting theories have never been resolved, either by the Supreme Court or custom. With the President and Senate

continued

[redacted]

STATINTL

The Kissinger Role

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, March 2—Henry Kissinger is in the center of a bitter controversy here for three reasons: (1) despite White House denials, he is undoubtedly the principal adviser to President Nixon on foreign policy; (2) that policy, particularly in Indochina, is opposed by influential members of the House and particularly the Senate, who feel they have a constitutional duty to examine the logic of the President's decisions; but (3) they cannot question Mr. Kissinger about Laos, the Middle East or anything else.

They can, of course, summon Secretary of State Rogers to Capitol Hill and question him, but it is widely believed here, as Senator Symington asserted on the floor of the Senate today, that Mr. Kissinger has been given many of the advisory powers normally reserved for the Secretary of State, and that he exercises them in the "privileged sanctuary" of the White House, without Congressional review.

It should be made clear what is not at issue here. Even Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Symington, and the other critics of the Indochina policy are not saying that Mr. Kissinger is responsible for that policy or that he is playing some devious Rasputin role.

The issue is simply that he defines the questions to be answered by the departments, formulates the options and the arguments for and against, consults privately with the President at the last stage before decision—and that he is not accountable, as the Secretary of State is, to the Congress, though his influence is undoubtedly greater than Mr. Rogers's.

Several events have envenomed this conflict between the right of the Senate to "advise and consent" on critical foreign policy questions, and the right of the President to take executive action, protected by "executive privilege."

Mr. Kissinger, recognizing the dilemma, agreed to meet privately with Chairman Fulbright and members of his committee at Senator Fulbright's house on Belmont Road. He did so twice, with the approval of the President, but the last time fell just before the U.S. invasion of Cambodia, and Mr. Kissinger said nothing about it. He felt he was not privileged to do so, but Chairman Fulbright felt that the committee was misled by his silence, and that this sort of informal meeting merely gave the impression of consultation but not the substance.

WASHINGTON

Several weeks ago, a member of Mr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff, John Lehman Jr., was reported in the press to have attacked Senator Fulbright in a private meeting as "mischievous" and not to be trusted with secret information placed before his committee. Mr. Kissinger has since criticized Lehman for "poor judgment," but when Fulbright invited Lehman to explain his charges, the White House again invoked "executive privilege" and instructed both Lehman and Kissinger not to appear.

Last week, Mr. Kissinger added to the controversy over his role by going on a C.B.S. television program with Marvin and Bernie Kalb to discuss the President's State of the World message, which was largely written by Kissinger and his staff. Always before, he had refused to talk publicly about the substance of foreign policy, but

New York Times/Mike Lien

this time he thought he could merely talk about how the report was written.

Was he trapped into answering questions by reporters after refusing to answer questions by Senators? "No," he says, "I merely misjudged the situation, and I'll certainly never do it again."

There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution that says the Secretary of State has to be the principal adviser to the President on foreign policy. Roosevelt often used Harry Hopkins rather than Secretary Hull in this role. Kennedy drafted the Harvard faculty Johnson often called in Justice Fortas, Clark Clifford and Dean Acheson at the last minute before making his decisions.

What is new now is that President Nixon has institutionalized the advisory function under Kissinger in the White House, given it a much larger staff (now 42 professionals and 68 clerical and other aides) and larger responsibilities, and put these larger powers beyond Congressional review.

This does not mean that the departments are cut out of the decision-making process. In fact, the more formal Nixon system is designed to involve them closer to the point of decision. Kissinger chairs first a senior staff committee composed of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the head of the C.I.A., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one staff member.

The job of this committee is not to make recommendations, but to define the choices open to the President. In fact, there is even one member of Kissinger's staff whose job it is to read all relevant public comments on the subject and suggest from these any additional course of action that may have been proposed.

This objective case study of the problem is then placed before the National Security Council composed of the President, the Vice President, and the principal security Cabinet members. Normally, Kissinger, as secretary of the council, defines the options in these meetings and the President asks each Cabinet member for his recommendations, but seldom Kissinger at this point. It is only later, after the President has studied the recommendations, that he usually calls in Kissinger before the final decision—but this, of course, is the critical moment and a major source of Kissinger's power.

In many ways it is the most orderly system of decision making in Washington since the last World War, but this does not remove the central issue of Congressional review with Kissinger or with John D. Ehrlichman, who exercises the same kind of unreviewed power on domestic policy.

The President, who is normally an advocate of decentralizing power, has actually centralized more power under the White House umbrella of executive privilege than any other Chief Executive in this century. And the diplomats are almost as puzzled by it as the Senators, for they want to get close to the power center and to Kissinger too, and actually they manage to do so more often than the Congress of the United States.

Nixon, Aides Meet On Foreign Policy

President Nixon met with his chief defense, diplomatic and intelligence advisers yesterday for a foreign policy review that reportedly centered on the Middle East and included a situation report on the Indochina war.

Administration sources said there were no critical developments in Laos or any other area that prompted the conference at the White House. They described it as a general policy discussion before the President left at 3:12 p.m. to spend the night at Camp David, Md.

Meeting with the President were Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Central Intelligence Agency director Richard Helms, and Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs.

White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said the meeting did not focus on Laos despite reports of persistent, heavy fighting between North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese forces.

Negotiations in the Arab-Israeli conflict, other sources said, are drawing prime attention of the highest administration officials this weekend. On Friday, Israel submitted to United Nations intermediary Gunnar V. Jarring its response to Egypt's position on a peace settlement in a critical stage of the negotiations. The United States is extremely anxious to see the negotiations carried past the current March 7 deadline on the Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire.

The intensified fighting in Laos, and in Cambodia where South Vietnamese forces also are heavily engaged with Vietnamese Communist troops, was said to have been discussed relatively briefly in the White House meeting.

These sources said there is no alarmist turn in the warfare that requires any sudden shift in allied strategy. There have been reports that a major increase in American air support for Saigon's troops fighting in the Laos panhandle region is in preparation, but administration sources yesterday denied that any significant change in the pattern of U.S. air support is imminent.

There is heavy fighting along the northern flank of the South Vietnamese forces operating in the Route 9 region of Laos, Defense Department officials acknowledged, now that the enemy has chosen to "stand and fight." Despite reports from the scene of heavy U.S. helicopter losses, however, Pentagon sources said that damage is still considered to be "an expected and acceptable rate of loss."

Mr. Nixon also formally accepted yesterday the resignation of J. Fred Russell as Under Secretary of the Interior.

Ziegler declined to comment on reports that the administration will seek a minimal $1.23 billion expansion of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system except to insist that "no final decisions" have been made.

On Monday the President will fly to Des Moines with Mrs. Nixon for an address before a joint session of the Iowa State Legislature.

STATINTL

[redacted]

BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER

M - 216,305
S - 298,557

FEB 22 1971

A Few Basic Facts About Laos

The accidental bombing of a friendly base in Laos last week touched off a minor explosion right here at home. Anti-war critics expressed surprise and shock to learn that the base was used for assorted undercover activities of the Central Intelligence Agency—and they went on from there to denounce the CIA's "private war" in Laos.

The CIA's activities in Laos over the past four or five years have scarcely been a secret, and with a grand total of approximately 100 agents in Laos, the CIA is hardly in a position to conduct a war.

What it has been doing is feeding, supplying and training a few thousand Meo tribesmen, under orders from the National Security Council in Washington and under the direct control of the American ambassador in Vientiane. The Meo tribesmen are poor farmers scattered over the mountains of northern Laos. They don't like the North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao Communists, and with a small amount of help and encouragement from the CIA, they have proved to be very useful and effective at harassing the enemy.

In comparison with the 70,000 North Vietnamese soldiers operating in Laos, the small CIA contingent is almost insignificant. And there would be no need for its presence if it were not for the huge invading force from Hanoi.

A little history seems in order.

Prior to the 1962 Geneva treaty guaranteeing the "neutrality" and "territorial integrity" of Laos, a contingent of U.S. Army Special Forces or "Green Berets" was stationed in that country to support the royal government. When that treaty was signed, they left. It was not until a year later —after it was obvious that the North Vietnamese had no intention of abiding by the treaty and removing their troops, and after the Laotian government asked the Americans for help once again— that the CIA sent in a small number of agents.

Incidentally, while we're on the subject of the Geneva treaty, it strikes us as rather ironic that former Ambassador Averell Harriman is denouncing South Vietnam's attempt to cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Harriman will be the main speaker at one of today's "teach-ins" protesting the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos. Perhaps someone in the audience ought to remind him that the 1962 Geneva treaty, which he negotiated, and which North Vietnam signed, prohibited the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trails by foreign troops — and ask him what's wrong with South Vietnam taking it upon itself to enforce his treaty after nine years.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

STAT

CAPITOL STUFF

By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Feb. 15—When an American aircraft through error of some sort dumped bombs on friendly forces at the Long Chang base in Laos with resultant casualties and materiel damage, the explosion also blew off a little more cover from the supposedly secret CIA war in the jungle-covered mountains.

News dispatches from Vientiane, the Laotian capital, described Long Cheng variously as "American headquarters" in Northern Laos or as the operating base for assorted undercover activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In view of the stepped-up fighting in the Long Cheng area and the celebrated Plain of Jars, and the domestic flap which has brought repeated White House denials that American ground combat troops are involved in the South Vietnamese invasion along Highway 9, this is as good a time as any for a little further clarification.

Blowing Cover Off What Isn't Such a Secret

CIA Director Richard Helms and his "spooks" in the field have got considerable attention for their operations in Laos in the last four or five years, but they have not been running any little private war of their own. Nor has the Laos war been much of a secret to anybody.

There are about 100 CIA agents in all of Laos. They include men who are experts in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage, in counter-insurgency operations, in surveillance and in military training. They are under the direct control of the American ambassador in Vientiane, and follow orders which are approved by the National Security Council in Washington.

Richard Helms
Not running a private war

Back in the 1961-62 period, the CIA, as well as the Army's Special Forces — the Green Berets — were active in Laos, engaged in surveillance and training operations in support of the royal government. Then, after the Geneva agreement in 1962 creating the troika "neutral" government in Laos, the Americans pulled out.

Some of the spooks may have remained behind. We wouldn't know. But they would have been very difficult to hide in the Laotian population, for the Americans have different colored faces and they are, as a rule, a foot or more taller than the Laotian people.

But a year later, when it was obvious that the North Vietnamese neither had pulled out nor had any intention of pulling out their thousands of regular troops, and fighting was continuing, Vientiane again asked American help. The CIA returned, in small numbers.

While other agencies of the U. S. government are charged with monitoring foreign broadcasts and code-breaking, and while these electronic intelligence duties, of enormous extent and cost, are on a global basis, the CIA does handle local, specific radio interception jobs. Such work would be done in Laos, within easy radio listening range of Hanoi and the North Vietnamese armed forces in the south.

They Made Arrangements With the Hill Men

Over the years, the CIA has established an excellent rapport with the Meo tribesmen, the poor hill farmers who didn't get along very well anyhow with the flatlanders in the cities and around the royal throne.

There were, and are, little pockets of the Meo people scattered all over the mountains; the CIA fed them rice, and supplied them with weapons and training. The spooks used the famed Air America flying company which, contrary to widespread belief, is not a CIA unit but a commercial company doing business under contract. The American Embassy uses Air America, and so does AID, also by contract.

The Meo proved to be excellent fighters; they didn't like the North Vietnamese nor their Pathet Lao (Laos Communist) associates, and the tribesmen were adept at harassment and interdiction.

Somewhere along the line, the CIA ran into Vang Pao, a tribal chief who was a leader of remarkable ability, who rallied the hill people around his banner and with a relatively moderate flow of American supplies turned his men into a tough little army. Vang Pao, a patriot, got to be so good at his fighting job that the Laotian government finally commissioned him a general and made him the commander of the region around the Plain of Jars.

Long Cheng was selected by Vang Pao as his major base several years ago, and he had CIA communications experts and advisers at hand. But about a year ago, he decided to decentralize. He separated his troops and scattered them around a number of smaller bases; Long Cheng lost its pre-eminence.

He's Got Only a Few Thousand Men

Vang Pao's immediate army consists of about 3,000 to 3,600 men; he doubtless could muster several thousand more in a pinch.

The Meo Tribesmen have raised a lot of hell with the North Vietnamese over the last couple of years in purely guerrilla operations. In the dry season, the North Vietnamese push forward with the Meos snapping at their flanks; when the rains come the Hanoi invaders pull back. Some of the towns and villages have changed hands fairly frequently.

Now, the North Vietnamese have a fresh division in the Plain of Jars area and it would appear that a battle of some consequence is in the making.

All these matters have been fairly open knowledge and the full details are known to four subcommittees of Congress, the Budget Bureau and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as well as the National Security Council. It's a skimpily concealed secret.

STATINTL

THE WORLD

5 FEB 1971



JACK HARNETT

U.S. VEHICLES IN LANG VEI NEAR THE LAOTIAN BORDER DURING OPERATION DEWEY CANYON II

Indochina: A Cavalryman's Way Out

SUDDENLY, the Vietnamese ground war came back to life.

For three years, the northwest corner of South Viet Nam had been a misty, mountainous no man's land. Khe Sanh, where 6,000 Marines had endured a bloody 77-day siege in 1968, was a moonscape of shell craters flecked by twisted steel runway sheets and discarded shell casings. A few miles to the south, the Rockpile was overrun by weeds. On a bluff overlooking the Laotian border, the hulks of battered Soviet tanks still lay rusting at the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, where ten Americans and 225 South Vietnamese died in a single night of hand-to-hand combat.

Last week the forbidding ruins, relics of an earlier and rougher stage in the war, were abruptly jolted from their silence. From jumping-off points 50 miles away, long columns of tanks, trucks and armored personnel carriers ground into the rugged western reaches of Quang Tri province, raising towering columns of dust. Overhead, gunships darted around in search of enemy troops. Giant Chinook helicopters flapped into long-abandoned bases, depositing men and massive earth-moving machines. At Lang Vei, a halftrack pulled up loaded with expectant-looking G.I.s. One soldier had a single word painted on his helmet: "Laos?"

Good question. All week, rumors of an invasion coursed through the world's major capitals, and frenzied speculation focused on what the U.S. was up to. By keeping everyone guessing—including the Communists—the Administration infuriated more than a few Congressmen, diplomats and newsmen. But it also pulled off a kind of psychological-warfare coup.

Ten months ago, Richard Nixon took the world by surprise when, pointer in hand, he went on nationwide TV to disclose, in too apocalyptic terms, the expansion of the war into Cambodia. Last week he said nothing at all about the vast operation under way in Military Region I, South Viet Nam's northernmost war area. When a six-day "embargo" on news from the area was lifted, more than 50,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese troops were involved in strikes that not only spanned the length of South Viet Nam but vitally affected its neighbors as well. Was the main object to sever the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail? Was it a feint to throw the Communists off balance? Was an invasion scheduled and then delayed because Nixon developed a case of cold feet—as some sources suggested but the Administration denied? Whatever the case, the operation suggested that in the process of retreating from South Viet Nam, the U.S. was churning up all of Indochina even more thoroughly than it did when the big American buildup began half a decade ago.

Pulling Up Short

By week's end, three separate operations had unfolded. In the coastal provinces on the Gulf of Siam, ARVN (for Army of the Republic of Viet Nam) troops prepared to slice into new infiltration routes that the Communists had been trying to extend from the Cambodian seaport of Kep into the southern part of South Viet Nam. Northwest of Saigon in Tay Ninh province, 18,000 ARVN armored cavalrymen surged over the border into the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. Both sanctuaries were cleared out last spring, but now Communist troops were beginning to drift back.

The main thrust—and the one shrouded in mystery—developed in rugged, sparsely populated and Communist-infested Military Region I (formerly known as I Corps). There the command massed a total of 20,000 ARVN and 9,000 U.S. troops, plus at least 600 choppers. The juggernaut advanced westward on, above and around Route 9, an all-weather dirt road running 40 miles across South Viet Nam into Laos. At Khe Sanh, road graders rolled across the red clay plateau as troops patched one shell-torn runway and built a second to handle up to 40 big C-130 transports a day. Long-disused combat bases with names like Vandergrift, Bastogne and Veghel, snaking south toward the A Shau Valley, were also reopened. Significantly, many of the U.S. troops involved in the operation were told that they could expect to remain for one to three months.

Farther west, Lang Vei was set up as an advance command post for the massive operation, code-named Dewey Canyon II.* Barely 200 yards from the border, a sign was erected: WARNING: NO U.S. PERSONNEL BEYOND THIS POINT. The caveat reflected congres-

* Its predecessor, a 1969 search-and-destroy operation conducted in the same area, was to have been named Dewy Canyon for the heavy fog that enshrouds the craggy terrain, but somebody slipped up on the spelling.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS



CHICAGO TRIBUNE
2 FEB 1971

[redacted]

STATINTL

Scherle Raps Fulbright

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10 (UPI)—Rep. William J. Scherle [R., Ia.] said yesterday Sen. J. William Fulbright [D., Ark.] attempted to subject a National Security Council employe to "star chamber and kangaroo court" proceedings because the man criticized Fulbright.

In a House speech, Scherle said Fulbright summoned John Lehman Jr. of the NSC to testify at a closed session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after a news report indicated Lehman criticized the senator at the private meeting of Senate staff members. The news report said Lehman accused Fulbright of leaking classified information to the press.

"In my opinion, none of us in either house is above criticism, and to react to criticism by attempting to intimidate your critics thru star chamber and kangaroo court tactics is, I believe, unconscionable," Scherle said. He said President Nixon should be commended for refusing to submit Lehman to an "inquisition" by the committee which Fulbright heads.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 JAN 1973

[redacted]

Case Would Bar C.I.A. Aid For Radio Free Europe

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23—Senator Clifford P. Case, Republican of New Jersey, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency had spent several hundred million dollars over the last 20 years to keep Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty functioning.

Mr. Case, a member of the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, said that he would introduce legislation Monday to bring Government spending on the two stations under the authorization and appropriations process of Congress. Representative Ogden R. Reid, Republican of Westchester, said today that he would introduce similar legislation in the House.

Radio Free Europe, founded in 1950, and Radio Liberty, formed a year later, both have powerful transmitters in Munich, West Germany, staffed by several thousand American technicians and refugees from Eastern Europe.

Radio Liberty broadcasts only into the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe to other Eastern European countries except Yugoslavia.

Both organizations have offices in New York and purport to be privately endowed with funds coming exclusively from foundations, corporations and the public. Both, however, are extremely reticent about the details of their financing.

Senator Case noted in a statement that both Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty "claim to be nongovernmental organizations sponsored by private contributions." However, he went on, "available sources indicate direct C.I.A. subsidies pay nearly all their costs."

The Senator said that the Central Intelligence Agency provided the stations with $30-million in the last fiscal year without formal Congressional approval.

Disclosures Restricted

Under [illegible] Intelligence Agency's operating rules, its activities—such as covert funding — are approved by the National Security Council. However, disclosure to Congress is limited to a handful of senior legislators on watchdog committees of each house.

The Central Intelligence Agency and Radio Free Europe both declined to comment today on Senator Case's statement. Efforts to elicit comment from Radio Liberty were unavailing.

Covert C.I.A. funding of the two stations has, however, been an open secret for years, although the C.I.A., in accordance with standing policy, and the two stations themselves have consistently refused to discuss either their operations or their funding.

Citing returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service in the 1969 fiscal year, Mr. Case said that the stations' combined operating costs that year totaled $33,997,336. Of this, he said, Radio Free Europe spent $21,109,935 and Radio Liberty $12,887,401.

Funds Sought by Advertisement

"The bulk of Radio Free Europe's and Radio Liberty's budgets, or more than $30-million annually, comes from direct C.I.A. subsidies," Mr. Case charged. "Congress has never participated in authorization of appropriations of funds to R.F.E. or R.L., although hundrdes of millions of dollars in Government funds have been spent durirng the last 20 years."

Mr. Case pointed out that Radio Frree Europe conducted a yearly campaign for public contributions under the auspices of the Advertising Council. Between $12-million and $20-million in free media space is donated annually to this campaign, he said, but the rreturn from the public is "apparently less than $100,000."

Furthermore, he said, both stations attempt to raise money from corporations and foundations but contributions from these sources reportedly pay only a small part of the stations' total budgets.

Senator Case said that his proposed legislation would seek to amend the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 to authorize funds for both stations in the fiscal year beginning next July 1. His proposal would call for an initial sum of $30-million, but he said that the sum would be subject to change.

Bar on Other Funds

At the same time, Mr. Case said, his proposal would provide that "no other" United States Government funds could be made available to either station except under the provisions of the act. He also said that he would ask that Administration officials concerned with overseas information policies be called to testify in order to determine the amount needed for the stations' operations.

"I can understand why covert funds might have been used for a year or two in an emergency situation when extreme secrecy was necessary and when no other Government funds were available," Mr. Case said.

But, he went on, the justification for covert funding has lessened over the years as international tension has eased, as the secrecy surrounding the stations has 'melted awey," and as more open means of funding could be developed.

"In other words," he said, "the extraordinary circumstances that might have been thought to justify circumvention of constitutional processes and Congressional approval no longer exist."

John Created XXX

Mr. Case pointed out that in 1967, after there had been public disclosure that the C.I.A. had been secretly funding the National Student Association, President Johnson created a committee that was headed by Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, the Under Secretary of State, and that included Richard Helms, head of the C.I.A., and John W. Gardner, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

He further noted that on March 29, 1967, Mr. Johnson publicly accepted the committee's recommendation that "no Federal agency shall provide covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or voluntary organizations" and that "no programs currently would justify any exceptions to this policy."

People familiar with the operations of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty noted that both had been started at the peak of the Cold War and had just "gone rolling on" ever [illegible] committee, some sources said, had cut off covert funding from virtually all other recipients.

"They solved all the tough ones," one source said, "but they were under such pressure from Johnson to get their report out and get the heat from Congress and the public cut off that they didn't solve the funding of the stations. They turned it over to another committee."

The second committee, whose members these sources declined to identify, worked over a year and then turned in secret recommendations to Mr. Johnson. However, Mr. Johnson pigeonholed the recommendations and finally left the problem for the incoming Nixon Administration to solve, the sources said.

[redacted]

STATINTL

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend $3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds $5-billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than 80 per cent of the total, or about $4-billion, about $2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now —half-way through his term —he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted, in U-2 photographs, the sign of a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos, Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the ar of a mother ship, plus tw conspicuous barges of a used only for storing a lear submarine's radioac effluent, alerted the Wh House. That led to int behind-the-scenes negotia and the President's re warning to Moscow not service nuclear armed s "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the i ligence community resist t ing with reporters, but ir views over several mo with Federal officials deal daily with intellig matters, with men ret from intelligence careers with some on active duty dicate that President N and his chief advisers ap ciate the need for high-g intelligence and "consume eagerly."

The community, for insta has been providing the P dent with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet siles, nuclear submarines airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitatio strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks wit this extremely sophisticate formation base," an off commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures —about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.— that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the output and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers —Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, he controls only about 10 per cent—$500-million to

NEW YORK TIMES

Foreign Policy: Pentagon Also Encounters Rebuffs

Following is the fourth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20—Though the Defense Department remains the largest, richest and most formidable Government agency, it, like other agencies, has lost to the Nixon White House some of its influence on foreign policy.

Senior military men have the satisfaction of sitting as equals on all major policy boards with civilian leaders of the Pentagon, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. They get their views directly to the President, unfiltered by civilians. But those views are rejected by the President as often as they are accepted.

While President Lyndon B. Johnson was jealous of the prerogatives of Presidential power, he usually took pains to invoke military support for his tough decisions, whether on Vietnam force levels or on the kind of antimissile missile he wanted to build. President Nixon, in contrast, seldom seems to feel the need for a public military endorsement of his actions.

Even when the Defense Department can present a united front of civilian and military planners pushing a project, the White House has shown no reluctance to impose its own solution. Mr. Nixon overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff when they argued against the unilateral elimination of stocks of biological weapons.

He overruled them again when they urged that the Russians be offered a package proposal on nuclear-arms control that would not prevent construction of a full 12-site Safeguard antimissile system; the offer, instead, was either for no missile defense or for one limited to protecting only the capitals of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Moreover, on at least two occasions when the military chiefs prevailed on a major policy matter at the White House, it was in counseling restraint on a President inclined toward bold action.

That happened in the spring of 1969, following the shooting down of an unarmed spy plane off the coast of North Korea, when the military stressed the paucity of forces available in the face of Mr. Nixon's initial inclination to bomb some North Korean airfields. As the military slowly moved air and sea reinforcements toward Korea, his anger cooled and he decided against retaliatory raids.

During the recent Jordanian crisis, after hundreds of Syrian tanks had gone into Jordan to support the Palestinian guerrillas against the troops of King Hussein, the Joint Chiefs, supported by officials of the State and Defense Departments, urged caution lest a misstep trigger a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, on issues in which the White House, for strategic reasons, was receptive to tough options offered by the military for essentially tactical reasons — as in the case of the Cambodian invasion and the heavy bomb strikes on air-defense sites and supply dumps in North Vietnam — hard-line military policy was supported.

An Impression Unsupported

Mr. Nixon's stand has sometimes given rise to the impression that military men are in the ascendancy. Early last month, after two intensive air strikes on North Vietnam and a commando-type raid on a prisoner-of-war camp near Hanoi, Senator J. W. Fulbright asserted that the Pentagon was "taking over the primary role in our foreign policy."

Since those hard-line actions seemed to break a pattern of more than a year's duration in which the Administration appeared to be fulfilling its pledge of negotiation rather than confrontation, the Arkansas Democrat's allegation may have struck a responsive chord around the nation.

However, it prompted a ranking Administration official to say that he had missed the point on the ground that it is not that the Pentagon has "inordinate influence on our foreign policy but rather that the Administration is itself more inclined to a hard-line bias in [illegible]

An assessment of the policy position and influence of military and civilian Defense Department leaders in the foreign-policy arena makes it clear that the stereotypes of hawks in the Pentagon and doves elsewhere no longer prevail. Nowadays a variety of shifting alliances in the Administration sometimes pair the Joint Chiefs and the State Department against the Pentagon's civilian leaders; at other times civilians are arrayed against the military; then again, key White House staff men may be pushing for bold moves, against opposition from the diplomats and the military leaders.

To gain some insight into the considerable shift of Pentagon influence in foreign policy, one must turn to the beginning of the nineteen sixties, when Robert S. McNamara was John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon of Secretary Melvin R. Laird is vastly different, in style and substance, from the establishment molded over a seven-year period by Mr. McNamara, who stayed through most of Mr. Johnson's Presidency.

Brilliant But Abrasive

Mr. McNamara, a brilliant but abrasive manager, organized a team of bright young civilian analysts who helped him take decision-making from the armed services and the Joint Chiefs and centralize it in his office. In the process the views of military men were consistently brushed aside, or so the military felt.

With the notable exception of Vietnam strategy, Mr. McNamara succeeded in gaining virtual autonomy over policy decisions, even those with large foreign-policy implications. And in a world in which the United States has commitments to more than 40 countries, there is little the Pentagon does or contemplates that lacks ramifications abroad.

It was Secretary McNamara rather than the President or the Secretary of State who each January published a "posture statement" outlining worldwide problems and how the United States intended to deal with them.

Into that setting stepped Mr. Laird, a smooth, politically shrewd Congressman from Wisconsin who had gained his knowledge of defense matters during more than a decade on the House Military Appropriations Subcommittee.

He de-emphasized the importance of civilian analysts and returned to the military a substantial role in the making of defense policy. Although he cut [illegible] budget, to which Mr. McNamara had added billions, he won the regard of the brass because they felt like full partners in the hard choices required by shrinking budgets.

One reason for the relationship is the mutual respect and warmth between the Defense Secretary and the Joint Chiefs that was obviously lacking on both sides during the McNamara era.

Nonetheless, Mr. Laird has retained a principal planning innovation of Mr. McNamara's: dividing the budget among the major military missions that must be fulfilled, not among the armed services as such. The first decision on, say, strategic missiles is how many are needed and of what kind, and only then is it determined how much money will go to the various missile programs.

There is no doubt that civilian control continues at the Pentagon. Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary David Packard make the final decisions on such questions as whether to develop and build a Navy fighter or an Army tank and on the number of combat divisions and aircraft carriers that will be maintained as the military establishment shrinks.

Under Mr. McNamara and his successor, Clark M. Clifford, it was civilian analysts who formulated the options, with the military coming in later on rebuttal; now the military initiate specific proposals on how the defense pie will be cut, with civilian analysts making their comments before ultimate decision.

During the long tenure of Mr. McNamara and the briefer one of Mr. Clifford, the Office of International Security Affairs —roughly 300 specialists who advise the Secretary of Defense on foreign policy — included some of the brightest and most assertive officials in Washington.

Laird Urged Pullout

Now, according to people in other agencies who deal with them, the current staff, with a few notable exceptions, is weaker. A senior State Department official commented: "In the McNamara era State dealt with I.S.A. because that's where the strong men were at Defense. Now we tend more and more to deal with the Joint Staff and the services."

On the large stage of policy, Mr. Laird has chosen a limited number of key positions and lobied hard for their acceptance, both in the Administration and in Congress.

One was his insistence that, in addition to the stress by the White House and State Department on negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Saigon and Hanoi to come to a

NEW YORK TIMES
26 JAN 1971

Foreign Policy: The Economic Problem

Following is the third in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 19—Despite deteriorating economic relations between the United States and the two other great trading powers—the European Common Market and Japan—the Nixon Administration has been unable in the last two years to develop a comprehensive foreign economic policy.

That state of affairs, privately described by high Administration officials as a long period of drift marked by policy contradictions and failures, has been causing concern in Washington, in foreign capitals and in the American business, labor and farm communities.

The foreign view has been that only the exercise of United States leadership can arrest a growing trend toward world economic conflict.

It was in recognition of the need for coordinating divergent domestic and overseas interests at a time of deepening crisis in the international trade, monetary and investment fields that President Nixon today established a Cabinet-level Council on International Economic Policy.

Mr. Nixon, the chairman of the new body, named Peter J. Peterson of Chicago, chairman of the board of Bell & Howell Company, to be executive director.

The council's task is to pull together military and economic aid, international trade and monetary, financial, investment and commodities matters into a cohesive body of policy, taking into account the requirements of foreign policy.

Until the establishment of the council, recommended by an advisory committee on Government organization, the authority and capacity to manage all the international economic questions have been scattered through the Government. Foreign economic policy was the victim of interagency battles that the White House often had to resolve on an improvised basis.

The establishment of the new machinery was not a simple bureaucratic move but a major effort to cope with the rapidly changing international economic situation, already posing grave foreign-policy problems for the United States.

Traditional questions of security and diplomacy are beginning to be overshadowed by rising protectionism here and abroad, by fears of trade wars and by deepening economic disputes with the European Economic Community and Japan—the two other great trading powers—as well as by differences with the underdeveloped nations and by the problems of economic and military assistance.

Free Trade Under Fire

The economic problems have Western Europe and Japan, threatening American markets abroad and invading the domestic market, has brought pressure to change the United States' traditional free-trade philosophy.

As Americans have lost to the six members of the European Common Market their place as the principal traders and as the domestic recession has added to concern over foreign competition, the Administration has found itself under mounting protectionist pressure. Japan's growing economic potential has had a similar effect.

The conomic problems have political implications that may significantly alter foreign policy.

A trade war with Western Europe, particularly after the Common Market is expanded with the anticipated entry of Britain and others, could result in a European shift toward the Communist countries, on the model of West Germany's "Ostpolitick."

That policy, inaugurated by Chancellor Willy Brandt and designed to achieve rapprochement between West Germany and the Soviet bloc, has already caused some nervousness in Washington. Many officials here believe that closer economic ties between Western and Eastern Europe may lead to political cooperation, leaving the United States relatively isolated.

Crucial Issue in Japan

A failure to settle trade and investment questions with Japan—a much more acute political problem in Tokyo than has been generally acknowledged in Washington—could, in the opinion of American officials, weaken the pro-American Government and induce more active economic if not diplomatic relations between Japan and Communist China.

Until now such political implications have often been lost from sight in the Nixon Administration's conduct of foreign economic policy. A high State Department official remarked recently: "In foreign economic policy we are in a state of drift. One hand often does not know what the other hand is doing."

Divisions have occurred in official ranks and in the business community. Industry and farm groups are divided between protectionism and free trade. Organized labor is turning toward protectionism.

Government departments increasingly act as spokesmen for the economic interests closest to them while the State Department, its voice weakening, attempts to keep traditional foreign-policy objectives foremost.

Congress May Intervene

Officially, the Administration remains committed to free trade. Thus far the President has tended to decide tariff controversies in favor of the free flow of imports, but Congress may invoke severe legislative restrictions this year.

The chief task of the new White House council, therefore, is to pull together under the president's control the over-all direction of foreign economic policy. That has already been done with diplomatic and security affairs, which are coordinated by the National Security Council, in which Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's special assistant for national-security affairs, plays the key role.

Foreign economic policy had been the missing link in the centralization. The new council, which including Secretary of State William P. Rogers as vice chairman, as well as Mr. Kissinger and Paul V. McCracken, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, provides the bridge between foreign affairs and the domestic policy groups, which are in the domain coordinated by John D. Erlichman, another assistant to the President.

It remains far from clear how soon and how effectively Mr. Nixon's new council can gain control over the rival interests that have been operating — with only occasional guidance and frequently improvised White House decisions—in nine Government departments and at least a dozen agencies.

In addition to the State Department, which is charged with negotiating most of the economic agreements but whose role is gradually diminishing, the Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Justice Transportation, Labor Agriculture and Interior Departments participate in making foreign economic policy.

That is not all. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the United States Tariff Commission, the General Services Administration, the Maritime Commission, the National Advisory Council, the Export-Import Bank, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency, the Federal Communications Commission and other agencies also have a voice.

Even before Mr. Nixon established the council, it was the White House that had to step into recent emergencies to coordinate policy when agencies directly responsible for economic affairs appeared to falter.

Last Saturday he dispatched Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin 2d to Teheran and several Arab capitals as a long-brewing and largely ignored crisis arose involving demands by producing countries for a greater share of the profits earned by American oil companies. The White House also directed the Justice Department to lift antimonopoly strictures so that the companies could unite in dealing with the producing countries.

Similarly, the White House virtually overruled the State Department last week to obtain the cancellation of a negotiating session with the European Common Market countries and Japan, set for Jan. 24 in Frankfurt, aimed at continuing an agreement limiting steel exports to the United States.

The White House forced the cancellation to influence the domestic steel industry to curtail price increases, using the threat of imports as a weapon in the battle against inflation.

Legislation Was Delayed

With foreign economic policy an orphan as Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have concentrated their attention elsewhere, the Administration delayed the submission of the measures designed to reorganize the foreign assistance programs. Although a Presidential message

Foreign Policy: Kissinger at Hub

Following is the second in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy and the President's relationship with his staff and with Government institutions:

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 18—A Harvard professor named Henry A. Kissinger cursed his luck when Richard M. Nixon defeated Nelson A. Rockefeller for the Presidential nomination at the 1968 Republican convention in Miami.

Friends recall that Mr. Kissinger, then Governor Rockefeller's chief expert on foreign policy, spoke with a tart, partisan bitterness about Mr. Nixon. He was sharply critical of what he felt were the nominee's vague and elusive policy pronouncemeths and was worried that Mr. Nixon would be unable to lead the nation out of Vietnam.

Yet Mr. Kissinger has become the instrument by which President Nixon has centralized the management of foreign policy in the White House as never before—much as Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara once centralized control over the competing bureaucracies of the Pentagon.

In the process the President's brilliant and generally hard-line special assistant for national-security affairs has emerged not only as his most influential foreign-policy adviser but also as a natural ally in outlook and strategy. It is a far cry from Miami.

The President, who holds the final determinations on foreign policy firmly in his own hands, decided to concentrate responsibility at the White House. He then gave Mr. Kissinger authority to operate virtually as a super-Cabinet officer managing the sprawling foreign-affairs community

Mr. Nixon assumed office determined to take charge of foreign policy and not to leave it to the diplomats. He shunned the Eisenhower pattern of having the Cabinet officers forge grand compromises and present him with a single recommended course of action, leaving him no choice but approval or disapproval. He wanted more "options."



Associated Press

Henry A. Kissinger with President Nixon, for whom he has become the most articulate spokesman on policy.

In the 1968 campaign he declared his intention to purge the State Department and recast it more to his own liking. Once elected, he chose instead to leave the department in a secondary position and to build up the foreign-policy machinery of the White House.

The results are now clear. The Administration's tactics may continue to evolve, but its pattern of doing business is set—it is a Nixon-Kissinger pattern.

Mr. Kissinger is the pivotal figure. So well schooled is he in international affairs that conceptual planning on most major issues centers on him and his staff of 110. His understnding of geopolitics makes him the most articulate, and most frequently used, spokesman for policy, albeit through the anonymous pronouncements of "White House officials."

Active Hand In Diplomacy

Despite his initial reluctance, Mr. Kissinger takes an increasingly active hand in diplomacy, seeing a select group of important foreign visitors, meeting with the most prestigious ambassadors and troubled Senators and, on rare occasions, handling sensitive negotiations. He gets actively engaged, checks with the President and reports back to him fully.

The departments, jealous of what they consider their prerogatives, often complain about White House "usurping," but White House officials insist that this is the way the President wants it.

The net effect of the system has been to provide more orderly policy formulation on some issues—highly indicate proposals for the negotations with the Russians on strategic arms, for example. Conversely, in areas where neither the President nor his adviser has shown great personal interest, such as foreign economic polly, there is serious disarray.

The White House has not [illegible] long-range planning, as it has [illegible] much time and energy have been spent reaching to crises or trying to clear away inherited debris—winding down the Vietnam war and preventing an explosion in the Middle East.

Nonetheless, the system has given Mr. Nixon a sufficient grip on policy so that he has not been forced into major decisions by sheer bureaucratic momentum or high pressure from any quarter. There has been no repetition of President John F. Kennedy's Bay of Pigs disaster.

Invitable Atom-Age Shift

In the nuclear age it was virtually inevitable that power would drift from the State Department to the White House. Any President wants to assert ultimate command in moments of crisis and on key issues. To reconcile the positions of 40-odd agencies dealing in foreign affairs, he needs his own foreign-policy staff. The pattern had already emerged in previous Administrations; the Nixon Administration has brought about significant change.

In the architecture of government, the pillars of the new centralism are a rejuvenated National Security Council buttressed by a network of interagency committees designed—and all headed—by Mr. Kissinger. They inject the White House deep into the development of policy on defense and intelligence matters as well as on diplomacy.

In the more intangible currency of influence in this capital, the change is demonstrated by Mr. Kissinger's reputation — in the Government, Congress, the press and among the embassies—as a more powerful figure than either Secretary of State William P. Rogers or Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. None of his predecessors enjoyed such a reputation.

In the personal trappings of status, the symbols include his emergence from a White House basement office to bright, swank, Hilton-style quarters on the ground floor near the President's Oval Office. There he directs his growing staff, which is considerably bigger than those of his predecessors.

In protocol, a secretary said jokingly, Mr. Kissinger comes "just below God"—a jibe at his ego as well as his power.

Nixon Style and Personality

Why has he become so central to the Administration's pattern of operation? Primarily because of the style and personality of President Nixon, most important his determination to take the policy lead himself and his feeling that foreign affairs is his strong suit.

"I am not an expert on foreign policy," he said during the 1968 campaign, "I have strong con-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
8 JAN 1971

Advocacy vs. advice

Aides mold posture to presidential style

By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

White House aides in any administration can learn with guillotine swiftness that they must accommodate themselves to a President's style of decisionmaking.

Those President Nixon has summoned to the White House apparently have done so in good grace. They may find it enormously draining, but also often personally pleasant and certainly viable.

In these last hectic days of preparation of budget, economic, and State of the Union messages, aid and comfort from White House advisers is vital to the presidency.

In one sense they are middlemen—between the Cabinet members and the President—sifters of opinion and bureaucratic regulators who supply the President with the relevant facts for decisionmaking.

Close at hand

But the elite of the White House inner circle are also closer at hand than the Cabinet, and the President asks their advice, too. Everyone involved recognizes that the President must take the ultimate praise or blame. Any aide who is overanxious to have the public know of his personal good works obviously destroys his value to the presidency.

The press listens for the slightest hints on who originated what opinion, and the President and his aides read the media's speculation sometimes grimly, sometimes approvingly, sometimes laughingly.

How can diverse personalities, such independent, intellectual powerhouses as a Kissinger, a Moynihan, and a Shultz find the magical formula for serving the presidency without impairing their own integrities and futures?

One way is to play neither the role of an antagonist, at least not early in the decision-making process, nor to give substance to any suspicion of supplanting, duplicating, or undermining the role of Cabinet members.

Kissinger role noted

As one would expect there is speculation on the growth of influence of the staff of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, vis-à-vis the State Department and Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

With no assistance from either Dr. Kissinger or Mr. Rogers in making this kind of comparison, one source of information has been the informal views of some of the assistants of the two men.

And this method, it must be admitted, can be as vulnerable to inaccuracy as it is objectionable to Dr. Kissinger.

Are they as strongly opposed on a broad range of fundamental foreign-policy questions as has been portrayed in reports in this newspaper and in other periodicals?

Valued staff assistants are independent-minded and from varied backgrounds. They sometimes see the actions of their bosses through tinted lenses. Some are conservative, others liberal. They know much but not all. They cannot be expected to know what goes on when Mr. Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, and President Nixon consult in private.

Appearances belied

Despite the above reports, the available facts today seem to indicate that at the hour of crisis in foreign affairs, there has been a better working arrangement at the very top levels of government than is generally assumed.

This applies to such sensitive judgments as how to respond to the Soviet missile crisis in the Middle East and how to improve relations with Communist China, for example.

And, further, it is difficult to put Dr. Kissinger in the role of a direct competitor of the State Department, for his job entails rustling around in military and intelligence areas as well as diplomatic. He is called upon to look upon issues from a somewhat broader perspective than is the State Department.

Presidential method

Are there personality differences between Dr. Kissinger, an acknowledged expert in foreign and military affairs, and Mr. Rogers, a longtime confidant of Mr. Nixon and an adviser on a broad range of subjects, beyond those that men of goodwill mutually tolerate, recognizing that those of differing backgrounds can make a contribution to the President's knowledge?

This question is almost beside the point when one takes into account President Nixon's mode of decisionmaking as explained by Dr. Kissinger.

The role of Dr. Kissinger, in particular, is easily misunderstood. He described it on TV recently: "The Secretaries of State and Defense have a responsibility to make specific recommendations to the President. I have two responsibilities. One is to make sure that the President gets as many choices put before him as possible — as many realistic choices put before him as possible.

"The second is to see to it that when issues overlap various departments that each department's point of view is put before the case to the President.

"My basic position cannot be that of an advocate. My position has to be that of helping the President make his decisions."

And at another point, Mr. Kissinger commented:

"The first thing to understand is that nobody gets to be president who suffers from a weak will. And, therefore, no president is likely to take only one person's advice. No president can afford to take only one person's advice.

"If my view differs from that of one of the Cabinet members then the President would hear the Cabinet member. But the way the President makes decisions, in any event, isn't that he calls in a series of people individually. What he generally does is to call all the interested parties together. In my field that is inevitably the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense; almost always the director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

"Then he asks me, on the basis of preliminary work that has been done in subordinate bodies, to explain what the issue is. He almost inevitably calls on the Secretary of State first to state his recommendations. Then everybody else has an opportunity to state his views."

AMERICAN OPINION
Jan 1971

NO INTELLIGENCE

A Worried Look At The C.I.A.

Frank A. Capell *is a professional intelligence specialist of almost thirty years' standing. He is Editor and Publisher of the fortnightly newsletter,* The Herald Of Freedom, *has contributed to such important national magazines as* The Review Of The News, *and is author of* Robert F. Kennedy — A Political Biography, The Untouchables, *and other books of interest to Conservatives. Mr. Capell appears frequently on radio and television, lectures widely, and never fears controversy. He lives in New Jersey, is an active Catholic layman, and father of seven sons.*

THE Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947 after its wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), was exposed as thoroughly infiltrated by the Communists. Let us examine some of that O.S.S. personnel.

In 1948, former Communist spy Elizabeth Bentley appeared as a witness before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. On Page 529 of the formal report of those Hearings is the record of Miss Bentley's testimony about intelligence she received from Comrades inside O.S.S. while she was operating as a Soviet courier:

> *All types of information were given, highly secret information on what the OSS was doing, such as, for example, that they were trying to make secret negotiations with governments in the Balkan bloc in case the war ended, that they were parachuting people into Hungary, that they were sending OSS people into Turkey to operate in the Balkans, and so on. The fact that General Donovan* [head of O.S.S.] *was interested in having an exchange between the NKVD* [the Soviet secret police] *and the OSS.*

That's right, O.S.S. and the N.K.V.D. were working very close indeed.

When asked what kind of information Communist O.S.S. operative Maurice Halperin gave her to be forwarded to the Soviet Union, Miss Bentley testified: "Well, in addition to all the information which OSS was getting on Latin America, he had access to the cables which the OSS was getting in from its agents abroad, worldwide information of various sorts, and also the OSS had an agreement with the State Department whereby he also could see State Department cables on vital issues." Halperin was Chief of the O.S.S. Latin American Division at the time when, as Miss Bentley has sworn, he was one of her contacts in a Soviet espionage ring.

Carl Aldo Marzani was Chief of the Editorial Section of the O.S.S. Marzani has been several times identified under oath as a member of the Communist Party. Using the most highly classified information, he supervised the making of charts on technical reports for higher echelons of the Army, the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the O.S.S. Comrade Marzani made policy decisions and was liaison officer between the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and the Office of the Undersecretary of War.

When questioned before a Congressional Committee, Irving Fajans of O.S.S. took the Fifth Amendment rather than admit to his Communist Party membership and long history of activities on behalf of the Soviets. Comrade Fajans was a key O.S.S. operative despite the fact that he was known to have been a member of the Communist Party and to have served in the Communists' Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain during the years 1937-1938.

Robert Talbott Miller III was another contact of Soviet courier Elizabeth Bentley. An O.S.S. employee assigned to the State Department, he was Assistant Chief in the Division of Research. On a trip to Moscow, Comrade Miller married a member of the staff of the *Moscow News.*

Leonard E. Mins, a writer who had worked for the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow and written for *New Masses,* was also on the staff of the top secret O.S.S. Comrade Mins took the Fifth Amendment rather than [illegible] past and present membership in the Communist Party. He refused to deny that he was a Soviet agent ever

[redacted]

STATINTL